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“Emotion feelings are unique in their ability to capture and dominate the mind, to 
preempt information processing channels, color perception and cognition, and influence 
our actions (Bower, 1981; Isen et al., 1985; Niedenthal & Kitayama, 1994; Zajonc, 
1980)” - Carroll Izard, 2002; pp.798, italics not in original, added for emphasis. 
The above characterization of emotion points at its potency in almost every aspect 
of human functioning.  This significance has been well documented in psychology 
research for almost one hundred years now (e.g., James, 1884; McDougall, 1908; Freud, 
1930).  In contrast, the advent of emotion research in management literature is only about 
three decades old (cf. Ashkanasy, Härtel & Daus, 2002).  Emotions have been linked to 
important work outcomes such as job satisfaction, organizational citizenship behavior, 
workplace deviance behavior and task performance (Fisher, 2000; Fisher & Noble, 2004; 
Lee & Allen, 2002).  
In spite of this progress, there are several serious concerns with emotion research 
(e.g., Briner & Kiefer, 2005; Beal, Weiss, Barros & McDermid, 2005).  The first concern 
is a lack of consistent definitions of emotions (Briner & Kiefer, 2005).  Second, 
misalignment of theory and the measurement of emotion threaten the validity of such 
research (e.g., Robinson & Clore, 2002; Beal et al., 2005).  The third concern with 
emotion scholarship is that discrete emotions need to be studied rather than overarching 
positive and negative dimensions.
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The traditional approach to the study of emotions tends to aggregate emotions into 
overarching positive and negative dimensions (cf. Briner & Kiefer, 2005) for the sake of 
simplicity.  This practice is fraught with concerns, as each emotion is unique in its 
adaptational significance for the individual (see Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991).  Moreover, 
each emotion has its own set of antecedents and  
consequences (Diener & Emmons, 1984; Diener, Smith & Fujita, 1995; Fisher, 2000; 
Lazarus, 1991; Lee & Allen, 2002; Weiss, Suckow & Cropanzano, 1999).  This 
dissertation seeks to address these shortcomings in several ways.  First, the definition and 
operationalization of emotions are rooted in basic psychological theory, thus conforming 
to the knowledge base in the area.  Second, the research design incorporated herein, 
corrects for the misalignment of theory and measurement found in a vast majority of 
emotion scholarship (cf. Ashkanasy, 2003; Beal et al., 2005).  Specifically, all emotions 
are dynamic reactions to another person, entity or event (Izard, 1991; Ortony, Clore & 
Collins, 1988).  As such, the measurement of emotion and its consequences are best 
represented by within person designs (Beal et al., 2005; Fisher, 2000; Miner, Glomb & 
Hulin, 2005).  This dissertation takes a two-step approach towards achieving this goal; 
using both an event based lab design and a follow up critical incident based field study 
with repeated measures.  Third, the focus is on four specific discrete emotions rather than 
overarching dimensions.  In addition, I cast coping strategies as explanatory mechanisms 
that link emotions to behaviors.  This type of explanatory research is deemed necessary, 
as management research to date has treated the processes that transmit emotions to 
behaviors as a black box.  Emotional Intelligence (EI) is presented as the key ingredient 
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to understanding how emotions relate to coping strategies (see also Ashkanasy, Ashton-
James & Jordan, 2004; Zeidner, Matthews & Roberts, 2006).  
As noted earlier, we now recognize the importance of emotions in individual 
behavior (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Ashkanasy et al., 2002).  Some scholars have 
even labeled this attention “the affective revolution” in organizational research (Barsade, 
Brief, & Spataro, 2003).  This affective revolution has included all forms and definitions 
of mood, affect and emotion.  A definition of emotion is first presented and the 
delineation between emotion, mood and affect follows. 
Defining Emotion 
 Multiple definitions of emotion abound, ranging from the lay version of feeling a 
particular way to mood states (George &Brief, 1992) to physiological changes (Briner & 
Kiefer, 2005) to reactions to an event (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991).  Emotion is defined 
as an organized mental response to an event or entity (Izard, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988). 
The emotion response is characterized by physiological, experiential, motivational and 
cognitive components (Izard, 1991; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso & Sitarenios, 2001). 
Emotions are shorter and more intense than moods (Fisher, 2000; 2002).  They not only 
arise in response to events, but also contain information about that event.  This 
information is fed into our cognitive decision making processes (Gohm & Clore, 2002). 
In sum, emotions are transient, intense reactions to an event, person or entity (Diener et 
al., 1995; Fisher, 2000; Ortony et al., 1988).  Some scholars have even suggested that 
emotions are primarily a social phenomenon because they arise out of interactions 
(Fischer & Tangney, 1995).  Since emotions arise in response to an event and are more 
intense than moods, they are significant precursors to action (Frijda, 1986).  
4
While most emotion scholars recognize the transient nature of emotion, an 
alternate point of view exists that emotions could be more than transient reactions (Frijda, 
Mesquita, Sonnemans & Van Goozen, 1991).  Many debates in psychology center on the 
state vs. trait nature of emotion (Izard, 1971; 1991).  Emotions could recur with every 
interaction that succeeds the first emotion-eliciting event.  The effects of emotions could 
wear off with time resulting in a more diffused mood state (Izard, 1991).  Here, I do not 
wish to enter that debate.  Rather, I simply adopt the predominant scholarly point of view 
that emotions are short term, intense reactions to an event (e.g., Beal et al., 2005; Frijda, 
1993; Fisher, 2000, 2002; Fisher & Noble, 2004; Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984; Mayer et al., 2001; Ortony et al., 1988; Weiss et al., 1999; Zelenski & 
Larsen, 2000).  Individual and group emotion plays an essential role in individual and 
group functioning (e.g., Ashkanasy et al., 2002; Kelly & Barsade, 2001).  A prime 
challenge facing the twenty first century manager is that of managing an employee’s 
emotions in light of negative events such as downsizing, mergers and acquisitions, ethical 
scandals and technological insecurity (Barclay, Skarlicki & Pugh, 2005).  
Emotions (e.g., anger, joy, pride, guilt) are short lived, intense reactions to an 
event and impact work behaviors (Parkinson, 1995).  It is crucial to distinguish between 
emotion and other related constructs such as affect, mood and attitudes (e.g., job 
satisfaction).  Regardless of how emotion is defined, it is short lived and influential in 
instigating action (Izard, 1991; Mayer et al., 2001; Zelenski & Larsen, 2000).  This is an 
important distinction to make at this point because affect is a broad umbrella term that 
includes but is not limited to emotion (Fisher, 2000).  Affect refers to longer lasting 
phenomenon characterized as positive or negative affect.  These affect definitions include 
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mood. Moods are longer in duration than emotions yet shorter in duration than affect 
(Frijda, 1993; Fisher, 2000).  They are more diffused than emotions and lack a specific 
target (Frijda, 1993; Fisher, 2000).  Moods activate in an individual’s cognitive 
background, have no specific target, are not as intense as emotions and persist for a 
longer duration (Briner & Kiefer, 2005; Fisher, 2000).  
Attitudinal constructs such as job satisfaction and affective commitment might be 
“emotion laden constructs” (Briner & Kiefer, 2005), yet they are not emotion either as 
they are more diffused and longer lasting (Fisher, 2000; 2002).  They also encompass a 
significant cognitive and evaluative dimension (Weiss, 2002).  Empirical support for the 
above conceptual distinctions also exists.  George (1991) found that state affect predicts 
helping behaviors beyond that possible by trait affect.  Discrete emotions seem to predict 
organizational citizenship behaviors and workplace deviance behaviors over and above 
that indicated by overall affect (Lee & Allen, 2002).  This section presented the definition 
of emotion as well as the distinction between emotions and related affective constructs. 
The following section presents a brief review of recent studies on emotion. 
The instigating nature of moods and emotions in organizational citizenship 
behaviors (OCBs) and workplace deviance behaviors (WDBs) is well documented in 
organizational literature (Berkowitz, 1998; George & Brief, 1992; Isen & Baron, 1991; 
Staw, Sutton & Pelled, 1994; Staw & Barsade, 1993; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).  
Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) found that both cognitive and affective influences drive 
productive and counterproductive behaviors.  The most defining research support for the 
effects of emotion on OCB and WDB stems from a recent study conducted by Lee and 
Allen (2002).  They found that WDB was better predicted by a discrete negative emotion 
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in the form of hostility than an overall negative affective state.  Related research also 
indicates that positive emotions such as joviality, attention and interest are directly 
related to OCBs (Cropanzano, Rupp & Bryne, 2003).  The experience of positive 
emotions has been linked to better cognitive functioning, physical and psychological 
health (Tugade & Frederickson, 2004).  Similarly, negative emotion has been linked to 
unhealthy coping behaviors, lowered cardiovascular function and physical health 
problems (Frederickson, 2001).  These findings have fueled a sudden surge of interest in 
affective influences on work behavior.  This surge might have led to the sidestepping of 
certain fundamental issues, such as construct validity, in emotion inquiry (e.g., Briner & 
Kiefer, 2005; Beal et al., 2005).  After almost three decades since the first research on 
emotion, one needs to take a step back and question the validity of inferences drawn from 
emotion research. With this goal as the broad underlying motive, the following section 
offers a critique of emotion research, thus setting the stage for this study. 
A Critique of Emotion Research 
 Briner and Kiefer (2005) reviewed contemporary emotion research (2000-2004) 
from a range of sources including most top scholarly publications.  They noted several 
serious flaws that threaten the validity of associated inferences.  First, they found that 
most research does not define emotion in any valid fashion.  Emotion definitions need to 
conform to the knowledge base in the area (i.e., basic psychological theories) and not tap 
into broad affective constructs.  This review revealed that less than forty percent of 2606 
papers explicitly stated and defined emotion.  Either the remainder did not refer to well-
established definitions of emotion or they referred to affect as emotion.  The lack of 
7
sound definition adhering to theory is potentially a serious issue as it casts doubt on 
accumulated research on emotion (Briner & Kiefer, 2005).  
With these basic definitional problems plaguing emotion research, the 
measurement of this dynamic construct is also in question.  Recall that emotion is defined 
as a short-lived, intense reaction to a specific event.  Emotion measurement typically asks 
respondents to report on how they felt at some point in the past, or across some past 
period (e.g., last week, last month, last six months and so on)(e.g., George, 1991; Madjar, 
Oldham & Pratt, 2002; Pelled & Xin, 1999).  Although, this measurement format is 
practical and relatively easy to implement, it is riddled by retrospective biases.  Several 
scholars have called into question what they measure (Robinson & Clore, 2002; Beal et 
al., 2005).  Consequently, it is useful to distinguish the sources of knowledge that are 
tapped using differing emotion measurement schemes.  Robinson and Clore (2002) 
demonstrated that the traditional form of emotion measurement taps into semantic 
emotion knowledge.  This type of knowledge reflects what people think they should have 
felt in the referenced period, rather than what they actually experienced.  On the other 
hand, episodic emotion knowledge involves capturing emotional experiences very close 
to their actual occurrence (Beal et al., 2005; Miner et al., 2005).  They are less colored by 
retrospective biases (Robinson & Clore, 2002).  These authors recommend that both 
forms of knowledge are useful, albeit for differing research goals.  If the goal is to tap 
one’s memory of an emotional experience, then semantic knowledge could be useful.  If 
the stated goal is to tap into the experience of emotion itself, then episodic emotional 
knowledge is the best source (Robinson & Clore, 2002).  The first measurement issue 
concerns the contamination of data sources by retrospective biases. 
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The next issue plaguing emotion scholarship that emotion research tends to 
aggregate discrete emotions into an overall dimension of positive and negative emotion 
(Briner & Kiefer, 2005).  This practice is easy to implement and simplifies the study of 
emotion.  The scientific reason for such aggregation is based upon underlying common 
variance within each dimension (see also Izard, 1991).  All positive emotions stem from a 
primary appraisal of a favorable event, interaction or outcome expectancy.  All negative 
emotions are evoked primarily through an unfavorable interaction or event.  Most 
importantly though, the common theme within each dimension is restricted to the 
eliciting event (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991).  Beyond the primary appraisal, each emotion 
is unique and rich in its own right.  Conceptual foundations of discrete emotion theories 
suggest distinct effects for each emotion (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991).  
Each emotion triggers differing secondary cognitive appraisals and is unique in its 
adaptational significance (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002).   For example, anger and guilt both 
result from a primary appraisal of an unfavorable interaction or event.  This primary 
appraisal is common to all negative emotions.  However, anger and guilt differ in 
secondary appraisals and behavioral consequences.  Anger results from a secondary 
appraisal of other blameworthiness for the unfavorable event.  The individual might also 
foresee a less favorable future.  Taken together, these appraisals translate into a core 
relational theme of a self-demeaning offense for anger.  It is at this point of secondary 
appraisals that discrete emotions are labeled (Lazarus, 1991; 1999).  Guilt, on the other 
hand, involves the secondary appraisals of self-blame and a less desirable future.  These 
secondary appraisals translate into a Core Relational Theme (CRT) of violation of 
societal or personal standards.  Furthermore, anger leads to emotion-focused coping and 
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aggressive behaviors whereas guilt leads to emotion-focused coping and compliance at 
the cost of personal well being (Izard, 1991).  Similarly, all positive emotions stem from 
a primary appraisal of a favorable event or interaction.  For example, pride and happiness 
both result from a primary appraisal of a favorable interaction or event.  However, pride 
differs from happiness because it is elicited only in the event of a secondary appraisal of 
self-satisfaction.  Research indicates a negative effect of excessive pride on task focus 
(Izard, 1991).  The point of these illustrations is that while positive and negative emotions 
have common underlying features, each positive and/or negative emotion is sufficiently 
distinct to merit its own research agenda (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; 1999). 
Emotions are necessarily dynamic and any real test of emotion theories requires 
measurement at multiple points in time (Beal et al., 2005; Miner et al., 2005). Consider 
the Broaden and Build theory’s (Frederickson, 2001, 2003; Frederickson & Joiner, 2002) 
position that positive emotion is self-reinforcing.  Repeated experiences of positive 
emotions lead to beneficial health and cognitive effects.  This theory further contends that 
resilient individuals use positive emotions to buffer negative emotions and cope with 
adversity (Tugade & Frederickson, 2002).  This self-reinforcing effect cannot be tested 
for without a measurement scheme that captures emotion at several time points. Larsen 
and Frederickson (1999) point out that all emotion measurement is at best probabilistic in 
nature.  In order to enhance the probability of capturing unique true score variance, 
measures at multiple points in time are required.  A within person, event based design is 
essential to the alignment of levels of theory and measurement (Beal et al., 2005).  
This research seeks to address the above concerns with emotion research in the 
following ways.  First, this research defines emotion consistent with basic psychological 
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theories, specifically, the Cognitive Appraisal Theory.  Second, I focus upon specific 
discrete emotions rather than overarching positive and negative emotion dimensions. 
Theory development in organizational literature with regard to such specific discrete 
emotions is scarce (cf. Briner & Kiefer, 2005).  This research contributes theoretically by 
adopting a fine-grained approach to the study of emotion.  Third, research design and 
measurement conform to the theory underlying emotion.  This implies measurement close 
to the emotion experience and repeated measures of emotion. The following section 
addresses another component that deserves more attention in emotion literature.  This 
component is the black box that links emotions to specific behaviors. 
Coping with Emotions 
The predominant concern of most organizational emotions research has been with 
the effects of emotion on behaviors.  The more pertinent question for emotion scholars 
today is how do emotions translate into behaviors?   Drawing upon Cognitive Appraisal 
Theory (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), I suggest that coping mechanisms are 
the immediate consequence of felt emotion, and it is these coping mechanisms that then 
drive behavior.  A detailed account of Cognitive Appraisal Theory is presented in the 
next chapter.  Here, I define and discuss coping only to help explain the overall research 
model.  Coping is a process of self-regulation that includes cognitive and intended 
behavioral strategies, in response to the experience of emotion (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984).  Several distinct conceptualizations of coping have emerged (e.g., Carver, Scheier 
& Weintraub, 1989; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1999; Folkman, Lazarus, 
Dunkel-Schetter, Delongis & Gruen, 1986), however the common underlying theme of 
these conceptualizations identifies two distinct and unique forms of coping.  These are 
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known as task-focused and emotion-focused coping strategies.  Task-focused coping 
involves actively managing the event with a focus on resolution of the event.  It includes 
five components such as active coping, planning, suppressing competing activities, 
restraint coping, and positive reappraisal (Carver et al., 1989).  Emotion-focused coping 
is a strategy that is primarily symptom focused wherein the focus is on managing the 
emotion.  It includes the five components of denial, behavioral disengagement, mental 
disengagement, alcohol and drug disengagement and venting emotions (Carver et al., 
1989).  In addition, four specific coping types do not consistently classify as either task or 
emotion-focused coping.  These dimensions are seeking social support for instrumental 
reasons, seeking social support for emotional reasons, acceptance and turning to religion 
(Carver et al., 1989). 
In general, it has been found that individuals use task-focused coping in response 
to positive emotions and emotion-focused coping in response to negative emotions (Park, 
Armeli & Tennen, 2004).  A further corollary to this relationship is that task-focused 
coping is associated with productive behaviors, whereas emotion-focused coping is 
associated with greater incidence of counter-productive behaviors (Park et al., 2004). 
Cognitive appraisal theorists contend that people differ in their choice of coping 
strategies (Izard, 1991; Park et al., 2004).  Yet, almost nothing is known about specific 
competencies that could lead to differences in choice of coping strategies.  In this 
dissertation, I argue that some people will engage in task-focused coping even in the face 
of negative emotion.  Similarly, some people might engage in emotion-focused coping 
even when they are experiencing positive emotions.  What, then, might contribute to 
individual differences in choice of coping strategy?  Recently, scholars have articulated 
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theoretical arguments for the vital role of EI in the coping process (Ashkanasy et al., 
2004; Jordan, Ashkanasy & Härtel, 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006).  The following section 
presents a definition of the ability-based model of EI with an eye towards implications in 
organizational settings. 
Emotional Intelligence 
EI is an individual difference that reflects the ability to recognize the meaning of 
emotions and to use that information in reasoning and problem solving (Mayer, 
Caruso and Salovey, 1999).  The construct has its roots in the multiple intelligences 
concept that began to take shape amongst psychometricians and psychologists in the 
early 1900s. Mayer and colleagues’ conceptualization is theoretically driven by the 
early work of Thorndike (1920) and L.L Thurnstone (1941) (Jordan et al., 2002). 
Gardner (1983) further extended the concept of social intelligence to include eight 
different types of intelligence in his most recent work.  The aspects of Gardner’s 
work that find application in Mayer and colleagues’ conceptualization are 
“interpersonal” and “intrapersonal intelligence”.  These two dimensions are woven 
into the current EI conceptualization, as a hierarchical multidimensional construct 
comprised of four areas of skills.  These four skills are believed to load onto one 
universal factor, specifically EI (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso & Sitarenios, 2003).  These 
four skills are briefly summarized in the next section. In illustrating the effects of EI 
on work behavior, I draw upon the hypothetical case of a positive and negative work 
event.  The positive event involves an employee who has just received a promotion.  
The negative event involves an employee in a situation where s/he is reprimanded for 
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poor performance.  The benefit of this critical storytelling technique is it aids the 
explanation of implications of EI.  
Perception 
 Perception refers to the ability to be aware of one’s emotions, identify them, and 
express them accurately to others.  It also refers to the ability to perceive other’s 
expressed emotion (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  Emotional expressivity can occur through 
verbal and nonverbal channels.  Effective managerial functions require understanding and 
responding to such communication.  The ability to understand one’s own and other’s 
emotions is particularly germane to the current study.  The first step in actively managing 
one’s emotions is being aware of what one might be experiencing.  An employee might 
experience joy and pride at the promotion, and the first step in managing these emotions 
effectively is recognizing them accurately.  In the event of the supervisor’s 
admonishment, the employee possibly experiences shame and/or anger.  The first step in 
managing these negative emotions is perception of these negative emotions or, in lay 
terms, being emotionally self-aware.  
Using emotion to facilitate thought 
Using emotion to facilitate thought involves prioritizing an emotion as important or 
unimportant, classifying the sources of the emotion and being aware of how they 
influence the thought process (Mayer et al., 1999).  It encompasses being able to adopt 
multiple perspectives to the problem or the stimulus, and making decisions in light of 
these perspectives (Mayer et al., 1999).  By the very nature of the rationalization that 
takes place within this component, it is expected that individuals can use this information 
in making better decisions.  In the same vein, stressful situations will be reported less 
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negatively by individuals higher on this component than individuals who are lower on it 
(Jordan et al., 2002).  
 Furthermore, where this ability really starts to matter in the current study is in its 
connection to the rationalization, which occurs in response to experience of an emotion.  
In the above illustration, the experience of anger can send an employee into a spiral of 
negative emotions.  This could potentially lead her/him to emotion-focused coping (e.g., 
Herrald & Tomaka, 2002).  Alternatively, being able to prioritize the anger into 
motivational energy can actually serve as an energizing force (cf. Fitness, 2000).  An 
often neglected characteristic of negative emotions is they involve considerable 
motivational energy (Izard, 1991).  The employee with high scores on both first and 
second dimensions of EI can recognize anger and shame as negative emotions with the 
potential for self-harm.  This perception leads to rationalization that could, in turn, 
translate into extra vigilance (Izard, 1991).  Likewise, in response to happiness or pride, 
the employee’s perception and rationalization could lead to renewed vigor at work (Izard, 
1991). 
Understanding Emotion 
 Understanding emotion reflects the ability to recognize emotions that are more 
complex and the patterns in which they might occur.  It also includes the ability to 
analyze the transitions from one emotion to another (Mayer et al., 1999).  Mayer and 
colleagues propose that this branch correlates most with cognitive intelligence.  The 
reason for this proposition is that emotional understanding is “most allied with cognitive 
processing and abstract reasoning, it is most cognitively saturated” (Mayer et al., 2001). 
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Recent empirical evidence supports the third branch’s correlation with IQ (e.g., Roberts, 
Zeidner & Matthews, 2001).  
This dimension is most critical when several emotions occur together.  If a senior 
colleague was denied the same promotion that our employee obtained, s/he feels empathy 
and compassion for the other.  Simultaneously, s/he might take pride in her/his 
achievement.  If this employee was a high scorer on this dimension of EI, s/he 
understands the transitions between the complex emotion blends of empathy, compassion 
and basic pride.  Similarly, this employee could experience anger, shame and perhaps 
sadness at the supervisor’s admonishment.  If this employee is a high scorer on this 
dimension of EI, s/he recognizes the transitions between anger, shame and sadness with 
the potential for differing consequences.  This understanding is most critical to managing 
these emotions, as detailed in the next section.  
I adopted a hierarchical perspective in illustrating these dimensions, suggesting that each 
branch builds on the previous ones.  Therefore, now we have an employee as a high 
scorer on perception, using emotion to facilitate thought and understanding emotion. The 
first implication is emotional self-awareness.  The second component implies 
rationalization stemming from self-awareness.  The third component leads to enhanced 
knowledge of transitions between complex emotional blends.  These three components 
taken together pave the way for effective emotion management (Mayer et al., 1999). 
Emotion management 
The fourth aspect of EI refers to emotion regulation.  It is the ability to connect or 
disconnect from emotions based upon their usefulness in any given situation (Mayer & 
Salovey, 1997).  Management of emotion differs amongst individuals and can explain 
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variance in individual outcomes such as personal growth and favorability of social 
relations (Mayer et al., 2001).  This domain of EI offers an interface of one’s emotion 
abilities with the personality domain, because emotion regulation can vary by personality 
traits (Mayer et al., 2001).  In the above illustration wherein the employee experienced 
empathy, compassion and pride all at the same time, s/he might engage in more helping 
behaviors if s/he acted upon her/his empathy or compassion.  Alternatively, if s/he acted 
upon her/his pride only, s/he might isolate her/himself from coworkers because of a 
swollen head syndrome.  If this employee were a high scorer on the previous dimensions 
as well as this one, s/he might choose to act upon her/his compassion.  Consider the 
employee in the anger situation.  For a high EI individual, one of two things could 
happen. S/he connects with felt anger and channels it into a motivational force (cf. 
Fitness, 2000).  Else, s/he disconnects from this emotion temporarily in order to focus on 
the task.  A low EI individual might have connected with anger and engaged in 
aggression towards the supervisor.  S/he could also disconnect with that emotion by 
denial or distraction.  The key is the ability to connect or disconnect with one’s feelings 
in an adaptive fashion (Mayer et al., 1999).  The common thread between the experience 
of both a positive and negative emotion for a high EI individual is the ability to engage in 
any form of coping that is self-beneficial.  In summary, the four-branch model of EI 
offers promising insights into individual coping mechanisms.  This section presented an 
overview of the definition and implications of EI.  Research objectives of this study 




The first objective of this dissertation is to unravel the immediate cognitive 
consequences of felt emotion.  Coping strategies as described earlier constitute these 
cognitive consequences, and serve as the mechanisms for translating emotions into 
behavior (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  The second objective concerns the role of EI in 
the relationship between emotions and coping.  People vary in their choice of coping 
strategy.  Some of this variability might stem from the nature of the emotion experience 
itself.  However, recent theoretical developments (e.g., Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Jordan et 
al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006) indicate that the relationship between emotion and coping 
is contingent upon an individual’s EI.  Furthermore, EI could have direct effects on 
coping (Zeidner et al., 2006).  Coping is then related to work behaviors such as task 
performance, organizational citizenship behavior and workplace deviance behavior. 
These ideas are broadly depicted in Figure 1.1. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1.1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
A full discussion of each specific relationship contained in the model appears in 
the next chapter.  This research differs from past emotion research in at least four 
fundamental ways.  First, all theory and analyses will be at the specific discrete emotion 
level.  Second, a repeated measures approach that more accurately captures the 
intraindividual variation in emotion will be used.  Third, I start to address the black box 
between emotion and behaviors by examining the role of coping strategies.  Fourth, by 
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introducing EI as a moderator of the relationship between emotion and coping, we start to 
place bounds on the beneficial effects of positive emotion and the detrimental effects of 
negative emotions.  
Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
This research incorporates current theory from the academic psychology and 
emotion literatures to present a more holistic approach to examining the meaning of and 
consequences of emotions.  We tend to use the terms “courage, interest, joy,” and such 
other concepts rather frequently at work.  Yet, rarely do we attribute the affective 
connotations that these constructs deserve.  Instead, courage, joy, interest and many other 
emotions are mostly cast as job related cognition (cf. Ashkanasy, 2003).  A paradigm 
shift of sorts has occurred in the management literature since the late eighties (Barsade et 
al., 2003).  It is now well documented that emotions are prime motivators of human 
action (cf. Frijda, Manstead & Bem, 2000).  This research contributes to the existing 
literature on several counts, as noted below.  
The most important contribution of this study lies in unraveling the immediate 
cognitive consequences of emotion at work.  In doing so, I rely on seasoned theoretical 
foundations such as Cognitive Appraisal Theory.  Simultaneously, I also introduce EI as 
moderator of the relationship between discrete emotion and coping.  While this study is 
grounded in the solid theoretical foundations of cognitive appraisals, it also introduces a 
novel perspective of the role of individual differences in emotion management.  These 
two aspects answer scholarly calls for such theoretical development.  Sutton and Staw 
(1995) called for sound theories that tell a good story and have explanatory power rather 
than predictive power only.  The role of coping answers this call by offering explanatory 
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cognitive mechanisms between felt emotion and behaviors.  The focus of most 
management research has been on uncovering the attitudinal and behavioral implications 
of emotion only (e.g., Barclay et al., 2005; Fisher, 2000; 2002; Fisher & Noble, 2004; 
Lee & Allen, 2002; Miner et al., 2005).  This research starts to address how these effects 
unfold.  Such an examination takes us a step beyond simple prediction of emotion-
behavior relations.  
House, Shane and Harold (1996) have called for the examination of stable 
dispositional influences on work - related variables. This research answers this call 
through the investigation of the role of EI.  Academic psychology has already generated 
an impressive body of literature suggesting that lower EI is related to deviancy amongst 
youths and adolescents (Lopes, Salovey, Côté & Beers, 2005).  The progress made in 
these related disciplines needs be built upon in organizational behavior (Brief, 2001). 
Given the significance of emotions in work life, the time is now ripe to investigate the 
role of individual differences that help us understand the effects of these emotions on 
work behaviors (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995). 
The alignment of emotion definitions, measurement and analyses with the theory 
underlying it is another contribution regardless of actual results that might emerge.  To 
facilitate this alignment, emotion is defined as per its knowledge base and theory is 
developed for each specific emotion.  I incorporate a research design aimed at 
minimizing retrospective bias and capable of capturing intraindividual variability in 
emotion.  Such an alignment is believed to be important, considering that most affective 
constructs are dynamic in nature, making the need for a correct measurement scheme 
even more pronounced (Beal et al., 2005).  Consider an employee who is scheduled to 
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have a performance appraisal meeting.  S/he might experience some degree of fear in 
anticipation.  This fear might lead to poor customer service on this employee’s part. 
During the appraisal meeting, this employee’s performance is found to be exceptional. 
This event might lead to positive emotions such as pride and happiness.  Two aspects are 
worth noting in this context.  First, this employee’s emotions have fluctuated 
considerably over the course of the day.  This variability is treated as error in a between 
person design.  Second, this employee’s work behaviors have also fluctuated 
considerably.  In the first instance, the customer might have been displeased with the 
employee’s service.  After the meeting, this employee’s positive emotions might lead to 
exceptional service or, alternatively, real inattention to customers.  If this employee could 
channel her/his pride (or joy) constructively, s/he could perform better.  Alternatively, 
experience of positive emotion signals that everything is okay with the status quo and no 
additional effort needs be expended (Izard, 1991).  In this scenario, the employee might 
make mistakes and be inattentive to customer needs.  In neither case are the performance 
fluctuations and associated triggers documented in the typical appraisal.  The reason for 
such within person research is even more pronounced by a recent finding regarding 
employee mood states.  Specifically, a recent study found that over half of the variance in 
mood states on the job occurred within person (Miner et al., 2005).  These authors 
concluded that between person research in affective constructs are limited, as they ignore 
half of the variance by design.  They and other scholars have sounded calls for more 
within person research in affective based constructs (Beal et al., Briner & Kiefer, 2005; 
Miner et al., 2005).  This dissertation answers the call for such research.  
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As for practical contributions, with this research model, our knowledge of what 
precedes work behaviors could be augmented.  If the relationship between unhealthy 
coping and deviant behaviors (that are undoubtedly costly to the organization) is 
supported, then that information has managerial implications.  If the relation between 
healthy coping, task performance and OCBs is supported, then that information is 
potentially valuable.  In the event that these relations do hold, how exactly does it matter 
to practitioners?  One needs to consider the “so what” aspect of this research.  One 
straightforward implication is that employees could be trained to engage in healthier 
forms of coping.  Such training could be administered through stress prevention and 
management programs that have already gained prominence in organizational settings 
(e.g., Myers & Betchel, 2004; Murphy & Sauter, 2003). 
More pertinently, though, the “so what” aspect of this research is heavily 
dependent on the role of EI in the relationship between felt emotion and coping. 
Organizations might offer training that helps individuals manage their emotions better. EI 
is a form of intelligence and is believed to result from genetic and environmental factors 
(Mayer, 2006).  Interventions might be designed to impart knowledge even though any 
form of intelligence itself is relatively stable over an adult’s life span. While one might 
not be able to develop EI, s/he could develop their knowledge regarding emotional 
information (Mayer, 2006). 
From a practical standpoint, most performance interventions take a between 
person approach (e.g., applicant selection, job redesign, pay structures) (Beal et al., 
2005).  These interventions have their place in organizational research.  However, there is 
also a growing need to examine within person variability and causes of such variability 
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(Beal et al., 2005).  This is all the more pertinent as some results indicate that the within 
person component rivals in magnitude the between component in performance variations 
(Deadrick, Bennett, & Russell, 1997; Fisher & Noble, 2004).  Future research could help 
pinpoint events in an employee’s work environment that trigger positive and negative 
emotions.  Specifically, studies pinpointing negative work events that lead to lower 
productivity are the next logical step of this research.  This next step falls within the 
bounds of a related stream of research, Affective Events Theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 
1996).  This theory posits that employees experience uplifts and hassles at work everyday 
and an accumulation of these events predicts their attitudes and behaviors (Fisher, 2000). 
Ashkanasy et al., (2002) contend that managing these events is the most pertinent 
challenge for managers today.  Research results indicate that such management could 
occur through incorporating more uplifts (positive interactions) that buffer the effects of 
hassles (negative interactions) (Grzywacz & Marks, 2000; Miner et al., 2005). 
Organizations might benefit from pinpointing negative work events, and this knowledge 
could in turn lead to behavioral interventions that promote more conducive work 
climates.   
 In conclusion, reason and emotion are the two pillars driving human behavior 
(e.g., Izard, 2002; Mayer, 2006; Tomkins, 1962).  To exclusively focus upon one at the 
cost of the other is to impede the scientific development of behavioral knowledge.  This 
study is poised at the cusp of cognition and emotion.  Philosophically, one could contend 
that it places equal emphasis on reason and emotion, possibly two of the most potent 
process variables that affect employee behaviors.  In order to achieve the study 
objectives, chapter two presents a review of the cognitive appraisal and EI literatures and 
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develops the study hypotheses. Chapter three details proposed design, measurement and 
analyses strategies.  Chapter 4 covers data analyses and results.  Chapter 5 offers a 
discussion of results and implications for further theory and research. 
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Figure 1.1: Emotion, Coping, Work Behaviors and the Moderating Role of EI* 
 
*Emotions are referred to as a broad category here only for clarity, however 
















REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the Cognitive Appraisal Theory.  A brief 
review of controversies in the EI literature follows.  I offer a comment on these 
controversies and a justification of the ability based model of EI.  Finally, I develop 
specific hypotheses, culminating in a discussion of the overall research model. 
Cognitive Appraisal Theory 
In studying the effects of discrete emotions on behaviors, one inevitably has to 
turn to underlying cognitive processes that link emotions to the potential for action.  
Cognitive Appraisal Theory was the first formal statement of scientific laws governing 
the elicitation and experience of emotions (Lazarus, 1999).  Contrary to popular beliefs 
that emotions are unpredictable, Lazarus and colleagues have generated an impressive 
body of research suggesting that emotion and cognition are deeply intertwined.  
Cognitive Appraisal Theory makes formal statements about specific cognitive 
antecedents and consequences of each discrete emotion (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; 
Lazarus, 1991).  Scholars have interpreted this theory in many forms over the years (e.g., 
Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1966, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984).  
However, there exists agreement amongst scholars on the basic cognitive processes 
underlying the elicitation, experience and consequences of emotions.  This description of 
Cognitive Appraisal Theory follows the work of Lazarus and colleagues (cf. Lazarus &
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Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991, 1999).  This theory posits that each emotion is 
unique in its person-environment interaction and adaptational significance for the 
individual.  Every emotion is defined by its own CRT.  This CRT refers to the range of 
cognitive appraisals that people make in response to an event.  It includes both a primary 
and a secondary appraisal process (Lazarus, 1991).  To illustrate the cognitive processes 
underlying the experience of emotions, I outline specific appraisals in Table 2.1. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2.1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 The appraisal process in response to an event includes two stages, primary and 
secondary appraisal.  Primary appraisal includes two components, goal relevance and 
goal congruence (Lazarus, 1991).  Goal relevance helps an individual decide if a 
particular event is personally relevant or not.  Goal relevance is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for emotion elicitation (Lazarus, 1991).  Goal congruence includes an 
overall judgment of the event for personal well being and consistency with one’s valued 
goals (Lazarus, 1991).  Primary appraisal culminates in an overall experience of positive 
or negative affective state (Lazarus, 1991).  Experiencing an unfair procedure could lead 
to a primary appraisal of goal obstruction, thereby inducing a negative affective state.  
Consequently, secondary appraisal sets in (Lazarus, 1991).  Secondary appraisal includes 
three basic issues: attribution of responsibility, perceived coping potential and future 
expectancy (Lazarus, 1999).  An attribution of agency occurs in the form of assigning 
responsibility for the event.  Blame and/or credit require a judgment about who or what is 
responsible for the event.  At this point, along with an overall affective state, there is an 
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attribution of responsibility.  Perception of goal congruence leads to a favorable future 
expectancy while goal incongruence leads to an unfavorable future expectancy (Lazarus, 
1991; 1999).  One then proceeds to evaluate her/his coping potential.  Discrete emotions 
start to crystallize in response to these appraisals (Lazarus, 1999).  This two-stage 
appraisal process characterizes the experience of specific discrete emotions.  The 
appraisal process contains several components that offer partial meaning to the complete 
emotional experience (Lazarus, 1999).  These individual components are combined into a 
core relational theme (CRT), which offers a synthesis of the whole meaning underlying 
each emotion (Lazarus, 1999).  Lazarus (1999) further points that the CRT is a “short 
hand summary of the global relational meaning” underlying each emotion (1999: 95). 
As an illustration of this two - stage appraisal process for each emotion, consider that an 
unfair procedure could lead to goal incongruence and an overall negative affective state.  
An unfavorable future expectancy and other blame results in anger directed at the agent 
of the unfair procedure.  In this illustration, if one assigned blame to oneself, the resulting 
emotion is guilt.  A fair procedure combined with goal congruence leads to happiness.  In 
the event of a fair procedure and self-credit, pride would result.  Positive emotions 
generally lead to actual task-focused coping and negative emotions lead to actual 
emotion-focused coping (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 
1991).  Note that the appraisal process includes an evaluation of perceived coping 
potential but not actual coping.  The evaluation of coping potential along with other 
appraisals combines to elicit a specific emotion.  However, actual coping occurs after the 
experience of emotion (Lazarus, 1999).  While I lay this out as a sequential process, these 
appraisals occur almost instantaneously, within seconds if not quicker (Lazarus, 1999).  
28
Formulation and testing of this causal sequence has been the most daunting aspect in 
cognitive appraisal research.  Most people might not even be conscious of such processes 
unless prompted to think about them (Lazarus, 1999). Cognitive appraisal research has 
made remarkable progress in identifying the appraisals and CRTs associated with specific 
emotions in a fine-grained fashion (Lazarus, 1999).  
There are several components associated with the experience of discrete emotions 
(e.g., goal relevance, goal congruence, blame/credit, coping potential and future 
expectancy).  All of these components are cognitive appraisals that inform one’s choice 
of coping strategy (Lazarus, 1999).  Yet these appraisals do not constitute actual coping 
(Lazarus, 1999).  The point of these comments is to clarify the distinction between 
perceived coping potential (a cognitive appraisal) that along with all other appraisals 
culminate in a specific emotion experience (Lazarus, 1999).  Actual coping is distinct 
from such perceived coping potential because coping is the cognitive self-regulation 
strategy that one uses in dealing with an emotion (Lazarus, 1999).  Actual coping is 
closest to behavior. All the aforementioned appraisals build up in ultimately informing 
one’s choice of coping (Lazarus, 1999).  In order to understand the coping process, it is 
essential to pinpoint what the individual might be thinking and feeling at each point in the 
emotion experience (Lazarus, 1999).  This is where each of the aforementioned appraisal 
components serves to inform coping strategies.  Extensive reviews of these coping 
mechanisms appear in the stress literature (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991). 
Here, I only consider those that are most pertinent to this research. 
Problem or task-focused coping is essentially the same construct with two 
differing labels used interchangeably in the literature.  This form of coping involves 
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actively managing the event with a focus on resolution of the event.  It includes five 
components such as active coping, planning, suppressing competing activities, restraint 
coping, and positive reappraisal (Carver et al., 1989).  Emotion-focused coping is a 
strategy that is primarily symptom focused wherein the focus is on managing the 
emotion.  It includes the five components of denial, behavioral disengagement, mental 
disengagement, alcohol and drug disengagement and venting emotions (Carver et al., 
1989).   
The above discussion explicitly draws attention to task-focused coping as a 
healthy form of coping and emotion-focused coping as an unhealthy form of coping 
(Aldwin, 1994; Brown, Westbrook & Challagalla, 2005; Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Terry 
& Hynes, 1998).  An emerging perspective in coping research is known as the goodness 
of fit hypothesis.  It suggests the importance of aligning specific coping efforts with the 
demands of the situation (Park et al., 2004).  This implies that emotion-focused coping 
might be better suited when events are not under one’s control.  Although this idea is 
theoretically intriguing, empirical support for this position is scarce.  Task-focused 
coping has been consistently related to productive behaviors while emotion-focused 
coping has been related to maladaptive functioning (Brown et al., 2005; Park et al., 
2004).  However, might there be stable individual differences that contribute to 
variability in coping in response to emotion?  One such potential individual difference is 
reflected in an individual’s EI, addressed next. 
Emotional Intelligence 
 Ever since the introduction of EI (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), a number of 
controversies have surrounded the construct in psychological (e.g., Roberts et al., 2001) 
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and organizational behavior (e.g., Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Becker, 2003; Daus & 
Ashkanasy, 2005; Landy, 2005; Locke, 2005) circles.  The debates in psychology have 
centered on the plausibility of EI as intelligence, its factor structure and psychometric 
properties.  Intelligence theories require that any form of intelligence be ability-based and 
correlate with general cognitive intelligence (Sternberg, 1997).  Any new intelligence 
should contribute unique variance beyond that of established constructs in that 
nomological network (Sternberg, 1997).  The most important aspect of intelligence is the 
capacity for abstract reasoning (Sternberg, 1997).  The differentiating aspect amongst 
multiple intelligences is the input information that precedes such abstract reasoning 
(Sternberg, 1997).  For example, verbal intelligence involves abstract reasoning regarding 
language.  Spatial intelligence includes abstract reasoning about the position and 
movement of objects in space (Mayer et al., 2001).  
EI meets the standard criteria for intelligence theories in the following ways (Mayer 
et al., 2001).  It is ability based as noted in the previous chapter.  It involves the capacity 
for reasoning about emotional information (Mayer et al., 2001).  This type of reasoning, 
as with other intelligences, draws upon one’s knowledge base to a certain degree (Mayer 
et al., 2001).  This knowledge base develops with age as emotions contain information 
about interrelationships (Mayer et al., 2001).  EI correlates with general cognitive 
intelligence (r=. 30) (Mayer et al., 2001).  It is sufficiently distinct to merit inclusion in 
the intelligence nomological network as a construct in its own right (Mayer et al., 2001).  
It has discriminating power beyond general intelligence and the big five personality 
dimensions (Mayer et al., 2001; Mayer et al., 2003). 
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The debate in psychology also concerns EI’s operationalization, psychometric 
properties and factor structure.  The MSCEIT v.2.0 represents the latest 
operationalization of EI; it succeeds the MSCEIT research version 1.1 and the MEIS 
(Mayer et al., 2001).  Preliminary evidence from a number of studies indicates that the 
MSCEIT demonstrates acceptable reliabilities at the individual factor and overall scale 
level (Cronbach’s alpha values at specific dimension and overall scale levels have 
exceeded .8) (cf. Giganac, 2005; Mayer et al., 2003).  Two week test –retest reliabilities 
were relatively high (r =. 86; Brackett & Mayer, 2003), indicating support for the stability 
of the MSCEIT.  The underlying four factors detailed earlier are reasonably 
intercorrelated and yet distinct from each other (r = 0.17 - 0.59).  Confirmatory factor 
analyses indicated better fit for an a priori four-factor structure as compared to two-factor 
and three-factor solutions (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Mayer, Salovey, Panter, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2005).  Further research concerning EI’s psychometric properties and, most 
importantly, predictive validity for work outcomes is needed.  
Preliminary evidence for the predictive validity of EI has started to emerge.  EI is 
positively related to prosocial behavior in a non-work context and is negatively related to 
deviance such as drug and alcohol abuse (Brackett, Lopes, Ivcevic, Mayer & Salovey, 
2004).  EI has been linked to quality of social relations amongst college students 
(Brackett et al., 2004).  These results remained statistically significant after controlling 
for intelligence and personality characteristics (Brackett et al., 2004).  Conceptually, EI 
has been related to emergent visionary leadership and motivational criteria that enhance 
personal well being and growth (Brackett et al., 2004).  
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Organizational research on EI is just beginning.  Preliminary results identify that 
emotionally intelligent individuals maintain a positive outlook even in the face of 
negative work events (Ashkanasy & Dasborough, 2005).  EI positively relates to 
performance and challenge appraisals on a math task (Lyons & Schneider, 2005).  This 
relationship remained statistically significant after controlling for GMA, thus indicating 
incremental validity for the MSCEIT (Lyons & Schneider, 2005).  In another study, 
higher EI was positively related to higher leadership effectiveness (Rosete & Ciarrochi, 
2005).   It was also found that EI explained variance beyond personality and IQ (Rosete 
& Ciarrochi, 2005).  The promise of EI lies in its novel theoretical suppositions. One of 
these is that emotionally intelligent individuals do not necessarily experience only 
positive emotions all the time.  However, given two individuals, one with high EI and 
another with low EI, the high EI individual is more likely to manage emotion effectively 
(Mayer, 2006).  This difference in ability to understand and reason through one’s 
emotional experiences could help explain individual differences in coping.  The most 
pertinent predictive capacity of EI for this study is the consequence for coping. 
Conceptually, EI should explain the ability to successfully cope with life’s challenges and 
decrease the incidence of maladaptive coping behaviors (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett 
et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; and Zeidner et al., 2006).  Choice of coping strategies in 
turn leads to behaviors.  The impact of EI in the relationship between emotion and coping 
is addressed next. 
Emotions are temporary reactions to an event while EI is a relatively stable 
competence that helps individuals channel emotions in useful ways.  While both high EI 
and low EI individuals might equally experience positive and/or negative emotions, 
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higher EI individuals are more adept at managing those emotions effectively (Ashkanasy 
et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006).  In 
organizational research, inequity has been related to greater incidence of 
counterproductive behaviors (Barclay et al., 2005).  Such inequity leads to anger, sadness 
and maybe the need for revenge against the organization for unfair treatment (Bennett & 
Robinson, 2000; Barclay et al., 2005; Lee & Allen, 2002).  In such scenarios, how does 
an individual’s EI make a difference?  Drawing upon EI’s theory, one could suggest that 
higher EI could lead to more task-focused coping (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 
2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006).  This proposition stems from EI’s 
theoretical position that it reflects the ability to engage in beneficial emotion management 
(Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006).  
In one study, higher EI was related to challenge appraisals rather than threat appraisals 
(Lyons & Schneider, 2005).  High EI individuals cope with negative emotions better by 
buffering them with positive emotions (Tugade & Frederickson, 2002).  The point of this 
discussion is that higher EI does not necessarily lead to the experience of positive 
emotions only.  However, the relationship between individual emotions and their coping 
strategies could vary by the level of their EI (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 
2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006).  This is because higher EI individuals are 
better able to reason about emotional information than low EI individuals are (Ashkanasy 
et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006).  This position 
is supported by a recent finding that emotionally intelligent individuals tend to maintain a 
positive outlook even in the face of negative work events (Ashkanasy & Dasborough, 
2005).  This positive outlook is reflected in responses such as seeking other opportunities 
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or developing new skills.  The low EI individual is not as adept at managing her/his 
negative emotion and is more likely to engage in dysfunctional coping (Ashkanasy et al., 
2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006).   
Several self-reported measures and conceptualizations of EI have been circulating in the 
popular press.  These models are mixed models as they offer a medley of all personality 
characteristics known to academia.  Such a constellation of personality traits might 
predict work criteria, yet is not intelligence (Mayer et al., 2005).  The discerning power 
of these mixed models with regard to the big five personality traits is not supported 
either.  The majority of skepticism (e.g., Becker, 2003; Landy, 2005; Locke, 2005) in 
academic debates is uninformed by the ability-based conceptualization of EI. The 
criticism leveled against EI stems from the popular press version of EI.  Even when 
scholars recognize the ability-based model, they are tainted by the non-scientific 
approach of the mixed models.  The following viewpoint on the conceptualization of EI 
clarifies some of the debates: 
“The Mayer and Salovey definition of Emotional intelligence is the recognized 
standard for scholarly discourse.  This status is reflected in the inclusion of Mayer et al., 
(2001) in the inaugural issue of the new APA journal, Emotion. Scholars who wish to 
contribute to the mainstream literature on Emotional intelligence need to be absolutely 
clear on this point” (Jordan, Ashkanasy & Härtel; in AMR dialogue 2003). 
Hypotheses Development 
 The focus of this project is on four emotions: anger, guilt, happiness/joy, and 
pride. I readily acknowledge the importance of studying other discrete emotions (e.g., 
disgust, envy, and fear).  The focus on these four emotions is primarily driven by several 
concerns.  The first concern is parsimony.  Moreover, while there might be some 
commonality in consequences of the emotions studied here, the mechanisms through 
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which these consequences come about are different for each emotion.  The story behind 
the elicitation and consequences of each emotion is distinct and unique.  In the theory 
development that follows, the working assumption is that the emotion literature needs 
more depth than breadth (Briner & Kiefer, 2005).  This goes back to the critique of 
emotion research.  We already know a lot about emotions in a very superficial fashion. 
The need for the explanatory mechanisms that translate felt emotion into behaviors 
cannot be ignored.   Had I adopted such a fine-grained analysis with a large number of 
emotions, parsimony could be severely compromised.  At the same time, I acknowledge 
that other emotions are also relevant to work settings.  In the interest of parsimony 
though, I defer the study of other emotions to future research.  The second concern 
driving my focus on these four emotions is their potential for action.  These four 
emotions are high activation and intensity affective states (Izard, 1991; Ortony et al., 
1988; Zelenski & Larsen, 2000).  They are distinguished from other low activation 
emotions (e.g., sadness, empathy) by their potential for action readiness (Izard, 2002).  
Third, these four emotions have prior precedent in organizational literature (Weiss et al., 
1999).   
In the theoretical development that follows, there are two levels of analyses. 
Following the critique of emotion research presented in the previous chapter, all theory 
for emotion, coping and behaviors is at the within-person level.  The role of EI as a stable 
between-person attribute is addressed at the between-person level.  The rationale for 
using shorter, more focused work periods as coping and behavioral referents is to isolate 
specific sources of within-person variance (Beal et al., 2005).  The tentative link between 
affective based constructs and behaviors stems from model misspecification (Ashkanasy, 
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2005; Beal et al., 2005; Fisher & Noble, 2004).  Behaviors are normally conceptualized 
as a between-individual variable and emotion is presumed stable to help facilitate simple 
analyses (Beal et al., 2005).  Such within-person variability in work behaviors is 
traditionally treated as error (cf. McCloy, Campbell & Cudeck, 1994).  This type of 
model misspecification is minimized by correctly aligning the definition of emotion with 
its measurement (Beal et al., 2005).  The specific structure of the within- and between-
person design employed in this project will be detailed at a later stage.  
The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Anger 
 Anger is a frequently used term in the everyday expression of one’s feelings.  
Research on the experience and expression of state anger is at best sparse in 
organizational literature (cf. Fitness, 2000).  Yet, several scholars agree that anger is one 
of the most potent of all negative emotions (Izard, 1991).  It is an interesting yet 
intriguing emotion for its underlying cognitive complexity and motivational potential for 
action (Weiss et al., 1999).  Ortony et al., (1988) indicate that anger results from two 
consecutive appraisals.  The primary appraisal is that the event is potentially damaging to 
one’s goals.  The secondary appraisal is that blameworthiness for the event rests on 
another (see also Lazarus, 1999).  Weiss et al., (1999) also contend that anger results 
from a primary appraisal of an undesirable event and a secondary appraisal of other 
blame.  The CRT for anger is a self-demeaning offense (Lazarus, 1991).  Our concern 
here is with the cognitive appraisals that constitute other blameworthiness.  This appraisal 
affects an individual’s coping strategy, task or emotion (Lazarus, 1999).  
 It is worthwhile to note one important relationship between task-focused and 
emotion-focused coping before delving further into conceptual development. 
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Considerable research support exists for the inverse relationship between task-focused 
and emotion-focused coping (Carver et al., 1989; Folkman & Lazarus, 1985).  
Theoretically, the reason for this negative association or mutually exclusive relationship 
is that people engage in only one form of coping only at a time (Carver et al., 1989).  
However, within each main type of coping there might be several components that could 
be interrelated. For example, active coping and positive reinterpretation, both 
components of task-focused coping, are positively related (Carver et al., 1989).  
However, the use of task-focused coping necessarily precludes the use of emotion-
focused coping (Carver et al., 1989).  This position is a working assumption in much of 
the theory development presented here.  
The experience of anger is first contingent upon the appraisal of a self-demeaning 
offense.  Secondarily, the individual holds another event or agent responsible for that 
offense.  Coping with anger is the next immediate step.  This includes both emotion-
focused coping and task-focused coping.  Conceptual and empirical evidence indicates 
that anger is positively associated with emotion-focused coping and negatively associated 
with task-focused coping (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
Conceptually, this relationship is driven by the appraisal of a threat that is common to all 
negative emotions (Lazarus, 1999).  In such a situation, the instinctual reaction as per 
Cognitive Appraisal Theory is to minimize the potential for self-harm resulting from the 
threat (Lazarus, 1999).  Thus, most people manage the symptoms of an event rather than 
actively trying to change the event or that particular interpersonal interaction (Lazarus, 
1999).  Consider evidence from one empirical study cited in Izard (1991).  In this study, 
it was found that twenty-eight percent of study participants reported feeling vengeful, 
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destructive and likely to attack others in response to anger.  In terms of cognitive effects, 
about half the study participants (50.1%) reported thinking about revenge, attacking 
others, expressing anger either verbally or physically and destruction.  Many of these 
behavioral intentions are characterized as emotion-focused coping.  They include 
components of distraction from the task and denial of task requirements.  Simultaneously, 
it indicates a lack of task-focused coping.  In sum,  
 Hypothesis 1:  Anger is positively related to emotion-focused coping. 
Hypothesis 2:  Anger is negatively related to task-focused coping. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2.1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
In the same study cited above (Izard, 1991), not all study participants were prone 
to such emotion-focused coping.  Thirteen percent of the participants reported thinking 
about ways to regain self-control and changing the event.  This denotes task-focused 
coping.  In terms of behavioral intentions, the results are even more revealing.  Only a 
third of the study’s participants revealed action tendencies directed at changing the 
situation and maintaining self-control.  Most scholars would agree this third of study 
participants (Izard, 1991) coped with anger “intelligently”.  What might separate the 
action tendency towards destructive coping from those that seek to reframe the situation 
in self-beneficial ways?  I contend that the choice of coping strategy is contingent upon 
an individual’s ability to intelligently deal with anger.  
It is worthwhile to revisit the theoretical rationale of EI at this stage.  It is the 
ability to actively recognize and manage emotions in a self-beneficial fashion (Mayer et 
39
al., 1999).  In the results cited above, it would make sense to distinguish the last third of 
all individuals who actively rechannel their anger into task-focused coping from the first 
two thirds who were inclined to behave aggressively.  Since EI indicates the ability to 
manage felt emotions, it influences the cognitive and coping implications of felt anger 
(Ashkanasy et al., 2004).  One who experiences anger and is a high EI person might 
recognize the felt emotion as anger and engage in task-focused coping.  For example, s/he 
might channel anger into extra vigilance with regard to her/his performance.  Several 
scholars acknowledge that negative emotions like anger have a purpose (Lyubomirsky, 
King & Diener, 2005).  They activate our motivational and cognitive bases to act in more 
cautious ways (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).  An individual with high EI would think about 
her/his anger and perhaps decide that s/he would never let such an event or agent demean 
her/him again.  S/he might engage in a coping strategy that facilitates changing the 
situation and being more vigilant in her/his work.  This case is illustrated by the 
hypothetical case of an employee in a negative work event.  A supervisor who 
reprimands an employee for low quality might personally attack that employee.  This 
employee experiences anger, as this attack is self-demeaning.  If s/he is a high EI 
individual, s/he will most likely point out to the supervisor that the personal attack is not 
very welcome.  S/he is more vigilant with regard to the task so that the same situation 
never occurs again.  This illustration comes with an interesting sidebar that is related to 
the individual’s EI.  The emotionally intelligent individual not only tries to actively 
manage the emotion and perform better at her/his task, but also minimizes repeated 
occurrences of the event (Mayer et al., 2001).  This points at our innate tendency to 
minimize the experience of negative emotion, as it is associated with pain (Izard, 1991). 
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On the other hand, consider the other two thirds of participants reported in the 
Izard (1991) study.  The tendency for dysfunctional coping is explained by low EI.  To 
play out this scenario fully, the employee with low EI would process anger as a self-
demeaning offense and think of ways in which to assuage that emotion.  S/he might not 
concentrate on the task because of emotion-focused coping.  Such emotion-focused 
coping is primarily aimed at assuaging felt anger.  This focus upon assuaging anger led 
most participants to fantasize about hurting the offending agent in some manner.  The 
following section offers illustrations of the ways in which emotion-focused coping is 
associated with focusing one’s energy on intended behaviors that could alleviate the 
wrongdoing. 
 Anger related research in organizations reveals that people focus upon intended 
behaviors as a form of emotion-focused coping (cf. Fitness, 2000).  Sometimes, this type 
of intended deviant behavior might not be directed towards the offending agent yet could 
be directed towards a symbolic representative of the offending agent (Fitness, 2000).  
One might question the need to harm or retaliate against someone or something that is not 
the object of anger in the preceding illustrations, such as the organization.  The answer 
lies in recent results that a subordinate might not always be able to retaliate against the 
supervisor (cf. Fitness, 2000).  This is because most employees are wary of upsetting the 
power balance (cf. Fitness, 2000).  People are also cautious about overtly causing damage 
to organizational resources (Douglas & Martinko, 2001).  Moreover, organizational 
display rules discourage the expression of anger at work (Fitness, 2000).  The employee 
might resort to intended revenge behaviors against anything that is symbolic of the 
organization (cf. Barclay et al., 2005; Fitness, 2000).  
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Anger is not always tied to intended aggressive behavior (Lazarus, 1999).  Studies 
have shown that most anger experiences lead to psychosomatic and other physiological 
symptoms (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002).  Over a period of time then, the innate tendency 
for survival requires some form of release of anger to offset these physical symptoms 
(Lazarus, 1999).  More pertinently, even if most angry people are not explicitly 
aggressive (and admittedly few are), most will still try to assuage their anger by at least 
focusing thoughts of revenge against the offending agent or event (Lazarus, 1999).  The 
point of this discussion is that not everybody deals with anger in the same manner.  It is 
worthwhile to unravel individual differences that contribute to different coping 
consequences of anger.  One such individual difference is EI, an ability to actively 
process and manage emotions.  High EI individuals might well report experiencing anger 
about the same as low EI individuals.  However, the four hierarchical dimensions of EI as 
discussed earlier aid the higher EI individual in actively coping with anger and their 
tasks.  The theoretical rationale underlying such beneficial management of anger by high 
EI individuals is drawn from recent theoretical propositions of Ashkanasy and colleagues 
on the one hand (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002) and Zeidner and colleagues 
on the other (Zeidner et al., 2006).  However, this work differs from theirs in that their 
work is in the domain of stress while this work is at the level of discrete emotions. 
Emotions are one component of the stress system; as such, their framework is more 
overarching while the current theoretical development is more molecular with regard to 
emotion effects.  
 The higher EI individual accurately perceives that the felt emotion is anger (i.e., 
emotion perception) (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  This perception leads 
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to rationalization regarding felt anger (i.e., using emotion to facilitate thought).  In this 
instance, the higher EI individual might realize that expression of felt anger is potentially 
harmful as per prior experiences (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  S/he 
could rationalize that anger is diverting their attention away from task focus and thus self 
regulate.  S/he may choose to disconnect from anger in order to better focus upon tasks or 
alternatively use the meaning of anger as a self-demeaning offense as the impetus for 
task-focused strategies (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  Anger is frequently 
accompanied by other emotions such as frustration, anxiety or fear (e.g., Izard, 1991; 
Lazarus, 1999).  The third dimension of EI (understanding emotion) contributes to 
recognition of the experience of these emotions simultaneously and prioritizing them as 
either important or unimportant in that particular situation.  The fourth dimension 
(emotion management) builds on the third dimension and helps an individual connect or 
disconnect from anger based upon its usefulness for personally favorable outcomes. 
Taken together, each dimension of EI informs the next higher dimension culminating in 
overall EI, which differentiates individuals in the relationship between anger and coping. 
For example, expression of anger leads to unfavorable interpersonal relationships at work 
(Fitness, 2000).  The higher EI individual would then disconnect from anger. 
Alternatively, the experience of anger could provide considerable motivational energy 
(Fitness, 2000).  In this instance, the higher EI individual would connect with anger 
(presumably without expressing it) and channel it into task focus (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; 
Zeidner et al., 2006).  
 The low EI individuals will focus more on emotion coping and, because of the 
exclusive relationship between emotion- and task-focused coping, will lose task focus. 
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This position is intuitively appealing as fantasizing about revenge, retaliation and such 
other forms of deviance take up considerable cognitive resources, diverting attention 
away from the task.  Thus, the experience of anger results in different coping 
consequences for the more emotionally intelligent individuals when compared to the less 
emotionally intelligent individuals.  
Hypothesis 3:  EI moderates the relationship between anger and task-focused 
coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and 
negative for lower EI individuals. 
Hypothesis 4:  EI moderates the relationship between anger and emotion-focused 
coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and 
positive for lower EI individuals. 
The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Guilt 
 Like anger, guilt results from a perceived displeasure at a specific action, event or 
interpersonal interaction (Lazarus, 1999).  The pattern of proposed relationships is similar 
to that of anger.  Hence, I represent these relationships together in Figure 2.1.  Guilt is 
distinct from anger because of its blameworthiness.  In guilt, one assigns the 
responsibility of the specific displeasure to oneself (Lazarus, 1999).  The core relational 
theme of guilt is perceived failure of living up to certain personal or societal standards 
(Lazarus, 1999).  The experience of guilt is tied to core evolutionary and biological 
mechanisms (Izard, 1991).  Most adults have a system of internalized values.  A violation 
of these values and self-blame leads to guilt (Izard, 1991).  Guilt is a basic existential 
emotion (Lazarus, 1999).  It serves as a moral compass without which most people would 
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not be able to act on their sense of right and wrong (Izard, 1991).  Guilt is the most 
essential emotion in the development of an individual’s cognitive-affective structure of 
conscience and the cognitive-affective-action structure of moral behavior (Izard, 1991). 
 Guilt motivates one consequence in almost every instance.  It is the motivation to 
correct the wrongdoing in some way or the other (Lazarus, 1999).  The causes of guilt 
stem from psychoanalytic and social learning theories.  Regardless of how guilt actually 
comes about, there exists agreement amongst scholars that guilt results from wrongdoing 
(see Izard, 1991).  This wrongdoing can take the form of trust betrayal, violation of a 
personal standard or simply harm to another (Lazarus, 1999).  It is easy to see that such 
causes readily present themselves in organizational settings. An employee who receives a 
bonus might feel happy at the outcome.  If s/he learns that the process used to allot that 
outcome was unfair, s/he experiences guilt along with happiness at the outcome (Weiss et 
al., 1999).  The most interesting feature of guilt is the imperative for action.  This action 
impulse is described next drawing heavily upon psychology research.  
 Two consequences of guilt have been reported by a number of studies (cf. Izard, 
1991).  The first is that guilt leads to compliance.  In a series of experiments designed to 
elicit subject’s behavioral responses to guilt, it was found that high guilt individuals were 
more likely to comply with requests that demanded time and resources even if there was 
no immediate material benefit to them (Izard, 1991).  The second consequence of guilt is 
intense self-reproach (Ortony et al., 1988).  Self-reproach could debilitate the normal 
functioning of the human mind (Izard, 1991).  Consider an employee who is promoted 
because of affirmative action laws.  This employee might experience guilt if s/he 
perceives that this promotion was not based upon equitable standards.  S/he might be 
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engulfed by self-doubt since the promotion was not merit based.  Strategies for resolution 
of self-reproach involve some form of emotion-focused coping.  Compliance at the cost 
of personal well-being, the most common consequence of guilt, is an example of 
emotional coping as it involves abandonment of responsibility for one’s own well-being. 
In sum, the research on guilt in organizational literature is scarce.  However, findings 
from psychology indicate that guilt leads to more compliance, temporary debilitation, 
denial and withdrawal from normal tasks (Izard, 1991).  The experience of guilt primarily 
causes people to engage in more emotion-focused coping (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). 
Simultaneously, they are distracted and disengaged from the task.  This distraction and 
denial takes focus away from the task.  Alternatively stated, guilt as a self-reproach 
emotion involves emotion-focused coping.  This form of coping comes at the expense of 
associated decrements in task focus.  
Hypothesis 5:  Guilt is positively related to emotion-focused coping. 
Hypothesis 6:  Guilt is negatively related to task-focused coping. 
Individuals who are higher on EI recognize guilt for what it is and seek to rectify 
feelings of self-reproach.  This last contention is based upon EI’s theoretical formulation 
that it is the ability to manage emotions in ways that are beneficial to the individual 
(Mayer et al., 1999).  The experience of this negative emotion shares the vigilance 
component with other negative emotions and results in higher task-focused coping where 
it is managed.  The high EI person, with an eye towards personally beneficial outcomes at 
the tail end of the emotional episode, is prone to task-focused coping as outlined in the 
case of anger (Zeidner et al., 2006).  The hallmark characteristic of guilt is abandonment 
of responsibility for personal well-being (Izard, 1991).  In response to such feelings of 
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compliance at the cost of personal well being, let us consider the effect of EI that could 
alter one’s coping strategies under guilt.  The first step is accurately recognizing that one 
is experiencing guilt and self-reproach (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  
This leads to rationalization regarding the self-reproach.  This rationalization might lead 
the employee (who is promoted because of affirmative action laws) to self-regulation 
aimed at proving oneself rather than abandoning responsibility for personal outcomes 
(Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  Similarly, the same employee 
experiencing guilt because of a non-merit based promotion might also feel proud and 
happy at a favorable outcome.  The third dimension of EI helps the individual recognize 
these multiple emotions and prioritize each as important or unimportant (Ashkanasy et 
al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  The fourth dimension, drawing upon the preceding 
dimensions, now leads the employee to either connect or disconnect with guilt based 
upon its usefulness.  For example, this employee might choose to connect with guilt and 
channel its motivational force into enhanced task focus.  Alternatively, if s/he perceives 
that guilt is obstructing task focus, s/he might disconnect from guilt and connect with 
pride, thus leading to enhanced task focus (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). 
In sum, EI leads to the realization that the tendency for compliance at the cost of personal 
well-being is not beneficial.  Where guilt is not actively managed (low EI), it results in 
temporary debilitation of the individual’s cognitive facilities and is characterized as 
emotion-focused coping (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  This form of 
coping is characterized by compliance at the cost of personal well-being.  The mental 
states of such individuals revolve around fear of punishment for the wrongdoing, internal 
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censure and lowered self-esteem (Izard, 1991).  The focus is on the emotion experience 
itself rather than effective resolution (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  
Hypothesis 7:  EI moderates the relationship between guilt and task-focused 
coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and negative for 
lower EI individuals. 
 Hypothesis 8:  EI moderates the relationship between guilt and emotion-focused 
coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for 
lower EI individuals. 
The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Joy 
The appraisal structure of joy is straightforward. Joy results from an appraisal of 
goal congruence (Lazarus, 1991; 1999).  The interesting feature of this basic emotion is 
in its consequences for coping and, subsequently, behaviors.  Joy and happiness are used 
interchangeably herein.  Some authors refer to an entire class of emotions that are 
pleasurable as joy (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).  Others have reserved the use of 
joy/happiness for an intense positive emotion resulting from desirable outcome 
expectancy (Ortony et al., 1988).  Joy is a positive emotion stemming from goal 
congruence.  One could be happy for another or for oneself.  In this research, I include 
both self- and other-directed joy.  
 It is worthwhile to consider certain consequences of joy from the standpoint of 
psychological theories.  Izard (1991) points out that joy results in an appreciation of the 
world around us.  It leaves an individual confident of who they are and leads to savoring 
every object in the world (Izard, 1991).  This intense appreciation is accompanied by not 
wanting to change anything.  Alternatively, there is a degree of contentment with the 
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status quo.  Happy individuals are less prone to dissecting and analyzing things, as they 
are not driven to change things (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).  Izard (1991) further notes 
that joy is associated with strength, vigor, confidence and competence.  Joy forges social 
bonds because the happy individual feels at one with their environs (Izard, 1991; 
Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). 
 The experience of joy has significant implications for individual physical, 
psychological and behavioral health.  Frederickson and colleagues (2001, 2003) propose 
unbounded beneficial effects of joy.  They posit that the experience of positive emotions 
such as joy is crucial to an individual’s cognitive and psychological resources 
(Frederickson, 2001; Tugade & Frederickson, 2002).  Individuals who experience these 
positive emotions more frequently are more likely to function better over a period of 
time.  The repeated experience of positive emotion widens cognitive interests and builds 
psychological resources (Frederickson, 2001).  These propositions are known as the 
Broaden and Build theory (Frederickson, 2001).  Happy individuals are more resilient 
and more successful in all spheres of life (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).  Empirical support 
for this theory has started to emerge.  For example, happy individuals have been shown to 
fight distress symptoms better and recover from illness more smoothly (Tugade & 
Frederickson, 2002).  An extensive review of research on joy shows that joy leads to life 
satisfaction and superior functioning across all life domains (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). 
 One question that deserves further examination is what psychological and 
cognitive processes unfold after the experience of joy?  Much research support exists for 
the positive consequences of joy, but very little research addresses the intervening black 
box of cognitive processes (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).  Cognitive Appraisal Theory has 
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formulated and found empirical support for the position that joy/happiness is positively 
associated with task-focused coping and is negatively associated with emotion-focused 
coping (Park et al., 2004).  In line with these findings, Lyubomirsky et al., (2005) 
reported that joy is associated with more effective coping in the face of challenges.  Such 
active coping strategies typically involve an approach orientation in which happy 
individuals pursue goals and draw upon skills accumulated in the past (Miller & Schnoll, 
2000).  Positive reframing of events, a form of task-focused coping, is related to joy 
(Miller & Schnoll, 2000).  Research to date reveals a pattern of task-focused coping in 
the face of joy (e.g., Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).  People are 
less likely to engage in avoidance strategies while experiencing joy (Izard, 1991).  The 
apptern of relationships for joy are depicted in Figure 2.2. 
 Hypothesis 9:  Joy is negatively related to emotion-focused coping. 
Hypothesis 10:  Joy is positively related to task-focused coping. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2.2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Most cognitive psychologists are quick to point out that joy is a rare emotion 
(e.g., Izard, 1991).  One who is constantly happy might be doubted for their mental health 
and might not function very effectively (Izard, 1991; Tomkins, 1962).  Joy leads to 
slower performance because it is accompanied by physiological (e.g., increased heart 
rates, systolic blood pressure) and psychological changes (Izard, 1991).  There exists a 
certain threshold to the healthy experience of joy (see also Frederickson & Losada, 
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2005).  Individuals cannot constantly experience joy and be expected to function better.  
Broaden and Build theorists now contend that the healthy emotion experience is 
characterized by both positive and negative emotions (Frederickson & Losada, 2005).  
They further argue that the critical ratio of positive to negative emotions is 3:2 for 
optimal functioning.  It is interesting to note that this is the fundamental proposition of EI 
as well.  High EI individuals tend to experience joy about the same as low EI individuals 
(Mayer, 2006).  High EI individuals experience joy and recognize it for that (Ashkanasy 
et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  They actively manage joy such that they are 
successful, implying task-focused coping. 
Does joy always lead to task-focused coping?  Some studies have found that this 
is not always the case (Isen, 1991).  One school of thought has conceptualized and found 
support for the position that positive emotions lead to decreased performance on tasks 
involving complex mental activity (Melton, 1995).  Positive emotions seem to encourage 
individuals to take shortcuts in the mental processing of information (Melton, 1995).  The 
mood congruence literature found that negative moods (admittedly not emotions) lead to 
more creativity and better performance in some domains (George & Zhou, 2002; Isen, 
1991).  Results on the effects of joy on task performance have been largely mixed (e.g., 
Isen & Means, 1983).  The experience of positive emotion fosters pursuit of activities that 
prolong the positive emotion (Izard, 1991).  Izard describes this tendency as viewing the 
world through “rose colored glasses” (1991:161).  He suggests that joy leads to rather 
paradoxical effects in cognitive patterns for some individuals. He argues that a positive 
event (e.g., a good performance) can cause joy and yet take away from subsequent task 
focus by slowing down problem solving and cognition. This discussion raises an 
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interesting issue for the current research.  Might it be that the research to date has not 
addressed the impact of stable individual differences such as EI?  
 Lyubomirsky et al., (2005) concluded their review on joy by suggesting that joy 
could lead to better task focus if the happy individual is motivated to perform well at the 
task.  An alternative perspective of why negative effects stem from joy is drawn from 
Ortony and colleagues (1988).  They contend that positive emotions can sometimes lead 
to the inability to cope.  They cite common references such as “crying happy tears”, “out 
of control” and “beside themselves with joy” as lay descriptions of the inability to cope.  
They question why some people tend to engage in expressive behavior characteristic of 
negative emotions, while feeling happy.  They suggest that such expressions are triggered 
by an evaluation of the inability to cope.  Of course, these evaluations of the inability to 
cope occur so quickly that in many instances we might be unaware of them.   
EI affects the relationship between joy and coping in the following manner. First, 
an individual’s perception of joy feeds this information to the second dimension, using 
emotion to facilitate thought.  This dimension of EI leads to rationalization and the 
needed motivation for the individual to remain task focused.  The third dimension helps 
her/him prioritize the experience of multiple simultaneous emotions.  Finally, all of this 
information builds up to inform emotion management.  This last dimension, along with 
other EI dimensions culminating in overall EI, signals the individual to be careful and 
vigilant with regard to tasks (Zeidner et al., 2006).  EI informs the individual that denial 
of workload, distractions and disengagement from the task (all forms of emotion-focused 
coping) are ultimately harmful (Zeidner et al., 2006). It is reasonable to expect that high 
EI individuals engage in more task-focused coping while low EI individuals are more 
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prone to emotion-focused coping.  This position derives from the theoretical foundations 
of cognitive appraisals and EI (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  Cognitive 
appraisals involve reasoning about emotional information.  EI indicates a set of 
competencies that aid such reasoning about emotional information (Zeidner et al., 2006).  
Thus, the high EI individual might better reason about emotional information and engage 
in adaptive coping (Zeidner et al., 2006).  A low EI individual who experiences joy is 
more likely to engage in emotion-focused coping, accompanied with a positive future 
expectancy and decrements in task focus.  Such an individual might be more prone to the 
“rose colored glasses” syndrome described by Izard (1991). 
Where this point of view differs from previously cited research is that we start to 
place bounds on the benefits of feeling happy.  The “happier and wiser” experience is 
differentiated from the “happier but dumber” experience by an individual’s choice of 
coping.  Recall that joy leads to increased heart rates and other physiological changes 
(Izard, 1991).  An individual has to regulate these changes at the very least before 
attending to task demands.  Such coping then is contingent upon an individual’s EI, 
which directs her/him to task-focused coping strategies because they are ultimately self 
beneficial.  Where EI does not aid such coping (low EI), people might be more prone to 
emotion-focused coping.   
Hypothesis 11:  EI moderates the relationship between joy and task-focused 
coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and negative for 
lower EI individuals. 
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Hypothesis 12:  EI moderates the relationship between joy and emotion-focused 
coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for 
lower EI individuals. 
The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Pride 
 Pride is considered especially important to organizational research because of its 
potential to initiate action towards achievement (Weiss et al., 1999).  Pride is similar to 
joy in that it includes a primary appraisal of goal congruence (Lazarus, 1991; 1999).  The 
pattern of relationships for pride is similar to that of joy.  Hence, I depicted these 
relationships together in Figure 2.2.  Pride differs from joy in that an attribution of self-
agency occurs for such goal congruence (Lazarus, 1991; 1999; Ortony et al., 1988).  
Consider an employee who has received a bonus or a promotion.  This would make the 
employee happy. Secondarily, if the employee perceives that s/he has put in a lot of effort 
and has produced quality work, s/he takes pride in that accomplishment.  Pride is a self-
attribution emotion and it emerges when one perceives that s/he has done something 
praiseworthy (Ortony et al., 1988). 
 The core relational theme for pride is self-satisfaction (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). 
Pride is associated with an individual’s appraisal that credit for the praiseworthy action 
lies with her/him.  This leads to self-satisfaction.  It is important to note that the 
elicitation of pride is complex, as what one defines as praiseworthy is sometimes in 
question (Lazarus, 1991; 1999).  There could be cultural differences in what constitutes 
praiseworthy action.  There could be a discrepancy between personal perceptions of 
praiseworthiness and societal standards for the same (Ortony et al., 1988).  One’s 
personal perceptions of praiseworthiness and organizational standards could be in 
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conflict, resulting in situations where pride is not elicited.  The few studies in the domain 
of pride have mainly focused upon the antecedents of this emotion (e.g., Weiss et al., 
1999).  Pride is associated with goal congruence, perceived fairness, and low situational 
demand (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002).  This study further revealed that pride led to more 
task-focused coping than anger or shame.  In general, positive emotions such as pride are 
associated with more task-focused coping because there is no perceived harm or threat to 
one’s well being (Lazarus, 1991; 1999).  The individual is free to focus her/his energy on 
the task rather than managing the emotion itself.  Moreover, pride is characterized by an 
approach motivation towards one’s task and leads to greater task focus (Lazarus, 1991; 
1999).  Simultaneously, pride also triggers lesser emotion-focused coping than anger and 
shame (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002).   
Hypothesis 13:  Pride is negatively related to emotion-focused coping. 
Hypothesis 14:  Pride is positively related to task-focused coping. 
Is there a dark side to pride?  As with joy, I propose that pride needs to be managed 
effectively.  Pride is one of the emotions that might signify a “too much of a good thing” 
effect unless one is able to actively manage it (Ortony et al., 1988).  This goes back to the 
CRT of pride, specifically self-satisfaction.  Pride is associated with confidence, higher 
self-esteem and self-satisfaction (Izard, 1991).  It is not hard to imagine that in some 
cases such feelings of self-satisfaction could easily lead to “being smug” and “acting in a 
condescending manner”.  A typical employee who feels smug or secure is unlikely to 
exert more effort.  S/he is not motivated to act, as there is no biological signal for action.  
This smugness denotes a form of avoidance coping.   Ortony et al., (1988) point out that 
the inability to cope with pride is characterized as “smugness” and “suffering from a 
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swollen head”.  These are everyday references to excessive pride, bordering on self-
absorption.  This type of self-absorption could result in being distant and condescending 
to coworkers.  This describes a form of emotion-focused coping.  
When does this swollen head syndrome set in and what differentiates the ability to 
cope from the inability to do so?  EI could help people cope with pride effectively.  The 
low EI individual is more likely to indulge in smugness and not cope beneficially with 
pride.  As noted in the case of each emotion earlier, the underlying EI dimensions 
contribute to the relationship between pride and coping through overall EI (Ashkanasy et 
al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).  First, perception of pride occurs, which in turn enables 
rationalization.  Such rationalization could involve trying to be humble and realizing that 
smugness could isolate one from their environs.  The third dimension enables one to 
prioritize the experience of multiple emotions.  Finally, the fourth dimension, emotion 
management, contributes to effectively managing pride in a manner that is self-beneficial. 
The high EI individual will likely engage in task-focused coping and not display the same 
form of smugness as the low EI individual.  This stems from the high EI individual’s 
understanding that distancing oneself from coworkers is not personally or 
organizationally beneficial.  
Hypothesis 15:  EI moderates the relationship between pride and task-focused 
coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and 
negative for lower EI individuals. 
Hypothesis 16:  EI moderates the relationship between pride and emotion-focused 
coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and 
positive for lower EI individuals. 
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Emotional Intelligence and Coping 
 In addition to the specific hypotheses set out above, EI has been consistently 
related to adaptive functioning in many domains (e.g., Mayer, 2006).  For example, 
higher EI is related to lower incidence of maladaptive coping such as drug and alcohol 
abuse in the child and counseling psychology domain (Mayer, 2006; Poulu, 2005; 
Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2005).  From a conceptual standpoint, higher EI individuals are 
better able to perceive and reason through emotional information and resolve the event in 
a fashion that facilitates beneficial outcomes (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 
2006).  Higher EI individuals are less likely to engage in maladaptive or dysfunctional 
coping such as denial, distraction and withdrawal (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 
2006).  They are more likely to positively reappraise even negative work events and 
adopt functional coping mechanisms (Jordan et al., 2002).  Zeidner et al., (2005) suggest 
that the higher EI individual more accurately appraises the emotion-inducing event and is 
more cognizant of ensuing emotional changes.  This type of emotional sensitivity allows 
the higher EI individual to steer away from maladaptive coping and focus more on 
adaptive coping (Zeidner et al., 2006).  In keeping with this emerging body of research on 
EI and coping, one might also expect main effects of EI on coping strategies.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 17:  EI is positively related to task-focused coping at the between 
person level. 
Hypothesis 18:  EI is negatively related to emotion-focused coping at the between 
person level. 
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Coping and Behaviors 
The previous section outlined the effects of emotion on coping strategies and the 
role of EI in the relationship between emotion and coping.  In this section, I present the 
effects of coping strategies on work behaviors.  Task-focused coping involves actively 
managing the event with a focus on resolution of the event.  It includes five components: 
active coping, planning, suppressing competing activities, restraint coping, and positive 
reappraisal (Carver et al., 1989).  Emotion-focused coping is a strategy that is primarily 
symptom focused wherein the focus is on managing the emotion.  It includes the five 
components of denial, behavioral disengagement, mental disengagement, alcohol and 
drug disengagement and venting emotions (Carver et al., 1989).  In this project, my focus 
is on three forms of work behaviors: task performance, organizational citizenship 
behaviors (OCB) and workplace deviance behaviors (WDB).
Task performance is defined as an individual’s successful completion of a 
particular task.  This definition derives its roots from early conceptualizations of an 
individual’s worth to the organization in terms of the tangible outputs (Borman, 1991). 
Aspects of task performance are inclusive of but not limited to task proficiency, 
completion, quality of outputs, quantity of outputs, and similar task-related criteria.  Task 
performance or in-role behavior is critical in the evaluation of employees.  It is well 
documented in organizational research that other employee behaviors contribute to 
overall organizational effectiveness (Motowidlo & Van Scotter, 1994).  One such 
voluntary behavior on the part of employees is Organizational Citizenship Behavior 
(OCB) (Organ & Ryan, 1995). 
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OCB scholars have generated multiple definitions (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; 
Organ, 1988, 1997) in the extant literature on the topic.  One common thread runs across 
all these definitions. OCB represents any employee discretionary behavior, though not 
critical to the task, which facilitates organizational functioning. Alternatively stated, the 
multiple conceptualizations of OCB have one theme in common, that OCBs are 
behaviors that are not a part of an employee’s task requirements though they benefit the 
organization (cf. Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Organ, 1988, 1997).  They include 
components such as, but not limited to, helping behaviors, sportsmanship, initiative, 
loyalty, compliance, civic virtue and self-development (cf. Lepine, Erez, & Johnson, 
2002).  In this dissertation, I adopt a two-dimensional conceptualization of OCB that 
includes OCBs directed towards other individuals (OCBI) and those that are directed 
towards the organization (OCBO) (e.g., Lee & Allen, 2002).  This conceptualization is 
not in conflict with the earlier described forms of OCBs; however, it follows prior 
precedent in literature that has examined the effects of emotions on OCBs and WDBs 
simultaneously (Lee & Allen, 2002).  
More recently, workplace deviance behavior (WDB) has taken on a certain 
prominence in organizational research (Barclay et al., 2005; Bennett & Robinson, 2000; 
Fox & Spector, 1999).  This prominence is attributed to the bouts of downsizing, 
technological insecurities and other challenges faced by many organizations (Barclay et 
al., 2005; Fitness, 2000).  Workplace deviance is defined as any voluntary 
counterproductive behavior that violates organizational norms and causes harm to 
organizational functioning (Robinson & Bennett, 1995; 1997).  It threatens the well-being 
of superiors and coworkers (Robinson & Bennett, 1995; 1997).  Barclay et al., (2005) 
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found that layoffs lead to anger and hostility towards the organization.  This hostility was 
found to cause retaliatory behaviors.  This result indicates a direct link between felt 
negative emotions and retaliatory behaviors.  In affirmative action justice research it was 
found that even when an outcome is favorable, individuals could perceive the procedures 
that were used to determine the outcome as unfair or untimely (Heilman & Alcott, 2001; 
Heilman, Block, & Stathatos, 1997).  This, in turn, leads to emotions that could cause 
retaliatory behaviors such as badmouthing the employer, seeking revenge against the 
manager and taking legal action.  Research on WDB subsumes workplace aggression 
research (Douglas & Martinko, 2001).  WDB as conceptualized in this study follows the 
precedent set in prior research in that it includes all forms of aggressive behaviors and 
antisocial workplace behaviors (Martinko & Zellars, 1998).  They are conceptually 
similar and indicate behaviors that cause harm to organizational functioning and/or 
threaten the well-being of coworkers and superiors.  
Earlier I described coping as the immediate cognitive consequence following 
experienced emotion.  Here, I extend that causal sequence a bit further and examine the 
effects of coping on behaviors.  Task-focused coping involves actively managing the 
event with a focus on resolution of the event.  It includes the five components of as active 
coping, planning, suppressing competing activities, restraint coping, and positive 
reappraisal (Carver et al., 1989).  By the very definition of task-focused coping, one 
could expect positive effects on task performance.  Empirical support for the positive 
association between task-focused coping and task performance increments exists (Herrald 
& Tomaka, 2002).  This result has been extended to other forms of success in general. 
Bennett, Martin, Bies and Brockner (1995) found that individuals who used task-focused 
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coping in the face of a layoff were more successful in seeking alternative employment 
opportunities.  Task-focused coping involves an approach motivation towards challenges 
and tasks and is therefore associated with better task performance (Herrald & Tomaka, 
2002; Park et al., 2004). 
Emotion-focused coping is a strategy that is primarily symptom focused wherein 
the focus is on managing the emotion.  It includes the five components of denial, 
behavioral disengagement, mental disengagement, alcohol and drug disengagement and 
venting emotions (Carver et al., 1989).  In such cases, task performance decreases as the 
individual is more focused upon managing the emotion itself.  This causes neglect of the 
task. Emotion-focused coping leads to task performance decrements (Herrald & Tomaka, 
2002). Bennett et al., (1995) found that layoff victims who engaged in emotion-focused 
coping were less successful in seeking alternative employment opportunities.  It is 
reasonable to expect a replication of the negative association between emotion-focused 
coping and task performance. 
Hypothesis 19:  Task-focused coping is positively related to task performance. 
Hypothesis 20:  Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to task 
performance. 
 The relationship between positive mood states, positive emotions and OCBs is 
well documented (Lee & Allen, 2002).  Positive moods have been conceptually linked to 
organizational spontaneity in the form of helping coworkers, protecting the organization, 
making constructive suggestions, and developing abilities that aid organizational 
functioning (George & Brief, 1992).  While these results support a direct link between the 
said mood state and OCB like behaviors, it is reasonable to assume a relationship 
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between emotions and OCBs as well.  With task-focused coping, one seeks to focus upon 
the task, positively reframe the situation and approach a problem rather than avoid it 
(e.g., Brown et al., 2005).  Task-focused coping involves an approach motivation rather 
than avoidance motivation.  With this approach motivation as the energizing base, an 
individual who is presented with a request for help is more likely to comply with that 
request even if it is not a part of her/his job description.  This argument further suggests 
that an individual is more likely to direct her/his approach motivational energy to helping 
coworkers, assuming extra responsibilities and such other behaviors known as OCBI.  
The same approach motivation causes her/him to be a good organizational citizen, make 
beneficial suggestions, and take any minor setbacks in stride.  This indicates that the 
same approach motivation could energize one towards more OCBOs.  Thus, 
conceptually, one might expect a positive association between task-focused coping and 
both forms of OCB.  In emotion-focused coping, the motivational base is mainly 
avoidance.  As such, the individual is more likely to deny the gravity of the event and 
withdraw from coworkers.  In this case, one employs a more repressive form of coping, 
which essentially isolates her/him from the environs.  One’s energy is focused upon the 
ongoing emotion experience.  In this frame of mind, an individual is less likely to engage 
in both forms of OCBs.  
Hypothesis 21:  Task-focused coping is positively related to OCBI. 
Hypothesis 22:  Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to OCBI. 
Hypothesis 23:  Task-focused coping is positively related to OCBO. 
Hypothesis 24:  Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to OCBO. 
62
With regard to WDB, one would expect exactly the opposite effect of both forms 
of coping.  This is related to the approach and avoidance motivation of each coping 
strategy.  In task-focused coping, the focus is on dealing with the task, which takes away 
the motivation to engage in deviant acts.  In emotion-focused coping, one is primarily 
involved in managing the symptom.  The focus shifts from the task to assuaging the felt 
emotion.  An individual who engages in emotion-focused coping seeks to restore a sense 
of equity by retaliation, slighting coworkers, stealing office supplies and aggression 
against the wrongdoer.  Similarly, emotion-focused coping resulting from narcissism 
could lead to work withdrawal, demeaning coworkers, bad mouthing the organization and 
so on.  The main idea here is that emotion-focused coping involves managing the 
emotion experience itself and not the task.  
Hypothesis 25:  Task-focused coping is negatively related to WDB. 
Hypothesis 26:  Emotion-focused coping is positively related to WDB. 
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The Full Model 
In this section, I attempt to put together the full model comprising the causal 
linkages discussed thus far.  This piecemeal approach helped clarify all linkages in a 
coherent fashion.  However, in reality, all of the above-described processes occur 
sequentially and the entire model is shown in Figures 2.3 - 2.6.  This set of figures offers 
a complete perspective on the relationships between each emotion, coping, EI and 
behaviors.  
Anger 
In the theoretical development of anger, I suggested that it results in emotion-
focused coping.  The angrier a person gets, the less they engage in task-focused coping. 
EI indicates the ability to reason through and manage one’s emotions (Mayer et al., 
1999).  A high EI individual manages anger beneficially and engages in task-focused 
coping along with a decrease in emotion-focused coping.  This stems from her/his 
understanding that neglecting the task and giving in to managing the symptom could lead 
to adverse future consequences.  S/he also understands that successful completion of a 
task is personally beneficial.  This position is consistent with the theoretical foundations 
of EI, which indicates that higher EI enables people to engage in effective coping 
strategies even in the face of negative work events (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 
2006).  Following the precedent set in the coping literature, I suggested that task-focused 
coping is associated with performance increments (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), OCBs and 
a lowered incidence of WDB.  Emotion-focused coping leads to performance decrements 




Insert Figure 2.3 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Guilt 
 Drawing upon the theoretical development in earlier sections, guilt is positively 
related to emotion-focused coping and negatively related to task-focused coping.  The 
unique consequence of guilt is compliance at the cost of personal well-being (Izard, 
1991).  Compliance at the cost of personal well-being is a form of emotion-focused 
coping as it involves the avoidance motivation.  Individuals with lower EI are more likely 
to succumb to this motivation.  This allows them to focus on things other than the task. 
The high EI individual refuses to abandon responsibility for personal well-being 
(Ashkanasy et al. 2005; Zeidner et al., 2006).  S/he engages in task-focused coping with 
an eye towards beneficial outcomes.  Task-focused coping is associated with performance 
increments (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), OCBs and a lowered incidence of WDB. 
Emotion-focused coping leads to performance decrements (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), 
WDBs and a lowered incidence of OCBs (see Figure 2.4).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2.4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Joy 
 As depicted in Figure 2.5, the experience of joy will in general lead to either task-
focused or emotion-focused coping.  Past literature has shown support for the positive 
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association between joy and task-focused coping (e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).  
Similarly, joy leads to lowered emotion-focused coping (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).  This 
result indicates that joy should lead to beneficial outcomes at all times.  However, I 
suggest that, contrary to commonly held beliefs, joy might not always be beneficial.  
Rather, the experience of joy and its effects on work behaviors might be contingent on 
how an employee reasons and manages her/his joy.  The choice of coping strategy in 
response to joy is contingent upon an individual’s EI.  Low EI individuals are prone to 
maladaptive coping even with positive life events (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 
2006).  Higher EI individuals will engage in task-focused coping.  Task-focused coping is 
associated with performance increments (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), OCBs and a lowered 
incidence of WDB. Emotion-focused coping leads to performance decrements (Herrald & 
Tomaka, 2002), WDBs and a lowered incidence of OCBs. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2.5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Pride 
This emotion is important to organizational studies because of its potential to 
initiate achievement-related behavior (Weiss et al., 1999).  The primary appraisal for 
pride is perception of a favorable outcome.  The secondary appraisal is that credit for the 
outcome is attributable to the self (Lazarus, 1991; 1999).  As depicted in Figure 2.6, pride 
leads to greater task-focused coping and lesser emotion-focused coping ((Herrald & 
Tomaka, 2002).  However, not everyone handles pride in this manner.  Some people 
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might suffer from extreme self-absorption and narcissism while feeling proud (Ortony et 
al., 1988).  The ability to manage pride is contingent upon EI.  High EI individuals 
manage pride beneficially, thus engaging in greater task-focused coping.  Low EI 
individuals are not adept at channeling the motivational energy of pride into useful 
outcomes.  They engage in greater emotion-focused coping.  Task-focused coping is 
associated with performance increments (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), OCBs and a lowered 
incidence of WDB.  Emotion-focused coping leads to performance decrements (Herrald 
& Tomaka, 2002), WDBs and a lowered incidence of OCBs.  All the hypotheses are 
summarized in Table 2.2.  
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2.2 and Figure 2.6 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Caveats 
 There are certain caveats to the theoretical development set forth here.  First, 
emotions have always been directly related to behavior (Barclay et al., 2005; Lee & 
Allen, 2002).  In this theoretical treatment, there are no direct effects of emotion on 
behavior.  I posit that emotions lead to coping and that coping leads to behaviors.  This 
position is consistent with Cognitive Appraisal Theory of Lazarus and colleagues 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991; 1999).  I expect the effects of emotions to 
fully pass through coping before they affect behavior.  Second, there could be differential 
effects of underlying EI dimensions (e.g., Jordan et al., 2002).  In the interest of 
simplicity, I do not delve into those differential effects here.  This research is positioned 
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as an initial study of the role of EI.  In as much as theory suggests an overarching 
construct, the first step is to examine the effects of the same.  Differential effects of each 
underlying dimension will be examined from a supplemental analyses perspective.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I first defined and discussed the Cognitive Appraisal Theory. 
Next, I presented a discussion of controversies surrounding EI research.  This is 
necessary as much skepticism surrounds EI in academic circles (e.g., Becker, 2003; 
Landy, 2005).  Hypothesis development for specific discrete emotions (anger, guilt, joy, 
and pride) followed.  Their implications for coping and the role of EI were addressed. 
Finally, coping was related to work behaviors.  Throughout, I addressed each emotion in 
an isolated manner, as if each emotion occurs separately.  This is only to simplify the 
presentation of the conceptual treatment of discrete emotions.  In reality, several 
emotions could occur simultaneously.  People could experience joy and guilt, joy and 
sadness, pride and anger and so on.  This issue is addressed from a measurement 
perspective in Chapter 3.  
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Table 2.1:  A Cognitive Appraisal Approach to Emotion* 
Emotion GC BC FE CRT EFC TFC 





Guilt low self negative 
Failure to 
















GC: Goal congruence; BC: blame/credit; FE: Future expectancy; CRT: Core relational 
theme; EFC: emotion-focused coping; TFC: Task-focused coping. 
*Adapted from Lazarus and Folkman (1984) as well as Herrald & Tomaka (2001) 
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Table 2.2: Summary of Hypotheses 
Number Hypothesis 
1. Anger is positively related to emotion-focused coping.  
2. Anger is negatively related to task-focused coping.  
3. 
EI moderates the relationship between anger and task-focused coping such that 




EI moderates the relationship between anger and emotion-focused coping such 
that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for 
lower EI individuals. 
5. Guilt is positively related to emotion-focused coping.  
6. Guilt is negatively related to task-focused coping.  
7. 
EI moderates the relationship between guilt and task-focused coping such that 




EI moderates the relationship between guilt and emotion-focused coping such 
that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for 
lower EI individuals. 
9. Joy is negatively related to emotion-focused coping.  
10. Joy is positively related to task-focused coping.  
11. 
EI moderates the relationship between joy and task-focused coping such that 




EI moderates the relationship between joy and emotion-focused coping such 
that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for 
lower EI individuals. 
13. Pride is negatively related to emotion-focused coping.  
14. Pride is positively related to task-focused coping.  
15. 
EI moderates the relationship between pride and task-focused coping such that 





EI moderates the relationship between pride and emotion-focused coping such 
that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for 
lower EI individuals. 
 
17. EI is positively related to task-focused coping.  
18. EI is negatively related to emotion-focused coping.  
19. Task-focused coping is positively related to task performance.  
20. Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to task performance.  
21. Task-focused coping is positively related to OCBI.  
22. Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to OCBI.  
23. Task-focused coping is positively related to OCBO.  
24. Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to OCBO.  
25. Task-focused coping is negatively related to WDB.  
26. Emotion-focused coping is positively related to WDB.  
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Figure 2.1: Anger, Guilt, Coping and EI 
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Figure 2.3: The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Anger 
 
TP: Task Performance; OCBI: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards other individuals; OCBO: 
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards the organization; WDB: Workplace Deviance Behavior 
 
Figure 2.4: The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Guilt 
 
TP: Task Performance; OCBI: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards other individuals; OCBO: 























Figure 2.5: The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Joy 
 
TP: Task Performance; OCBI: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards other individuals; OCBO: 
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards the organization; WDB: Workplace Deviance Behavior 
 
Figure 2.6: The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Pride 
 
TP: Task Performance; OCBI: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards 
other individuals; OCBO: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards the 



























This chapter offers a discussion of the research methods used to test the 
hypotheses detailed in the previous chapter.  First, a brief discussion of the research 
setting and design for Study 1 is presented.  Data collection procedures and 
operationalization of study variables is then discussed, followed by the analytical 
techniques for Study 1.  The above is then repeated for Study 2.  
The pursuit of causal linkages among study variables is one of the stated goals of 
this research.  In this project, I adopted a two-stage research design in order to ensure 
some degree of confidence in internal and external validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979; 
Pedhazhur & Schmelkin, 1991).  I first draw on a laboratory setting.  This is necessary 
for several reasons.  First, a laboratory setting better facilitates elicitation of specific 
emotions (e.g., anger, guilt, joy and pride).  One concern with a field setting is that 
spurious affective constructs could contaminate the experience of target emotions. 
Employees might also be biased against reporting such intense emotions in organizational 
settings.  Second, temporal precedence of independent variables over dependant variables 
cannot be fully ascertained in field settings.  However, with a laboratory setting, one has 
more confidence in the causal ordering of study variables as the elicitation of key 
independent variables drive changes in dependent variables.  A third and perhaps most
75
pertinent reason for a laboratory study is that it offers a high degree of rigor with 
regard to controlling for plausible alternative causal mechanisms.  This is achieved 
through control discussed in full detail below. 
Study 1 
 The sample for Study 1 is drawn from undergraduate business students at a large 
Midwestern university.  Participation was voluntary and confidentiality of responses was 
assured.  The target sample size for this study was 200.  Student samples have been 
severely criticized, especially when combined with the laboratory setting, for artificiality 
and lack of generalizability (Gordon, Slade, & Schmitt, 1986; 1987).  However, my main 
concern here is if the causal relationships proposed can happen, not if they actually will 
happen in work environments.  As such, generalizability to a work setting is not a goal of 
this lab study.  To improve confidence in the external validity of this work, a field study 
(Study 2) was conducted.  With that said, the phenomenon under investigation is 
psychological in nature and lab studies might be more relevant for examination of such 
psychological relationships (Greenberg, 1987).  The main strength of using such a 
controlled setting is that causal mechanisms can be better isolated.  This is more difficult, 
if not impossible, in field settings.  Thus, from an internal validity perspective, this lab 
study is essential to ensuring some degree of confidence in the associated causal 
inferences.  
This study was conducted in two phases.  In the first phase, students were 
randomly assigned to dyads.  Each dyad consisted of one participant and a confederate.  
They then worked on a task that required rank ordering items for survival on the moon.  
Participants were told that this task had correct answers and they would be scored based 
76
upon expert ordering of the same items. Each dyad had the opportunity to win or lose in 
completing the task.  Manipulations designed to elicit anger, guilt, joy and pride were 
built in.  An opportunity to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors directed 
towards other individuals (OCBI) was presented.  Participants also reported on their 
intended OCBIs.  The confederate rated each participant on actual observed behaviors.  
This entire procedure was repeated in the second phase, using different particpants, with 
the only difference being that an opportunity to engage in deviance rather than OCBI was 
presented.  Performance was assessed after the target emotions were elicited via an 
anagram task that has been reliably used to measure task performance in earlier research 
(Erez & Isen, 2002).  Despite hypotheses, OCBOs were not assessed in Study 1, as they 
are not relevant to a simulated setting such as this where there is no organization to direct 
citizenship behaviors toward.  All outcomes, including OCBOs, were assessed in Study 2. 
Design and Procedure 
 The emotion-eliciting event in this study was a manipulation of procedural justice 
perceptions drawn from Weiss et al., (1999).  In one condition, the confederate suggested 
that a friend had already completed the task and shared some of the correct answers 
(biased procedure in favor of the participant).  In another condition, the confederate 
suggested that s/he overheard the other dyad stating that they had some prior knowledge 
of the correct answers (procedure biased against the participant).  Dyads then completed 
the tasks and were given feedback about their performance.  Outcomes were manipulated 
as well, creating two possible outcome conditions, a win (positive outcome) or a loss 
(negative outcome).  This task setting created four emotion-eliciting conditions (see 
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Figure 3.1).  The emotions then acted as the independent variables for coping as 
discussed in later sections.  Participants were offered the opportunity to engage in OCBIs.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3.1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
In phase one, 100 participants reported to the lab in exchange for extra credit in an 
undergraduate business course.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
emotion conditions, resulting in 25 participants per condition.  Two confederates were 
scheduled for each session along with two participants per session.  Confederates were 
recruited from differing colleges and majors (except business) at the university.  I met 
with each confederate beforehand and ensured suitability for the role of the confederate.  
Furthermore, each confederate was given the same emotion condition script to portray 
and was given approximately 3 sessions to practice and train before the start of the actual 
sessions.  The confederate in each case dressed and acted like an undergraduate. 
Participants first reported to a laboratory waiting room.  Participants had no knowledge 
that the confederate was working with me.  Fifty such sessions were conducted over a 
four-week period.  Each session last approximately 35 – 40 minutes.  
After assigning participants to dyads, each dyad was moved to a separate room 
and was asked to fill out a questionnaire assessing state affect.  Then I explained that the 
first task was designed by NASA to examine the dynamics of team performance.  It 
required each dyad to imagine that they just landed on the moon and that their spaceship 
had run out of fuel.  They were to rank order a list of fifteen items in order of importance 
for their survival.  This task is attached in Appendix 1.  The criterion for rank ordering is 
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perceived usefulness of each item for survival in that scenario.  Participants were further 
instructed that NASA’s experts provided the correct ranking.  A win or loss would be 
determined by comparing their rank order to that of the other dyads, with both being 
compared to the rank order of NASA’s experts.  They were also told that the winning 
team would receive a $20 cash prize from NASA, to make this task more relevant to 
them.  The scheduled time for completion of this task was seven minutes, and I left the 
room after giving these instructions.  During this period, the confederate made comments 
to begin manipulating procedural fairness.  I collected the responses after seven minutes 
and left the room, purportedly to score the responses.  I then returned with the results, and 
told each dyad that they either won or lost.  This completed the intended manipulation of 
emotions.  At this stage, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire 
designed to assess emotions generated in response to the fair/unfair procedure and 
positive/negative outcome.  The instructions for this questionnaire asked respondents to 
indicate how they felt right at that instant.  
In one condition (cell 1 in Figure 3.1), participants who were subject to a 
favorably biased procedure and a positive outcome should have experienced joy because 
of perceived goal congruence.  In the same condition, guilt should have been elicited 
because the positive outcome violated personal and societal standards of fairness.  In 
another condition (cell 2), participants who were subject to an unfavorably biased 
procedure and a positive outcome should have experienced both joy, because of goal 
congruence, and pride, as the positive outcome was attributable to the self.  Participants 
should have attributed credit for the positive outcome to themselves as the positive 
outcome occurred in spite of an unfavorable procedure; the win was of their own doing 
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(e.g., Weiss et al., 1999).  In the next condition (cell 3), participants who were subject to 
a favorably biased procedure and a loss should have experienced shame or anger.  If one 
assigned blame for the loss to oneself then shame should have resulted (not of interest), 
but if one attributed blame to the confederate then anger should have resulted (cf. 
Lazarus, 1999).  In the last condition (cell 4), participants who were subject to an 
unfavorable procedure and a loss should have experienced anger, as agency for the 
negative outcome was attributable to the procedure and not to oneself.  This procedure 
has reliably elicited the target emotions in past research (Weiss et al., 1999).  It is 
important to recognize that this procedure was only used to elicit variance in emotions. 
The actual triggering event that elicited each emotion was not important.  As such, 
whether or not specific emotions were elicited in a pattern consistent with the 
manipulations was irrelevant because the emotions themselves served as the independent 
variables.  
After completion of the emotion questionnaire, participants were asked to 
individually work on an anagram task for ten minutes.  This anagram task has been 
reliably used in past laboratory studies as a valid measure of performance on a mentally 
challenging task for undergraduate students (Erez & Isen, 2002).  This test used 10 
anagrams that were to be solved in ten minutes.  The test has right and wrong answers. 
After task completion, they were asked to complete the coping questionnaire.  After 
completion, I faked malfunction of the laptop computer that was in the room that was 
purportedly to be used for an online survey.  I commented that I needed to get it up and 
running to complete the session.  As I left the room to call for help, the confederate in 
each dyad suggested to the participant that they could help repair the computer as s/he 
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has expertise in the area, but the confederate stated that s/he would need help from the 
participant to do so.  Five minutes were allowed to pass to enable enactment of such 
helping behaviors.  At this stage, I returned to the room, and administered the OCBI 
questionnaire.  Each participant reported on intended OCBI while the confederate rated 
him or her on actual helping behaviors.  Participants were then debriefed and given an 
information sheet with a website address, user id and password to complete the MSCEIT.  
The Wunderlic (GMA measure detailed below) data was collected as a part of class time. 
The measure of GMA was necessary to help support incremental validity of the MSCEIT 
over a measure of general intelligence.  
In phase 2, another 100 participants reported to the laboratory.  The entire design 
and procedure described above for phase one was repeated in phase two except that the 
end focus was on the opportunity to engage in deviant behavior.  In the second phase, 
after completion of emotion and coping questionnaires, I left the room appearing upset 
that the laptop computer had failed.  At this stage, the confederate suggested that they 
steal the $20 cash prizes that were mistakenly left in the room.  Five minutes were 
allowed to pass to enable enactment of such deviant behaviors.  After this period, I 
returned and administered the intended WDB questionnaire.  Participants reported on 
her/his intended deviance while the confederate rated them on observed deviance. 
Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.  The MSCEIT and a 
questionnaire designed to assess general mental ability (GMA) were administered as a 
part of class time.  Note that it is essential to have two phases of data collection in order 
to isolate the sources of variance of each outcome behavior, OCBI and WDB.  Moreover, 
the opportunity to engage in two extreme forms of behaviors (OCBI and WDB) presented 
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within the same experimental setting spaced just a few minutes apart might not have been 
very credible nor taken seriously enough by participants.  For example, it might have 
seemed dubious for a confederate to suggest they help the experimenter first and then five 
minutes later suggest some form of deviance. 
In this design, capturing data from more than one source (e.g., self and peer 
reports) and at different points in time served to minimize common method variance.  For 
example, each participant reported emotions, coping and intended OCBI and WDB. The 
confederate assessed observed OCBI and WDB. The MSCEIT and GMA measure were 
administered at different points than the emotion, coping and intended behaviors 
questionnaire. 
Measures 
All measures used in this study are well validated in past research.  Each of these 
is addressed in turn.  Appendix 2 includes a list of all scales used in Study 1 and Study 2 
in their original form.  Appendix 3 includes the surveys used in Study 1, while Appendix 
4 includes the surveys used in Study 2. 
Emotion 
A questionnaire developed by Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O’Connor (1987) 
and later modified by Weiss et al., (1999) was used in this study to assess discrete 
emotions.  The original questionnaire has 213 emotion words grouped under each 
discrete emotion category.  Following Weiss et al., (1999), the emotion questionnaire 
used here was a shortened version of the original Shaver et al., (1987) measure.  This 
measure included 86 emotion words that included the four target emotions (anger = nine 
items; guilt = four items; joy = thirteen items; pride = three items) and other emotions.  
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The instructions for each emotion word read, “Please indicate how you feel right now”.  
The response format used a seven-point Likert scale (one = “not at all” to seven = “very 
much”).  In addition to the four target emotions of interest to this study, several other 
basic emotions such as fear, love, disgust and embarrassment were also included.  Such a 
scheme reduces the demand bias for the target emotions.  Psychometric evidence for this 
measure appears in the Shaver et al., (1987) study and the reliabilities from Study 1 are 
presented in the next chapter.  The surveys used in the lab study are included in Appendix 
3. 
Coping 
 The origin of coping measures traces back to the work of Lazarus and colleagues 
(Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; 1985).  Their measure, known as the Ways of Coping 
questionnaire, has been widely used and examined in the stress literature.  This measure 
has been severely criticized for psychometric problems.  First, it does not display a factor 
structure consistent with its theoretical foundations (Carver et al., 1989).  Specifically, 
several studies reported that more than two factors emerged, even though theoretically it 
is meant to assess two forms of coping, task and emotion (e.g., Aldwin, Folkman, 
Schaefer, Coyne, & Lazarus, 1980; Aldwin & Revenson, 1987; Folkman & Lazarus, 
1985; Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986).  Second, the Ways of Coping questionnaire 
lacks face validity with regard to certain items (Carver et al., 1989).  The third and 
perhaps most fundamental problem with this measure is that it was developed empirically 
rather than theoretically.  Items believed to represent any form of coping were randomly 
selected and subjected to factor analysis.  The results of factor analysis revealed certain 
dimensions that are not strongly theoretically linked (Carver et al., 1989).  These authors 
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also noted that the same problems apply to other popular measures of coping (e.g., 
Billings & Moos, 1981; 1984; Stone & Neale, 1984).  
In response to these issues plaguing the operationalization of coping, Carver and 
colleagues (1989) developed a theoretically based measure of coping, known as the 
COPE inventory.  The COPE inventory has demonstrated reliability with Cronbach’s 
alpha for each component underlying task-focused and emotion-focused coping 
exceeding .7.  The factor structure that emerged from exploratory factor analysis was 
consistent with theoretical predictions, though no confirmatory factor analytic results 
were reported.  However, Carver et al., (1989) indicated that the COPE inventory 
demonstrated convergent validity by way of theoretically expected associations with 
measures assessing similar constructs.  For example, components of task-focused coping 
(active coping and planning) were positively correlated with trait optimism and hardiness 
and negatively associated with trait anxiety and type A personality (correlations in the |
.25 -. 30 | range) (Carver et al., 1989).  Similarly, components of emotion-focused coping 
(mental, behavioral, alcohol and drug disengagement) were positively associated with 
trait anxiety and negatively associated with trait optimism and hardiness (correlations 
were in the | .25-. 35 | range) (Carver et al., 1989).  They further reported that the results 
of exploratory factor analysis supported the distinctness of the COPE inventory from 
these personality constructs, as expected (cf. Carver et al., 1989).  Other studies have 
reported both a factor structure consistent with its theoretical predictions and acceptable 
reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha values exceeding .8) (cf. Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; 
Penley, Tomaka, Goldsmith, Herrald & Palacios-Esquivel, 1997).  
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The instruction for this inventory asked respondents to think about which of the 
following strategies they most used in dealing with a specific event (i.e., the anagram task 
that followed emotion elicitation).  Respondents rated their coping strategy on a four-
point scale (one = “I did not do this at all” to four = “I did this a lot”).  It included five 
components under task-focused coping: active coping, planning, suppression of 
competing activities, restraint coping and positive reinterpretation.  Emotion-focused 
coping included five components: denial, behavioral disengagement, mental 
disengagement, alcohol and drug disengagement and venting emotions.  In addition, the 
COPE inventory assesses the following dimensions that do not load on either task or 
emotion-focused coping: seeking social support for instrumental reasons, seeking social 
support for emotional reasons, acceptance and turning to religion.  These four dimensions 
are not of interest in this study.  
Theoretically, some of the focal dimensions should be modestly correlated while 
others should not be correlated (Carver et al., 1989).  For example, the polar opposite 
dimensions of acceptance and denial were weakly correlated.  Carver et al., (1989) 
contend that this pattern lends credence to Cognitive Appraisal Theory’s position that 
people engage in a wide range of coping responses.  I also note that the COPE inventory 
assesses a wider range of coping responses than are theoretically of concern to the current 
study.  This feature is especially attractive as it casts a wider net to capture coping 
responses that might go unassessed by other measures discussed earlier.  A copy of the 
original COPE inventory is attached in Appendix 2.  
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Task Performance  
Task performance was assessed via the anagram-solving task used in Erez and 
Isen (2002).  The task includes ten anagrams to be solved in ten minutes.  Every anagram 
on the test has only one correct answer.  Performance is computed as the number of 
correct answers on the test with a minimum of zero and a maximum possible score of ten.  
This test appears in its entirety in Appendix 2.  
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCB)  
 OCBs were assessed using fifteen items (eight for OCBI and seven for OCBO) 
taken from previous OCB scales.  Past research that has examined the effects of discrete 
emotions on OCBs has used this measure and has found it to demonstrate acceptable 
reliability (Lee & Allen, 2002).  Sample items include “show genuine concern and 
interest toward other participants/coworkers” and “willingly gives her/his time to help 
other participants/coworkers”.  Confirmatory factor analysis of these fifteen items 
indicated loadings as hypothesized across two factors, OCBI and OCBO (Lee & Allen, 
2002).  The wording of these items were changed to reflect intended OCBI reported by 
each participant (one = “very slightly or not at all” to five = “definitely”).  The 
confederate rated the participant’s helping behaviors towards the confederate on a 
dichotomous scale (one = “did help” and zero = “did not help”).  The OCBO items are 
not relevant to this lab study and so were not assessed.  Items appear in Appendix 2. 
Workplace Deviance Behavior (WDB) 
 WDB was measured using a 28-item scale developed by Bennett & Robinson 
(2000).  This scale was psychometrically tested and used in Lee and Allen (2002).  
Sample items include “cursed at someone at work”, and “told someone about the lousy 
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place where you work”.  This measure included a five- point response format (one = 
“very slightly or not at all” to seven = “definitely did this”).  The reliability of this 
measure was .84 in the Lee and Allen (2002) study.  The target participant reported on 
intended deviance on items that are relevant to this simulated setting (20 of the possible 
28 items were used).  The confederate rated each participant’s deviance on a dichotomous 
scale (one = “engaged in this behavior” and zero = “did not engage in this behavior”).  
This scale was used in its entirety in the field study (Study 2).  This measure appears in 
Appendix 2.  
Emotional Intelligence 
The MSCEIT v.2.0 represents the latest operationalization of EI.  It succeeds the 
MSCEIT research version 1.1 and the MEIS.  The following description of the content in 
the MSCEIT is drawn from Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2004).  The MSCEIT is a 141-
item mental ability test with eight different sets of tasks.  Two sets of tasks are used to 
measure each of the four branches of EI.  Branch 1, perception, is measured through a 
faces task, in which participants are asked to identify emotions in faces, and pictures, in 
which participants are asked to identify emotions conveyed by landscapes and designs. 
The second branch, using emotion to facilitate thought, is measured through two subsets 
of tasks.  The first is sensations in which participants are asked to compare emotions to 
other tactile and sensory stimuli.  The second set of tasks is known as facilitation, in 
which participants identify specific emotions that might best facilitate a certain type of 
thinking.  Changes and blends measure the third branch, understanding emotions. 
Changes test a participant’s ability to understand under what circumstance emotion 
intensity increases or decreases and how one emotion changes into another.  Blends 
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assess the ability to identify complex emotion blends.  The fourth branch, managing 
emotion, includes emotion management and emotion relationships.  Emotion 
management presents participants with hypothetical scenarios and asks how they might 
maintain or change their emotions.  Emotion relationships assess the ability to manage 
self and other’s emotions so that a desired outcome is achieved (Mayer et al., 2004).  
One issue that deserves mention is the scoring method of the MSCEIT.  The 
scoring methods employed in the MSCEIT are expert and consensus based.  Hitherto, 
controversy about these forms of scoring was rampant, as the two forms of scoring did 
not correlate.  This inconsistency between consensus and expert scores was partly due to 
the use of just two experts in the earlier versions of the MSCEIT (cf. Mayer et al., 2001). 
However, recently, Mayer and colleagues have switched to the use of twenty-one well-
known emotion experts (Mayer et al., 2003).  The correspondence between expert and 
consensus scoring ranges from a low of .94 to a high of .99 for each of the eight tasks 
described earlier (Mayer et al., 2005).  Thus, the controversy surrounding the scoring 
method seems to be resolved, at least for now.  
Preliminary evidence from a number of studies (e.g., Giganac, 2005; Mayer, et 
al., 2003) indicates that the MSCEIT demonstrates acceptable reliabilities at the 
individual factor and overall scale level (Cronbach’s alpha values at specific dimension 
and overall scale levels have exceeded .8).  Two week test–retest reliabilities were 
relatively high (r =. 86; Brackett & Mayer, 2003), indicating support for the stability of 
the MSCEIT.  The underlying four factors detailed earlier are reasonably intercorrelated 
and yet distinct from each other (r =.17 - .59).  Confirmatory factor analyses indicated 
better fit for an a priori four-factor structure as compared to two-factor and three-factor 
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solutions (Mayer et al., 2005; Brackett & Mayer, 2003).  The MSCEIT correlates with 
general cognitive intelligence (r =.30).  It has shown discriminant validity beyond general 
intelligence and the big five personality dimensions (Mayer et al., 2001; Mayer et al., 
2003).  In keeping with prior research, a total (composite) EI score as well as underlying 
dimensions are examined in all analyses (e.g., Mayer et al., 2003).  
Control variables 
 In this section, I will briefly describe the operationalization of study controls.  
The first of these are state positive and negative affect.  This measure of baseline mood is 
required to facilitate statistical control of pre experimental levels of mood.  State PA and 
NA were assessed using the profile of Positive and Negative Affective Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988).  Such state affect measurement is necessary 
to improve confidence that mood effects do not contaminate emotion reports and is in 
keeping with the precedent set in past emotion research (cf. Brown et al., 2005; Herrald 
& Tomaka, 2002; Weiss et al., 1999).     
As with any new and developing research domain, the discriminant and 
incremental validity of EI over existing measures of intelligence needs be supported, 
specifically so with this set of work outcomes.  Several studies have now reported that the 
MSCEIT is distinct from general mental ability and verbal intelligence.  Correlations 
between the MSCEIT and GMA typically are in the .3-.4 range (cf. Brackett & Mayer, 
2003).  However, the test authors recommend partialling out the variance of GMA before 
making predictive validity inferences regarding the MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2005).  In 
keeping with these recommendations, general mental ability is used as a statistical control 
in this study.  
89
General mental ability was assessed using the well-validated Wunderlic Personnel 
Test (WPT).  It consists of fifty questions designed to assess one’s general reasoning and 
problem solving skills.  The duration of the test is 12 minutes. Correlations between this 
short measure of general mental ability and much longer measures such as the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale have exceeded .7 to .8 (Table 15, WPT Users’ manual).  As 
such, the WPT is believed to measure general intelligence accurately.  Furthermore, the 
WPT has demonstrated acceptable reliabilities and predictive validity for important work 
and life outcomes (see WPT users’ manual).  For example, a comprehensive meta 
analysis of accumulated research on the WPT indicates that validity coefficients with 
college grades, biodata, education and interview outcomes range from a low of .11 to a 
high of .33 (cf. Hunter & Hunter, 1984).  
Analytical Techniques 
 First, descriptive statistics for all study variables and their reliabilities were 
computed.  Simple bivariate correlations were computed to ensure that all study 
relationships are in the expected direction.  All hypotheses, including the moderating role 
of EI in the relationship between emotion and coping, were analyzed through moderated 
multiple regression (MMR). Two MMR models, one with each form of coping (task and 
emotion) as dependent variables, were run with all four emotions and EI as simultaneous 
predictors.  In the first step, state affect and GMA (control variables), all four emotions 
and EI were entered.  In the second step, the four interaction terms (emotion * EI) were 
entered.  In the absence of interactions, main effects were examined.  The models for 
these regression runs were as follows: 
 TFC = b0+ b1 (anger) + b2 (guilt) + b3 (joy) + b4 (pride) + b5 (EI) + error (3.1) 
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TFC= b0+ b1 (anger) + b2 (guilt) + b3 (joy) + b4 (pride) + b5 (EI) + b6 (anger* EI) + b7 (guilt * EI) 
+ b8 (joy* EI) + b9 (pride * EI) + error (3.2)                                                             
Note that the sample size for these regression runs was 200.  In the preceding 
discussion of analytical strategies, control variables were not included in equations 3.1 
and 3.2 for the sake of clarity and simplicity.  State affect and GMA were included in 
equations 3.1 and 3.2 in the actual analyses.  In equation 3.1, coefficients b1 - b4 capture 
the main effects of each emotion (anger, guilt, joy and pride) on TFC (Hypotheses 2, 6, 
10, 14 respectively), while b5 in equation 3.1 captures the main effect of EI on TFC 
(Hypothesis 17).  In equation 3.2, coefficients b6 - b9 represent the interaction effect of 
each emotion (anger, guilt, joy and pride), respectively with EI.  If any of these 
coefficients are significant and there is a significant improvement in R2 from equation 3.1 
to 3.2, then there is support for the moderation of EI on the relationship between emotion 
and TFC (Hypotheses 3, 7, 11 and 15, respectively).  If the interactions are not 
significant, main effects of each emotion (coefficients b1 through b4 in equation 1) and EI 
(b5 from equation 1) were interpreted.  Similar models were run to test the hypotheses 
related to emotion-focused coping (EFC) as an outcome.       
Next, two more OLS regression models were estimated.  The first model included 
task and emotion-focused coping as predictors of actual OCBI, while the second model 
used intended OCBI as the outcome.  Note that the sample size for each of these 
regression runs was 100.  In the first instance, the dependent variable, actual OCBI, was 
dichotomous.  Hence, logistic regression was used to estimate this model.  Intended 
OCBI was modeled using OLS regression.  The regression models are as follows: 
 OCBI (actual) = b0 + b1 (TFC) + b2 (EFC) + error                                          (3.3) 
 OCBI (intended) = b0 + b1 (TFC) + b2 (EFC) + error                                      (3.4) 
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OCBI indicates organizational citizenship behaviors directed towards individuals 
(the confederate in this case).  In equations 3.3 and 3.4, coefficients b1 and b2 capture the 
effect of each form of coping on OCBI (Hypotheses 21 and 22, respectively).  Similar 
models were run for actual and intended WDB.   
Study 2 
The setting for the field study was a municipal police department (site 1) and a 
college campus police department (site 2).  At the time of the study, site 1 had 110 active 
employees: 71 sworn police officers and 36 civilians with a paramilitary-based command 
structure including a Chief of Police, Major, Captains, Lieutenants, and various 
administrative supervisors.  Site 1 included two overarching functional classifications, 
operations and services.  The operations division included subunits such as criminal 
investigations and detection unit, special projects investigations team (SPIT), special 
operations team (SOT), drug abuse resistance program (DARE), patrol, animal control 
and jail supervision.  The services division included thirty-one civilians who perform a 
variety of functions such as dispatch, record maintenance, information specialization, 
training and firearms specialization.  Demographic characteristics of the overall sample 
are as follows: 102 White, 3 African American, 1 Asian-Pacific Islander and 4 American 
Indian.  The average age was 39.01 years with 83 men and 27 women. The average 
tenure with the site 1 is 11.45 years.   
Site 2 had 42 full time employees at the time of the study with four employees 
deployed in conflict and/or on medical leave.  Demographic data for this site were not 
available.  Overall, the total possible sample size for the field portion was approximately 
148.  I conducted a number of informal interviews with study participants, including the 
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deputy chief of police at site 1 and chief of police at site 2, to understand the nature of the 
setting and determine qualitative answers to certain questions about the sample.  These 
observations regarding the nature of the sample are summarized briefly and tie into the 
design proposed next. 
Do intense emotions such as anger, guilt, joy and pride occur in such a setting? 
I observed an officer for an entire day (10 a.m. to 8 p.m.).  Several incidents occurred 
throughout the course of this observation.  In one such incident, a victim of a traffic 
accident complained that the officer had misrepresented the events of the accident in 
writing a report of the same the previous day.  The officer admitted to a mistake and 
assured the victim that the report was now corrected.  In spite of this assurance, the 
victim accused the officer of being careless and threatened to complain to his chief.  The 
officer calmly apologized for the inconvenience and reassured the victim.  After the 
phone call ended, he was visibly angry as he claimed the victim had insulted him in spite 
of his best efforts to ameliorate the situation.  This anger was expressed through verbal 
and physical channels.  In another instance, the officer was able to resolve a domestic 
dispute satisfactorily and this led to admitted joy expressed through light-heartedness and 
renewed vigor in responding to a partner’s request for help.  In one last instance, this 
officer prevented an older woman’s home from being burglarized. Interestingly, he first 
expressed guilt that the woman’s personal space was violated.  He claimed that law 
enforcement had failed in its duties as a law-abiding civilian’s property was threatened in 
broad daylight.  At the end of the episode, which lasted approximately five hours, the 
officer said he was proud of his investigative skills, as the woman was safe.  These 
instances point to the possibility of intense emotion occurring regularly in this setting.  
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Range restriction and non-response bias
The other issue concerns the cynical nature of a vast majority of this sample.  
Interviews with the Deputy Chief and individual officers pointed at the intensely 
suspicious psyche of police officers.  This suspicious nature could potentially translate 
into range restriction on reporting of their partner’s behaviors (e.g., task performance, 
OCBs, WDBs).  This is because of loyalty to their partners, fear of management 
accessing this information, and cynicism associated with giving such information to an 
outside investigator.  Furthermore, participants might not respond to the survey items, as 
they are intensely protective of their own and each other’s well-being. While this issue is 
by no means novel to this study, as it faces nearly every field researcher (cf. 
Roth, Iddekinge, Huffcutt, Eidson &Bobko, 2002; Sackett & Yang, 2000; Borman, 
1991), it seems particularly threatening in this sample.  Several steps were taken to 
minimize this type of range restriction and non-response to the extent possible.  
Towards this end, I engaged in a series of credibility building exercises with the 
police officers without disclosing the intent of the study.  For example, during a ten-hour 
“ride along”, I was able to dispel one officer’s suspicions regarding my intent in 
observing him.  After a frank discussion in which I assured him that I was not a 
management plant, this officer’s attitude changed dramatically.  This attitude change was 
marked by a more open discussion of police duties and frustrations, culminating in this 
officer convincing a few of his fellow officers that I was trustworthy.  Similar exercises 
with a number of key informal group leaders were attempted to gain their confidence and 
convince them that the study was completely confidential.  I acknowledge that this might 
not have completely dispelled their suspicions, yet might have encouraged their 
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participation.  Moreover, such issues are characteristic of most field research and it is the 
responsibility of the researcher to anticipate and ameliorate them to the greatest extent 
possible.  The final step in ensuring accuracy in reporting will concern the design of 
anchors for each measure, and these are described in detail below. 
Research Design 
This study was a longitudinal field study with repeated measures taken on each 
participant for five consecutive days.  The definition of emotion as a dynamic construct 
necessitates two aspects in its measurement.  First, the measure of emotion should be as 
close to its actual occurrence as possible to minimize retrospective bias.  Second, it is a 
reaction to a particular event or entity.  To accommodate these two aspects, participants 
reported on the most critical work event at the end of the same day.  This ensured that the 
emotion measure is based on an event and captured very close to its actual occurrence. 
Research support exists for the position that participants can accurately recall their 
specific emotions for the same day but not for the past week, month and so on (Amabile, 
Barsade, Mueller & Staw, 2005).  
One alternative for such episodic measurement relies on the Experience Sampling 
Method (ESM).  The ESM technique involves the sampling of emotion experiences 
several times a day at either predetermined, equally spaced or random intervals.  This 
type of emotion measurement is not suitable to the current research goals for several 
reasons.  First, emotions such as anger, guilt, joy and pride are intense and occur at 
unpredictable times in the natural environment.  Random sampling ensures the accuracy 
of capturing low intensity affective states, yet might ignore the most emotionally 
demanding events of the day.  Second, the ESM technique is prohibitively expensive as it 
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typically involves the use of hand held PDAs.  Moreover, recently Green, Rafaeli, Shrout, 
Bolger and Reis (2006) have shown the equivalence of data obtained from ESM and 
paper and pencil Daily Reconstruction Methods (to be described later).  The third concern 
with ESM is that it might hinder the responsibilities of this study’s participants.  For 
example, a police officer that is in active pursuit of a suspect might not be able to respond 
to survey questions when the ESM prompts her/him to do so.  In fact, the only time when 
they might be able to respond to ESM prompts is if they were on patrol.  My experience 
with their job structure suggests that this is a rather rare occurrence for most officers.  
Generally, they are in active pursuit of suspects based on a tip from dispatch.  
An alternative technique is episodic measurement, which requires structuring the 
participants’ days around specific work episodes.  Beal et al., (2005), the original 
proponents of this approach in the management literature, suggested that episodes could 
be structured around goals to be achieved in each work episode.  This technique is not 
feasible either, as structured episodes that could be predetermined are not plausible for 
this sample.  For example, a university professor’s job could be split into episodes as 
follows: teach class from eight-ten, office hours from ten-twelve, lunch from noon-one, 
research activity from one-three, faculty meeting from three-five, and so on.  However, 
police officers typically respond to events as they happen and each episode has no clear 
beginning and ending point.  In most instances, the beginning and ending point of their 
workdays cannot be predetermined either.  While each shift is meant to last for ten hours, 
very rarely do shifts end in such an organized fashion.  In one instance, a police officer 
that reported to a shift at 7 a.m. was meant to get off at 5 p.m.  However, this officer was 
able to sign off only at 10 p.m., as they were in the middle of an incident that started 
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around 4 p.m. and ended at 8 p.m.  After the incident, he returned to the office to 
complete all paperwork, which took another couple of hours.  In light of these contextual 
considerations, the best-suited approach to this sample is the critical work event 
(incident) technique.  The procedure for data collection using this technique is detailed 
below. 
Data Collection Procedures 
The Daily Reconstruction Method (DRM) requires respondents to reconstruct 
their day as a series of episodes, and it has been shown to be a valid means for accessing 
affective processes (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004).  This 
technique has been used to study affective processes in the management literature with 
slight modifications (Amabile et al., 2005).  In the current study, respondents were asked 
to reconstruct the most critical work event for that day in as much detail as possible. They 
then reported their emotions and coping mechanisms in response to that event.  This 
procedure is detailed below. 
The chiefs of site 1 and site 2 sent out a memo supporting the study and 
requesting that all employees consider participating in this survey.  They further clarified 
that this study was being conducted for academic purposes and only I would have access 
to data (i.e., confidentiality was assured).  Next, each sergeant or supervisor similarly 
requested employees to participate as well.  Small gifts were given to each participant 
after questionnaire completion for the 5 days.  Prior research suggests that small 
incentives for each participant elicit better response rates than a raffle or drawing with 
prizes (e.g., Porter & Whitcomb, 2003).  I was present on site each day for five days at 
each shift change to administer and retrieve the completed questionnaires.  While 
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administering the questionnaire, I met with each employee, explained the overall purpose 
of the study (e.g., stress research in law enforcement settings), and solicited their 
participation.  They were further instructed to drop off their completed surveys in a 
locked drop box centrally located in the PDs and to which only I had access.  The 
employee’s name and badge number were used for purposes of identification and 
matching of surveys.  All participation was voluntary and completely confidential.  At the 
end of their shift each day, respondents were asked to fill out the above-mentioned 
questionnaires.  In this questionnaire, participants were instructed to think about the most 
critical work event for that day.  The instructions for this part, used in past research 
(Amabile et al., 2005; Kahneman et al., 2004), read as follows: 
“Please choose one event from today in which you worked with another officer 
and that stands out in your mind as particularly demanding or important.  Think of this 
event as a continuous series of scenes like in a film.  Give each scene a brief name to help 
you remember it (e.g., interrogated suspect, searched suspect, background check on 
suspect).  Try to remember as much detail as possible about each scene.  Describe this 
event in detail, kind of like writing in your diary.  Now, describe your feelings about the 
event, your work on the event and your fellow officer’s feelings about the event.  Add 
anything else you would like to report about this event.” 
Note that this portion (known as the free response section) did not ask participants 
to think about the target emotions of this study at all.  They were specifically asked to 
focus on that day’s event rather than provide retrospective reports.  Thus, this type of 
reporting called for specific events close in time to when they happened, with no 
prompting, and since confidentiality of participation was assured, these reports could be 
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thought of as largely accurate descriptions of events, thoughts and emotions that 
participants could have experienced (Amabile et al., 2005).  This portion of the 
questionnaire was qualitative only and not used for any statistical analysis.  This type of 
data collection combines the critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954) and DRM 
(Kahneman et al., 2004).  This method is routinely used in psychology research on 
affective processes (e.g., Flanagan, 1954) and, more recently, in management literature 
on affective processes and their effects on creativity (Amabile et al., 2005).  
Next, participants were asked to think about how they felt about that critical work 
event.  A list of emotion words as described in Study 1 was presented.  The response 
format used a five-point Likert scale (one = “very slightly or not at all” to five = “very 
much”).  In addition to the four target emotions of interest to this study, several other 
basic emotions such as fear, love, disgust and embarrassment were also included.  Such a 
scheme reduces the demand bias for the target emotions.  Participants then filled out the 
COPE inventory as discussed in Study 1.  
Each participant was then instructed to think about the fellow employee that s/he 
most closely worked with during the critical work event.  They were instructed to give 
that employee a packet containing the task performance, OCB and WDB survey.  The 
packet that each employee gave a coworker included a slip on the outside that described 
the event that the target employee had referred to as the critical event, time and location 
of the event.  This ensured that responses on the event, emotions, coping, and behaviors 
were matched.  On occasions where an employee worked on an event by her/himself 
then, they were instructed to fill out the behavioral ratings themselves.  Approximately 
33% of all returned behavioral surveys were self rated, while the remaining 66 % were 
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other rated.  I provide specific details about each behavioral outcome in the next chapter.  
The MSCEIT was completed online by the employees during a four-week period.  All 
surveys used in Study 2 appear in Appendix 4.   Twnety nine usable surveys were 
returned that could also be matched up with MSCEIT data.   Thus the response rate for 
study 2 was 20%.  
Measures 
 Most measures used in this study were identical to that of Study 1.  However, 
some measures were different to help accommodate the accurate assessment of behaviors 
in this sample.  First, the coping, OCB, WDB and EI assessments were the same as in 
Study 1.  For the emotion measure, the 86-item emotion measure used in Study 1 was cut 
down to 46 words in this study.  The reduction was accomplished through the deletion of 
non-focal emotion words.  The anchors for OCB and WDB scales were changed to 
encourage enough variance in ratings as participants might be biased towards the more 
positive anchor in the traditional response format.  Additionally, this type of anchoring 
was designed to minimize non-response and invalid responses to the greatest extent 
possible.  For the WDB scale, the response format employed a five-point scale (one = 
“very slightly or not at all” to five = “definitely did this”).  For the OCB scale, the 
response format utilized a five-point scale (one = “did not do this at all” to five = 
“definitely did this a lot”).  As noted earlier, this change in anchoring was meant to 
encourage respondents to report on their partner’s behaviors.  
Task performance 
 Patrol performance on the focal task was observed by the partner and was 
reported by the partner.  The measure that was used was developed from a standard 
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measure currently in use at this organization.  This measure meets the industry standards 
for performance appraisals in law enforcement.  This measure was slightly modified and 
shortened to make it more suitable to the current study’s requirement of performance 
appraisal for a single event.  The instructions for this scale asked respondents to indicate, 
on a seven-point scale (one = “acceptable” to seven = “exceptional”), the observed 
behavior for the target officer for that particular event.  An additional anchor on the 
seven-point scale was NO, which stands for “not observed”.  This would be an 
appropriate response when a particular behavior is not relevant to a given situation.  For 
example, a traffic related incident might not elicit any behavior relating to criminal 
procedures, thereby eliciting a NO rating.  This measure consisted of three components, 
specifically, knowledge, performance and relationships.  The knowledge dimension 
includes the following five items:  departmental policies/procedures, criminal statues, city 
ordinances, traffic codes, and code of criminal procedure.  The performance dimension 
includes the following twelve items: driving skill, orientation and response time to calls, 
field performance, investigative skills, interview/ interrogation skills, officer safety, 
control of conflict, problem solving, decision making, radio usage: listening and 
comprehension, radio usage: appropriate use of codes/procedures, and radio usage: 
articulations of transmissions.  The relationships dimension includes the following three 
items: with citizens in general, with ethnic groups other than one’s own, and with other 
department members.  This patrol performance measure was only used with site 1.  Task 
performance for all civilian employees and all employees of site 2 was measured using a 
seven-item measure developed by Williams and Andersen (1991).  The instructions for 
all behavioral outcomes asked that the target person be rated on the behaviors described 
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in the timeframe during the incident or immediately thereafter.  Sample items included 
“adequately completed assigned duties” and “performed tasks that are expected of 
her/him”.  These measures appear in Appendix 2. 
 
Analytical Techniques 
 Preliminary investigations of the data included computation of descriptive 
statistics, simple bivariate correlations and reliabilities for scales.  The analysis of 
longitudinal data presents significant challenges compared to analyses of cross sectional 
data.  Bliese and Ployhart (2002) note that such complexity is both conceptual and 
methodological in nature.  Conceptually, one needs to determine the specific goals of 
analyzing data from a particular methodological perspective.  The goal is to uncover 
patterns of covariation as detailed in hypotheses 1-26 (e.g., covariation between each 
emotion and coping on the one hand, and covariation between coping and behaviors on 
the other).  Such within person variability represents level one of the analyses described 
below.  The next conceptual goal is to examine if the emotion-coping patterns are 
contingent upon an individual’s level of EI.  This represents level two of the analyses 
because EI is an inter individual difference that is hypothesized to moderate the intra 
individual relationship between emotions and coping.  EI is also expected to affect coping 
directly.  
The analytical technique for this study was a repeated measures analysis using the 
Random Coefficient Modeling (RCM) framework (e.g., Bliese & Ployhart, 2002).  RCM 
is superior to basic regression for two important conceptual reasons.  First, data using 
repeated measures captures intraindividual variability over time, and the observations at 
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each period (e.g., time t1) are not independent of observations at another time point (e.g., 
time t4).  Multiple responses from an individual will tend to be correlated.  As such, the 
assumption of independence of observations that underlies most statistical techniques is 
violated.  Failing to account for this violation can result in biased significance testing.  
RCM can account for this non-independence.  Second, repeated measures with non-
independence can often yield complex error structures that, if not accounted for, can bias 
significance testing.  RCM allows for such complex error structures.  Regression cannot 
accommodate these methodological factors of non-independence of study observations 
and complex error structures.  RCM allows level one coefficients to randomly vary across 
individuals.  These estimates are based on pooled estimates of all observations on that 
individual for all the periods under consideration and an estimate based on data from all 
other individuals.  
Level 1 
 With regard to terminology, I reserve the use of RCM in referring to the class of 
models used for simultaneously modeling intraindividual relationships with 
interindividual predictors (cf. Ployhart, Holtz & Bliese, 2002).  Hierarchical Linear 
Modeling (HLM) (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Bryk, Raudenbush & Congdon, 1994) is 
used to refer to one of the software programs adopted to run these RCM models (Ployhart 
et al., 2002).  The following section presents models at level 1 and level 2 in RCM using 
HLM terminology (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Bryk et al., 1994).  
First, I estimated the basic null model in which task-focused coping is only 
modeled as a function of the individual.  This partitions variance in the outcome into 
within and between person components.  From the null model, if the ICC (between 
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person variance/total variance) values exceeded .10 for the focal outcome, examination of 
the RCM model is justified as the between individual variance is substantial enough to 
justify repeated measures analyses (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002).  The model for level one 
relationships between task-focused coping and each of the four emotions takes the 
following form: 
Level 1  
 (TFC) ij = π0j + π1j (anger) + π2j (guilt) +π3j (joy) + π4j (pride) + rij         (3.5)  
In this equation, i is used to denote time (e.g., 0-4), j denotes respondent, π0j 
represents the intercept, π1j- π4j the slopes relating emotion to TFC, and rij is the within 
person residual error.  However, the most important step is to uncover inter individual 
differences in coping in response to emotion.  Such differences are modeled by EI in my 
model, and this represents level two of this analyses as EI is a between person difference 
that could potentially affect the nature of emotion-coping relationships at the within 
person level. 
 Level 2 
 π0j = β00 + β01j (EI) + uoj                                                                                                                (3.6) 
The β01j coefficient in equation 3.6 captures the main effect of EI on TFC with 
TFC pooled across all five times.  As such, this coefficient provides a test of Hypothesis 
17.  Now, introducing EI as a predictor of slope variability captures the moderating effect 
of EI as follows: 
 π1j = β10j +β11j (EI) + u1j                                           (3.7) 
 π2j = β20j+β21j (EI) + u2j  (3.8) 
 π3j = β30j+β31j (EI) + u3j                                                                                                                   (3.9) 
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π4j = β40j+ β41j (EI) + u4j                 (3.10) 
 From equation 3.7, β21j indicates the moderating effect of EI on the relationship 
between anger and TFC, thereby providing a test of Hypothesis 3.  Similarly, in equations 
3.8 -3.10, β21j, β31j and β41j capture the interaction effects of each of the other emotions 
(guilt, joy and pride, respectively) with EI.  These coefficients offer a test of Hypotheses 
7, 11 and 15, respectively.  This completes the analyses of the effects of emotions on 
task-focused coping, and the main and moderating effect of EI on the relationship 
between emotion and task-focused coping.  This entire series of analyses was repeated 
using emotion-focused coping as the outcome to test the hypotheses concerning the 
effects of emotions on emotion-focused coping, and the main and moderating effect of 
EI.  
Finally, the relationship between each form of coping and behavior needed to be 
modeled.  The first step was to run a null model.  An appreciable ICC value will justify 
further RCM analyses.  Task performance is modeled as follows: 
 (Task performance) ij = π0j + π1j (TFC) + π2j (EFC) + rij                           (3.11) 
 π0j = β00 + uoj                                  (3.12) 
 π1j = β10+ u1j          (3.13) 
 π2j = β20+ u2j                                                        (3.14) 
β10 from equation 3.13 and β20 from equation 3.14 capture the effects of TFC and 
EFC on task performance, respectively, thereby providing a test of hypotheses 19 and 20.  
Similar equations were estimated for OCBI, OCBO and WDB.  With these set of 
equations, we have now modeled intra individual change in coping as a function of 
emotion and intraindividual change in behaviors as a function of coping mechanisms.  
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Study one consisted of two phases of data collection.  Phase one included WDB 
as an outcome while phase two included OCBI as an outcome, with each phase using 
different subjects.  First, descriptive statistics for all study variables and their reliabilities 
were computed.  Simple bivariate correlations were computed to ensure that all study 
relationships were in the expected direction.  These results are presented in Table 4.1 on 
the main diagonal.  All Chronbach’s alphas were over 0.70 and most were over .80.  All 
bivariate correlations were in the expected direction.  I only discuss the most important 
correlations here in the interest of conciseness, but Table 4.1 presents all correlations for 
variables included in this study.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Anger positively correlated with guilt (r = 0.46; p < 0.01), negatively correlated 
with joy (r = -0.30, p < 0.01), positively correlated with EFC (r = 0.15, p < 0.05) and 
positively correlated with intended workplace deviance (r = 0.25, p < 0.01).  Similarly,
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guilt was negatively correlated with joy (r = -0.14, p < 0.05), positively 
correlated with EFC (r = 0.25, p < 0.01) and positively correlated with intended 
workplace deviance (r = 0.22, p < 0.01).  Furthermore, a negative correlation was found 
between EI and guilt (r = -0.14; p < 0.05).  These preliminary analyses suggest that guilt 
related to each study variable stronger than did anger. 
Joy and pride were also strongly positively correlated (r = 0.71, p < 0.01), 
suggesting that these two discrete emotions co occur quite a bit.  Joy (r = 0.20, p < 0.01) 
and pride (r = 0.26, p < 0.01) were associated with TFC in the expected directions.  
Rather surprisingly, EI was not related to either TFC or EFC.  However, EI did reveal a 
negative correlation with intended WDB (r = -0.29; p < 0.01) and a positive correlation 
with task performance (r = 0.26; p < 0.01).  TFC was positively correlated with EFC (r = 
0.15; p < 0.05), indicating that TFC and EFC co occur, at least to some degree.  This 
suggests that people could engage in both forms of coping simultaneously.  TFC was 
positively correlated with intended OCBI (r = 0.30; p < 0.01), intended WDB (r = 0.12; p 
< 0.10) and task performance (r = 0.26; p < 0.01).   
EFC was positively correlated with intended WDB (r = 0.27; p < 0.01).  
Interestingly, EFC was negatively correlated with the understanding emotions dimension 
of EI (r = -0.15; p < 0.05).  This relationship supports of my original theorizing wherein I 
had suggested that individuals with higher EI would engage in less EFC.  While that 
relationship did not appear at the overall EI level, it does seem to exist at the underlying 
dimension level.  This also indicates the value of examining underlying EI dimensions in 
addition to overall global scores.  
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In terms of outcome behaviors, intended WDB displayed negative correlations 
with each dimension of EI:  perception (r = -0.20; p < 0.01), using emotion to facilitate 
thought (r = -0.24; p < 0.01), understanding emotions (r = -0.20; p < 0.01) and managing 
emotions (r = -0.25; p < 0.01).  Task Performance was positively correlated with each 
dimension of EI:  perception (r = 0.21; p < 0.01), using emotion to facilitate thought (r = 
0.16; p < 0.05), understanding emotions (r = 0.29; p < 0.01) and managing emotions (r = 
0.14; p < 0.05).  
In addition, correlations amongst the dimensions of EI and gender are also 
reported in Table 4.1 for the sake of completeness.   
Analytical Overview 
The moderating role of EI in the relationship between discrete emotions and 
coping was analyzed through ordinary least squares regression.  Two hierarchical 
moderated multiple regression (MMR) models, one with each form of coping (task and 
emotion) serving as dependent variables, were run with all four emotions and EI as well 
as their interactions, as simultaneous predictors.  For all analyses to follow, in the first 
step, the control variables (state affect, General Mental Ability (GMA)) and the 
predictors (all four emotions and EI) were entered.  In the second step, the four 
interaction terms (emotion * EI) were entered.  Following Aiken and West (1991), all 
terms included in creating the interaction term were mean centered prior to creating the 
interaction terms.  With regard to interpretation of the results for each run, a cutoff of p < 
0.05 is used for significance.  However, given the restrictive sample size (n = 185 for 
emotion to coping and intended behaviors; n = 90 for actual behaviors) combined with 
the number of predictors (eleven in model 3 of each MMR run), I also interpreted 
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marginally significant effects (p < 0.10).  In all supplemental analyses, the same 
analytical approach was used. 
Significant interactions within each MMR run were interpreted if the following 
three conditions were met:  the term comprising the interaction effect in model 2 of the 
MMR run was significant or marginally significant (Aiken & West, 1991;Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Bedian & Mossholder, 1994).  Drawing upon Bedian and Mossholder’s 
(1994) arguments, there are several rationales for interpreting significant interactions in 
the absence of a significant improvement in the R squared and/or the F statistic.  First, 
this requirement for a significant F statistic is applicable to simultaneous multiple 
regression and not necessarily MMR.  Second, the logic advanced by Bedian and 
Mossholder (1994) applies to theoretically specified interactions only.  The significance 
of the F statistic ensures alpha level protection for the model, thus ensuring that the 
results are not an element of chance.  However, when one enters main effect terms in 
model 2 of an MMR, these are entered first to eliminate the shared variance from the 
interaction term.  Alternatively stated, the interaction term is composed of variance 
unique to the product term with the main effects’ variance partialled out.  The 
significance of the interactions is indeed a test of significance of this set in the MMR 
model.  Hence, the improvement in R squared from the previous step might not be 
significant, yet there still might be meaningful information which would go undetected if 
one were looking strictly at the overall F statistic and significant improvement in R 
squared.  Moreover, the F statistic in model 2 of such an MMR run provides an omnibus 
significance test of the overall model (in this case all eleven variables) and would be 
unnecessarily restrictive.  Very simply put, an overall F test in this context tests the fit of 
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a single regression line to the underlying data.  In the case of an interaction, theoretically 
we are suggesting that not one but two or more lines could fit the underlying data.  As 
such, the notion of a significant F statistic does not make too much conceptual or 
statistical sense.   
Where such significant or marginally significant interactions exist, main effects 
not included in the interaction are also interpreted from model 2 of the MMR run.  In the 
absence of interactions, main effects are interpreted from model 1 of the MMR run, 
which omits the interaction terms, when model 1 generates a significant or marginally 
significant overall F.  In summary, I interpreted significant or marginally significant 
interaction effects even if they were accompanied by a non significant change in R 
squared and/or F statistic.  However, I only interpreted significant or marginally 
significant main effects (in the absence of significant or marginally significant 
interactions) in the presence of a significant or marginally significant F statistic. 
In testing the coping → behavioral outcomes part of my research model, I applied 
OLS regression tests only as there are no theoretically specified interactions here.  In 
these hypothesized tests, all variables were simply entered in a simultaneous regression 
run.  Again, the procedure used in interpreting these effects were the same as noted above 
(p < 0.10 is marginally significant, p < 0.05 is significant).  The significance levels for 
these interpretations are the same as noted above.  
Hypotheses Testing 
The model being tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables 
was as follows: 
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TFC/EFC = b0+ b1 (state PA) + b2 (state NA) + b3 (GMA) + b4 (anger) + b5
(guilt) + b6 (happiness) + b7 (pride) + b8 (EI) + b9 (anger * EI) + b10 (guilt * EI) 
+ b11 (happiness* EI) + b12 (pride * EI) + error (equation 4.1) 
 
The results with TFC serving as dependent variable are reported in Table 4.2.  It 
is customary to interpret interaction effects before main effects and, hence, the test of the 
hypotheses is not in the same order as listed in Chapter Two.  Hypotheses 3, 7, 11 and 15 
posited a moderating role of EI in the relationship between each discrete emotion (anger, 
guilt, joy and pride, respectively) and TFC.  These analyses revealed no support for these 
interaction effects.  Since the interactions were not significant, main effects of each 
emotion and EI were interpreted from model 1.  Hypotheses 2 and 6 posited negative 
effects for anger and guilt, respectively, on TFC, while Hypotheses 10, 14 and 17 posited 
positive effects of joy, pride and EI, respectively, on TFC.  Hypotheses 2, 6, 10 and 17 
were not supported.  Pride had a marginally significant positive effect on TFC (β = 0.17;
p < 0.10), indicating some support for Hypothesis 14.   
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Similar models were run to test the hypotheses related to EFC as an outcome.  
Hypotheses 4, 8, 12 and 16 posited a moderating role of EI in the relationship between 
each discrete emotion (anger, guilt, joy and pride, respectively) and EFC.  These results 
are also reported in Table 4.2 and indicate no support for the interaction of each emotion 
with EI.  Hypotheses 1 and 5 posited positive effects of anger and guilt, respectively, on 
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EFC, while Hypotheses 9, 13 and 18 posited negative effects of joy, pride and EI, 
respectively, on EFC.  These hypotheses were not supported.  Next, three more 
regression models were estimated as shown equation 4.2  
Task performance/intended OCBI/intended WDB = b0 + b1 (TFC) + b2 (EFC) + 
error (equation 4.2)  
These results are reported in Table 4.3.  Hypotheses 19 and 20 posited that TFC 
would positively affect task performance and that EFC would negatively affect task 
performance, respectively.  Hypothesis 19 was supported as TFC was positively related 
to task performance (β = 0.28; p < 0.01).  Hypothesis 20 received some support as EFC 
was marginally and negatively related to task performance (β = -0.13; p < 0.10).   
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Hypotheses 21 and 22 posited that TFC would positively affect intended OCBI 
and that EFC would negatively affect intended OCBI, respectively.  Of these, Hypothesis 
21 was supported with a positive effect of TFC on intended OCBI (β = 0.30; p < 0.01) 
while Hypothesis 22 was not.  Hypotheses 25 and 26 posited that TFC would negatively 
affect intended WDB and that EFC would positively affect intended WDB, respectively.  
Of these, Hypothesis 25 was not supported while Hypothesis 26 was supported with a 
significant positive effect of EFC on intended WDB (β = 0.26; p < 0.01).   
Furthermore, recall that actual helping behavior and deviance were also measured 
through confederate ratings.  Using these ratings as the dependent variable, Hypotheses 
21 and 22 (TFC and EFC on OCBI, respectively) as well as Hypotheses 25 and 26 (TFC 
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and EFC on WDB, respectively) were retested.  Here, OCBI was operationalized as 
helping to fix the equipment and WDB was operationalized as willingness to steal cash 
prizes.  The dependent variables, actual OCBI and WDB, were dichotomous in this case.  
Hence, logistic regression was used to estimate this model and remains as is shown in 
equation 4.2.  These results are reported in Table 4.4.  Hypotheses 21, 22, 25 and 26 were 
not supported while using actual behavior as the dependent variable.  This completes a 
test of all hypotheses for Study 1.  In summary, pride was the only emotion that affected 
TFC.  These analyses revealed promising results for the coping to behavioral outcomes 
part of the model. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
There could be two potential reasons for the lack of better results on the front end 
of this model.  First, underlying EI dimensions, with their more specific factors, could 
relate more strongly to TFC and EFC than the overarching total EI scores, and play a 
stronger moderating role.  Second, each discrete emotion might need to be examined 
separately, and I discuss the reasons for this more fully below.   
Supplemental Analyses 
In this section, I present an extension of the analyses presented above.  I present 
results examining each discrete emotion in isolation, along with underlying EI 
dimensions and their interactions with the discrete emotion as simultaneous predictors.  
This analysis might be the most appropriate one for the following theoretical and 
methodological reasons.  Theoretically, these discrete emotions co occur, yet they 
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contribute their own variance in affecting each form of coping.  OLS regression is based 
on the variance partitioning approach that estimates the unique variance contributed by 
each discrete emotion.  As such, this technique soaks out the shared variance.  In doing 
so, substantial, albeit shared, trait variance associated with each emotion is lost.  For 
example, guilt and anger share variance as indicated by their correlation (r = 0.46; p < 
0.01).  Yet when one experiences both guilt and anger, each emotion presumably has its 
own implications for that individual’s coping strategies.  One does not act upon the 
unique variance left behind by processing both guilt and anger.  Instead, one perceives 
anger as a self demeaning offense and also feels intense self reproach as a consequence of 
guilt, and acts on both.  Moreover, the emotions under scrutiny here are intense short-
lived ones, and people act upon them instantaneously.  Finally, I offer one more rationale 
for examination of each discrete emotion separately.  The co-occurrence of emotions is 
an artifact of the study design, at least to some extent.  Following Weiss et al., (1999), I 
adopted the best known procedure to create conditions favorable for emotion elicitation.  
However, like these authors, I also note that two or more emotions could co-occur in each 
condition of emotion elicitation.  For example, when participants are exposed to a 
favorable outcome only, with no mention of an unfavorably biased procedure, 
theoretically we are attempting to elicit joy.  However, in this study, and in the one cited, 
both joy and pride occur in this condition.  Weiss et al (1999) also examined these 
discrete emotions as outcomes in separate ANOVAs rather than MANOVA, in effect 
looking at each discrete emotion in isolation as an outcome.  The goal of this research is 
not necessarily the examination of unique variance contributed by each discrete emotion.  
Rather, it is to examine the effects of each discrete emotion (which might share variance 
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with another emotion) from the standpoint of cognitive appraisals.  Alternatively, each 
emotion might have its own effects on each form of coping that could go undetected by 
entering them as simultaneous predictors within the same regression run.  Finally, I 
present what is perhaps the most pertinent reason for such a separate examination of each 
discrete emotion.  My level of theory is at the level of each discrete emotion and its 
consequences for coping as if they were occurring in isolation.  My theorizing does not 
posit the simultaneous effects of these discrete emotions and that we measured them 
within the same setting is a matter of convenience only.  The intent was not necessarily to 
study their simultaneous effects.  I also note that this practice is not entirely uncommon in 
discrete emotion research (e.g., Herald & Tomaka, 2002; Izard, 1991) as no solid theory 
exists for the theoretical and measurement implications of simultaneous emotion 
experiences and their consequences for coping.  
Furthermore, this type of analyses is also necessitated to accommodate all EI 
dimensions in the same regression run.  EI is theoretically presumed to be a hierarchical 
multidimensional construct (Mayer et al., 1999).  As such, every dimension feeds input to 
the next higher dimension.  While the results above are promising and offer a glimpse of 
what overarching global scores on EI might contribute, a more complete insight might be 
gleaned by examining all EI dimensions within the same regression model.  One might 
argue that such an analysis would ideally include three control variables, all four discrete 
emotions and four EI dimensions as well as their interactions within the same regression 
model.  However, given the modest sample size (n=185), and the number of predictors 
(27 in each run), such an analyses would be severely underpowered.  Hence, I examine 
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each discrete emotion separately in the supplemental analyses, which reduces the number 
of predictors to 12 in each MMR run.  
Moreover, the supplemental analyses reported below augment the hypotheses 
testing reported above, yet answer different theoretical questions from a standpoint of 
future research and implications for theory and practice.  The point is, each of these 
analyses offers a coherent stand-alone story on its own, and they offer a fuller 
understanding of how discrete emotions can interact with EI and its dimensions, thus 
affecting coping.  I elaborate on the interpretation of these relationships in fuller detail in 
the discussion section. 
Anger, TFC and EFC. 
The moderating role of each sub dimension of EI in the relationship between 
anger and TFC and EFC was analyzed through ordinary least square regression.  In much 
of the write up and equations to follow, note that I use the term “using” as an abbreviated 
form of the “using emotions to facilitate thought” dimension of EI, “understanding” as an 
abbreviated form of the “understanding emotions” dimension of EI, and “managing” as 
the abbreviated form of the “managing emotions” dimension of EI.  To investigate the 
moderating role of each sub dimension of EI in the relationship between anger and TFC 
and EFC, the following model was tested: 
TFC/EFC = b0+ b1 (state PA) + b2 (state NA) + b3 (GMA) + b4 (anger) + b5 (perception) 
+ b6 (using) + b7 (understanding) + b8 (managing) + b9 (anger * perception) + b10 
(anger * using) + b11 (anger* understanding) + b12 (anger* managing) + error 
(equation 4.3) 
Thus, this set of analyses included two regression runs, one with TFC and one 
with EFC serving as dependent variables.  All four EI dimensions (perception, using, 
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understanding and managing) and anger, as well as their interactions, served as 
predictors.  I note that this sequence of regression runs is repeated with each discrete 
emotion in the following sections.  As seen in Table 4.5, these analyses revealed a 
significant negative effect of managing on TFC (β = -0.22; p < 0.01).   
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.5 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
As seen in Table 4.5, with EFC as the dependent variable, the interaction of 
perception and anger was significant (β = -0.23; p < 0.01), the interaction of using and 
anger was marginally significant (β = 0.36; p < 0.10), and the interaction of managing 
and anger was also significant (β = -0.50; p < 0.01).  This model showed a significant 
improvement in R squared (∆ R2 = 0.07; p < 0.01) from the previous step and the overall 
F statistic was also significant (F = 2.60; p < 0.01; R2 = 0.15).  From Figure 4.1, the 
interaction of anger and perception was in the expected direction. It indicates that 
individuals with higher scores on perception engaged in decreased EFC as anger 
increased.  Individuals with lower scores on perception engaged in increased EFC as 
anger increased.  This interaction was further probed using the test of simple slopes (cf. 
Aiken & West, 1991).  Also consistent with Aiken and West (1991), I probed this 
interaction at one standard deviation above and below the mean.  This analysis revealed 
that the simple slope of anger on EFC was not statistically significant for one standard 
deviation above the mean (β = 0.03; p > 0.01).  However, it was significant for values of 
the moderator (i.e, perception) at one standard deviation below the mean (β = 0.43; p < 
0.01).  This indicates that the positive relationship between anger and EFC is significant 
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only for lower scores on perception.  The plot for the interaction of using and anger 
(Figure 4.2) was not in the expected direction in that higher scores on this dimension 
were associated with increased EFC and lower scores are associated with decreased EFC.  
A test of the simple slopes one standard deviation above and below the mean of using 
revealed that the simple slope of anger on EFC was statistically significant for one 
standard deviation above the mean (β = 0.56; p < 0.01).  However, it was not significant 
for values of the moderator (i.e, using) at one standard deviation below the mean (β =
0.09; p > 0.01).  This indicates that the positive relationship between anger and EFC is 
significant only for higher scores on using.  The interaction plot (see Figure 4.3) for the 
interaction of anger and managing was in the expected direction.  It shows that higher 
scores on managing emotions were associated with decreased EFC as anger increased.  
Lower scores on managing were associated with increased EFC as anger increased.  A 
test of the simple slopes revealed that the simple slope of anger on EFC was not 
statistically significant for one standard deviation above the mean (β = -0.18; p > 0.01).  
However, it was significant for values of the moderator (i.e, managing) at one standard 
deviation below the mean (β = 0.32; p < 0.01).  This indicates that the positive 
relationship between anger and EFC is significant only for lower scores on managing. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 4.1 - 4.3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Guilt, TFC and EFC. 
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To investigate the moderating role of each sub dimension of EI in the relationship 
between guilt and TFC and EFC, the same model represented in equation 4.3 was tested 
with anger being replaced by guilt. 
As seen in Table 4.6, these analyses revealed a significant negative effect of 
managing on TFC (β = -0.23; p < 0.01).  With EFC serving as the dependent variable, the 
interaction of perception and guilt was significant (β = -0.20; p < 0.05) and the interaction 
of using and guilt was significant (β = 0.34; p < 0.01).  This model showed a significant 
improvement in R squared (∆ R2 = 0.04; p < 0.10) from the previous step and the overall 
F statistic was also significant (F = 2.36; p < 0.01; R2 = 0.14).  These interactions are 
graphically depicted in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.  
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.6 and Figures 4.4 and 4.5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
From Figure 4.4, it can be seen that higher scores on perception were associated 
with decreased EFC and lower scores on perception were associated with increased EFC 
as guilt increased.  This interaction was in the expected direction.  A test of the simple 
slopes revealed that the simple slope of guilt on EFC was not statistically significant for 
one standard deviation above the mean (β = 0.05; p > 0.01).  However, it was significant 
for values of the moderator (i.e, perception) at one standard deviation below the mean (β
= 0.31; p < 0.01).  This indicates that the positive relationship between guilt and EFC is 
significant only for lower scores on perception.  From Figure 4.5, it can be seen that 
higher scores on using were associated with increased EFC and lower scores on using 
were associated with decreased EFC as guilt increased.  This interaction was not in the 
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expected direction.  A test of the simple slopes revealed that the simple slope of guilt on 
EFC was statistically significant for one standard deviation above the mean (β = 0.57; p <
0.01).  However, it was not significant for values of the moderator (i.e, using) at one 
standard deviation below the mean (β = -0.22; p > 0.01).  This indicates that the positive 
relationship between guilt and EFC is significant only for higher scores on using. 
Joy, TFC and EFC. 
To investigate the moderating role of each sub dimension of EI in the relationship 
between joy and TFC and EFC, the same model represented in equation 4.2 was tested 
with anger being replaced by joy.  As seen in Table 4.7, these analyses revealed a 
significant negative effect of managing emotions on TFC (β = -0.21; p < 0.01).  This 
relationship was not in the expected direction.  Joy had a marginally significant positive 
effect on TFC (β = 0.14; p < 0.10).  This relationship was in the expected direction.  No 
significant relationships were detected between the predictors and EFC.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.7 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Pride, TFC and EFC. 
To investigate the moderating role of each sub dimension of EI in the relationship  
between pride and TFC and EFC, the same model represented in equation 4.3 was tested 
with anger being replaced by joy.  As seen in Table 4.8, these analyses revealed a 
significant negative effect of managing emotions on TFC (β = -0.19; p < 0.05) and a 
significant positive effect of pride on TFC (β = 0.16; p < 0.05).  The negative effect of 
managing on TFC was not in the expected direction, while the positive effect of pride on 
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TFC was in the expected direction.  No significant relationships were detected between 
the predictors and EFC. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.8 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
This completes all analyses of the emotion → coping relationship part of my 
research model both at overarching construct level as well as underlying dimension level.  
In summary, examining discrete emotions separately reveals a richer and more interesting 
pattern of results.  A full discussion of all results appears in the next chapter. 
One last set of analyses for Study 1 was conducted, specifically the examination 
of overall EI and its relationship with the outcome behaviors.  While not a part of original 
theorizing, this is necessitated in the light of recent results supporting the linkage of EI 
with behaviors.  EI has been shown to positively relate to prosocial behavior in a non-
work context and negatively related to deviance such as drug and alcohol abuse (Brackett 
et al., 2004).  EI positively relates to performance and challenge appraisals on a math task 
(Lyons & Schneider, 2005).  In the light of these linkages, it was reasonable to 
investigate the relationship of EI to the outcome behaviors in this study. The model being 
tested in this case was as follows: 
Behavioral outcome = b0+ b1 (GMA) + b2 (EI) + b3 (TFC) + b4 (EFC) + error 
(equation 4.4) 
Three regression models, one with each kind of behavioral outcome (task 
performance, intended OCBI and intended WDB) serving as dependent variables, were 
run with all four predictors as shown in the above equation.  As seen in Table 4.9, EI (β =
0.23; p < 0.01) and TFC (β = 0.28; p < 0.01) had significant positive effects on task 
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performance.  These relationships are in the expected direction.  Only TFC had a 
significant positive effect on intended OCBI (β = 0.30; p < 0.01).  EI (β = -0.24; p < 0.01) 
had a significant negative effect (β = -0.27; p < 0.01) while EFC had a significant 
positive effect on intended WDB (β = 0.24; p < 0.01).  These relationships are in the 
expected direction. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.9 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Similar supplemental analyses were also conducted with actual behaviors (helping 
and deviance rated by the confederates) serving as the dependent variables in a logistic 
regression model.  However, none of the aforementioned four predictors related to the 
dependent variable in these analyses and, hence, those analyses are not reported in tabled 
form in the interest of conciseness.  
Study 2 
 First, descriptive statistics for all study variables and their reliabilities were 
computed.  Simple bivariate correlations were computed to ensure that all study 
relationships were in the expected direction.  All level one variables were aggregated to 
level two for computation of descriptive statistics.  These results are presented in Table 
4.10.  All Chronbach’s alphas were over 0.70 with the highest found for joy at 0.96.  All 
bivariate correlations were in the expected direction.  I only discuss the most important 
correlations here in the interest of conciseness, but Table 4.10 presents correlations 




Insert Table 4.10 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Anger was negatively correlated with joy (r = -0.55, p < 0.01) and pride(r = -0.40, 
p < 0.05), positively correlated with EFC (r = 0.68, p < 0.01) and negatively correlated 
with OCBO (r = -0.40, p < 0.10).  Similarly, guilt was negatively correlated with joy (r = 
-0.34, p < 0.10).  These preliminary analyses suggest that anger related to each study 
variable stronger than did guilt. 
Joy and pride were also strongly positively correlated (r = 0.75, p < 0.01), 
suggesting that these two discrete emotions co occur quite a bit.  Joy (r = 0.51, p < 0.01) 
and pride (r = 0.56, p < 0.01) were associated with TFC in the expected directions.  
Rather surprisingly, EI was not related to either TFC or EFC as expected.  TFC was 
negatively correlated with EFC (r = -0.43; p < 0.05).  TFC was positively correlated with 
OCBI (r = 0.44; p < 0.05) and OCBO (r = 0.54; p < 0.01).  As expected, EFC was 
negatively correlated with performance (r = -0.51; p < 0.05) and OCBO (r = -0.50; p < 
0.05).   
Analytical Overview 
The moderating role of EI in the relationship between discrete emotions and 
coping was analyzed through random coefficient modeling (RCM).  I have already noted 
the appropriateness of RCM for this study and I refer the interested reader to pages 100-
101 in chapter three for a discussion of the same.  The most pertinent advantage of RCM 
is that it allows level one coefficients to randomly vary across individuals.  These 
estimates are based on pooled estimates of all observations on that individual for all five 
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periods under consideration and an estimate based on data from all other individuals.  
Furthermore, it allows for the correlation of responses from the same individual across all 
five time periods of interest.  Thus, level one in the following analyses captures within 
person variability in emotions, coping, and behavioral outcomes, while level two captures 
between person variability in EI. 
For each set of analyses I first estimated the basic null model in order to estimate 
the ICC.  Recall that, from the null model, if ICC values exceed .10, examination of the 
RCM model is justified (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002).  If an RCM model is justified, I move 
forward to test the full model at level 1 and where appropriate, level 2 (note that models 
specifying the behavioral outcomes do not include level 2 predictors).  In terms of 
interpretation of results for each run, the cutoff p < 0.05 is used as a cutoff for 
significance.  However, given the restrictive sample size (level 1 n =113 and level 2 n = 
29) combined with the number of predictors (9 in each RCM run), I also interpreted 
marginally significant effects (p < 0.10).  In all supplemental analyses, the same 
analytical approach was used. 
Hypotheses Testing 
The model being tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables 
was as follows: 
Level 1  
 (TFC/EFC) ij = π0j + π1j (anger) + π2j (guilt) +π3j (happiness) + π4j (pride) + rij 
(equation 4.5) 
 In this equation, i denotes time (e.g., 0-4), j denotes respondent (1-29), π0j 
captures the intercept, π1j- π4j the slopes relating each emotion to TFC/EFC, and rij 
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represents the within person residual error.  However, the most important step was to 
uncover and model inter individual differences in TFC/EFC in response to emotion.  This 
was the specified role of EI in my model, and this represents level two of this analysis, as 
EI is a between person difference that could potentially affect the nature of emotion-
coping relationships at the within person level. 
 Level 2 
 π0j = β00 + β01j (EI) + uoj                                                                                                         (equation 4.6) 
The β01j coefficient in equation 4.6 captures the main effect of EI on TFC/EFC with 
TFC/EFC pooled across all five times.  As such, this coefficient provides a test of 
hypothesis 17.  Introducing EI as a predictor of slope variability captures the moderating 
effect of EI as follows: 
 π1j = β10j +β11j (EI) + u1j                                           (equation 4.7) 
 π2j = β20j+β21j (EI) + u2j  (equation 4.8) 
 π3j = β30j+β31j (EI) + u3j                                                                                                          (equation 4.9) 
 π4j = β40j+ β41j (EI) + u4j                 (equation 4.10) 
 From equation 4.7, β11j indicates the moderating effect of EI on the relationship between 
anger and TFC, thereby providing a test of Hypothesis 3.  Similarly, in equations 4.8 
through 4.10, β21j, β31j and β41j capture the interaction effects of each of the other 
emotions (guilt, joy and pride, respectively) with EI.  These coefficients offer a test of 
hypotheses 7, 11 and 15, respectively.  This completes the analyses of the effects of 
emotions on TFC/EFC, and the main and moderating effect of EI on the relationship 
between emotion and TFC/EFC.  The results with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent 
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variables are reported in Table 4.11.  From Table 4.11, it can be seen that the ICC value 
for TFC (0.46) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.11 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
It is customary to interpret interactions before main effects and hence I test for the 
interaction hypotheses first.  These analyses revealed no support for the interaction 
effects of EI with anger, joy and pride.  Thus, Hypotheses 3, 11 and 15 were not 
supported.  The interaction of guilt and EI was significant (β22j = -0.02; p < 0.05).  The 
interaction plot of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.6) revealed that high EI individuals 
maintained the same level of TFC, while low EI individuals engaged in increased TFC as 
guilt increased.  Thus, Hypothesis 7 was also not supported. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Since the interactions for anger, joy and pride were not significant, main effects of 
each emotion were interpreted.  Hypothesis 2 posited a negative effect for anger on TFC, 
while, Hypotheses 10 and 14 posited positive effects of joy and pride, respectively, on 
TFC.  β10j , β30j and β40j in the level two equations capture the effects of each specific 
emotion (i.e., anger, joy, and pride, respectively) on TFC, thereby providing a test of 
Hypotheses 2, 10 and 14.   Hypotheses 2 and 10 were not supported either.  Hypothesis 
14 was supported with a significant positive effect of pride on TFC (β = 0.13, p < 0.01).  
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Hypotheses 6 and 17 posit the main effects of guilt and EI, respectively, on TFC.  They 
are not tested as guilt and EI were involved in a significant interaction as noted above.  
Similar models were run to test the hypotheses related to EFC as an outcome.  
From Table 4.11, it can be seen that the ICC value for EFC (0.22) exceeded the suggested 
0.10 cutoff.  Hypotheses 4, 8, 12 and 16 posited the moderating role of EI in the 
relationship between each discrete emotion (anger, guilt, joy and pride, respectively) and 
EFC.  These results are also reported in Table 4.11 and indicate support for the 
interactions of anger (β = 0.01, p < 0.01), guilt (β = 0.02, p < 0.01) and joy (β = 0.01, p <
0.01) with EI.  The interaction plot of anger and EI (see Figure 4.7) indicates that both 
high and low EI individuals engaged in increased EFC as anger increased.  This effect 
was more pronounced for higher EI individuals than lower EI individuals.  The 
interaction plot of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.8) indicates that higher EI individuals 
engaged in increased EFC and lower EI individuals engaged in decreased EFC as guilt 
increased.  The interaction plot of joy and EI (see Figure 4.9) indicates that higher EI 
individuals engaged in increased EFC and lower EI individuals engaged in decreased 
EFC as joy increased.  These interactions, while significant, are not in the expected 
direction and hence, Hypotheses 4, 8 and 12 were not supported.  The interaction of pride 
and EI was not significant and Hypothesis 16 was not supported.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 4.7 - 4.9 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 13 posited a negative effect of pride on EFC.  This hypothesis was not 
supported.  Hypotheses 1, 5, 9 and 18 posited the main effects of anger, guilt, joy and EI, 
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respectively, on EFC.  These hypotheses are not tested as all of these variables were 
involved in significant interactions as noted above.   
Next, four more RCM models were estimated with task performance, OCBI, 
OCBO and WDB as outcomes. The model was estimated as follows: 
(Task performance/OCBI/OCBO/WDB) ij = β00 + β10j (TFC) +β20j (EFC) + error 
(equation 4.11) 
In the above equations, β10j and β20j capture the effects of TFC and EFC on task 
performance, respectively, (or OCBI, OCBO, WDB), providing a test of hypotheses 
relating TFC and EFC to behavioral outcomes.  These results are reported in Table 4.12.  
Hypotheses 19 and 20 posited that TFC would positively affect task performance and 
EFC would negatively affect task performance, respectively.  From Table 4.12, it can be 
seen that the ICC value for task performance (0.54) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff.  
From Table 4.12, Hypothesis 19 was not supported.  Hypothesis 20 was also not 
supported, as the significant relationship between EFC and task performance (β = 0.40; p
< 0.01) is in the opposite direction to what had been hypothesized. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.12 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Hypotheses 21 and 22 posited that TFC would positively affect OCBI and EFC 
would negatively affect OCBI, respectively.  From Table 4.12, it can be seen that the ICC 
value for OCBI (0.53) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff.  TFC had a significant 
positive effect on OCBI (β = 0.22; p < 0.05), providing support for Hypothesis 21.  EFC 
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had a significant negative effect on OCBI (β = -0.33; p < 0.05), providing support for 
Hypothesis 22.   
Hypotheses 23 and 24 posited that TFC would positively affect OCBO and EFC 
would negatively affect OCBO, respectively.  From Table 4.12, it can be seen that the 
ICC value for OCBO (0.36) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff.  From Table 4.12, 
Hypothesis 23 was not supported.  Hypothesis 24 is not supported as the significant 
positive effect of EFC on OCBO (β = 1.49; p < 0.01) is in the opposite direction to what 
had been hypothesized.   
Hypotheses 25 and 26 posited that TFC would negatively affect WDB and EFC 
would positively affect WDB, respectively.  From Table 4.12, it can be seen that the ICC 
value for WDB (0.68) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff.   TFC had a significant 
negative effect on WDB (β = -0.11; p < 0.01), providing support for Hypothesis 25.  EFC 
had a significant negative effect on WDB (β = -0.11; p < 0.01).  Hypothesis 26 was not 
supported as the direction of this relationship was in the opposite direction to what was 
hypothesized.  
This completes a test of all hypotheses for Study 2.  There could be three potential 
reasons for the lack of better results.  First, underlying EI dimensions, with their more 
specific factors, could relate more strongly to TFC and EFC than the overarching total EI 
scores.  Second, each discrete emotion might need to be examined separately, and I 
discussed the reasons for such a analyses earlier with respect to Study 1.  Third, these 
results could be sample specific, and I discuss the characteristics of this particular sample 
that could have affected results in the next chapter.  
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Supplemental Analyses 
In this section, I present one more extension of the analyses presented above.  I 
present results for each discrete emotion and underlying EI dimension.  The rationale for 
such supplemental analyses has already been noted with regard to Study 1.  
Anger, TFC and EFC. 
The model tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables took the 
following form: 
Level 1  
 (TFC/EFC) ij = π0j + π1j (anger) + rij (equation 4.12) 
 In this equation, i denotes time (e.g., 0-4), j denotes respondent (1-29), π0j 
captures the intercept, π1j captures the slope relating anger to TFC/EFC, and rij captures 
the within person residual error.   
 Level 2 
 π0j = β00 + β01j (perception) +β02j (using) + β03j (understanding) +β04j (managing) 
+ uoj        (equation 4.13) 
The β01j coefficient in equation 4.13 captures the main effect of perception on 
TFC/EFC with TFC/EFC pooled across all five times.  Similarly, β02j, β03j, and β04j 
capture the main effects of using, understanding and managing, respectively, on 
TFC/EFC.  Introducing the EI dimensions as predictors of slope variability captures the 
moderating effects of EI dimensions as follows: 
 π1j = β10j + β11j (perception) +β12j (using) + β13j (understanding) +β14j (managing) 
+ u1j             (equation 4.14) 
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From equation 4.14, β11j indicates the moderating effect of perception on the 
relationship between anger and TFC/EFC.  Similarly, β12j, β13j, and β14j capture the 
interaction effects of using, understanding, and managing, respectively, on TFC/EFC.   
Note that this set of analyses differs from analyses presented in the preceding 
sections in that this model has one level 1 predictor, four level 2 predictors and four cross 
level interaction terms.  In the earlier analyses, there were four level one predictors, one 
level two predictor and four cross level interaction terms.  The ICC values for TFC and 
EFC have already been presented earlier through the null model runs.  I will not repeat 
them again here for the sake of conciseness.  However, I note that with the appreciable 
ICC values seen previously, these further RCM analyses are justified.  
The results for the analyses are reported in Table 4.13.  With TFC serving as the 
dependent variable, the interaction of anger and managing was significant (β = -0.01; p < 
0.01).  The interaction plot (see Figure 4.10) revealed that individuals with higher scores 
on managing engaged in decreased TFC while individuals with lower scores on managing 
engaged in increased TFC as anger increased.  This interaction was not in the expected 
direction.  
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.13 and Figure 4.10 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
With EFC serving as the dependent variable, the interaction of anger and using 
was marginally significant (β = -0.003; p < 0.10).  The interaction plot of anger and using 
(see Figure 4.11) revealed that both individuals with higher and lower scores on using 
engaged in increased EFC as anger increased.  This effect was more pronounced for 
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individuals with lower scores on using.  The interaction of anger and managing was 
significant (β = 0.01; p < 0.01).  The interaction plot of anger and managing (see Figure 
4.12) revealed that individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in increased 
EFC, while individuals with lower scores on managing showed very little change in EFC 
as anger increased.  These interactions were not in the expected direction.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.11 and 4.12 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Guilt, TFC and EFC. 
 The model tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables and guilt 
as a level 1 predictor was the same as represented in equations 4.12- 4.14, but with anger 
in equation 4.12 being replaced by guilt.  The results for these analyses are reported in 
Table 4.14.  With TFC serving as the dependent variable, the interactions of guilt and 
perception (β = -0.02; p < 0.01), guilt and using (β = -0.02; p < 0.01) and guilt and 
managing (β = 0.06; p < 0.01) were significant (β = -0.02; p < 0.01).  The interaction plot 
of guilt and perception (see Figure 4.13) revealed that individuals with higher scores on 
perception showed very little change in TFC while individuals with lower scores on 
perception engaged in increased TFC as guilt increased.  The interaction plot of guilt and 
using (see Figure 4.14) revealed that individuals with higher scores on using showed very 
little change in TFC while individuals with lower scores on using engaged in increased 
TFC as guilt increased.  The interactions of perception and using with guilt were not in 
the expected direction.  The interaction plot of guilt and managing (see Figure 4.15) 
revealed that individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in increased TFC 
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while individuals with lower scores on managing engaged in decreased TFC as guilt 
increased.  The interaction of managing and guilt was in the expected direction.  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4.14 and Figures 4.13 – 4.15 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
With EFC serving as the dependent variable, the interactions of guilt and 
perception (β = 0.01; p < 0.01) and guilt and using (β = 0.01; p < 0.01) were significant.  
The interaction plot of guilt and perception (see Figure 4.16) revealed that individuals 
with higher scores on perception engaged in increased EFC, while individuals with lower 
scores on perception showed very little change in EFC as guilt increased.  The interaction 
plot of guilt and using (see Figure 4.17) revealed that both individuals with higher scores 
on using engaged in increased EFC, while individuals with lower scores on using showed 
very little change in EFC as guilt increased.   These two interactions were not in the 
expected direction.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 4.16 and 4.17 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Joy, TFC and EFC. 
The model tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables and joy 
as a level 1 predictor was the same as represented in equations 4.12- 4.14, but with anger 
in equation 4.12 being replaced by joy.  The results these analyses are reported in Table 
4.15.  With TFC serving as the dependent variable, the interaction of joy and managing 
was significant (β = 0.01; p < 0.01).  The interaction plot of joy and managing (see Figure 
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4.18) revealed that individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in increased TFC 
while individuals with lower scores on managing engaged in decreased TFC as joy 
increased.  This interaction was in the expected direction. 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4.15 and Figure 4.18 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
With EFC serving as the dependent variable, the interaction of joy and 
understanding (β = 0.01; p < 0.05) was significant.  The interaction plot of joy and 
understanding (see Figure 4.19) revealed that individuals with higher scores on 
understanding engaged in increased EFC, while individuals with lower scores on 
understanding engaged in decreased EFC as joy increased.  This interaction was not in 
the expected direction. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.19 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 Pride, TFC and EFC. 
The model tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables and pride 
as a level 1 predictor was the same as represented in equations 4.12- 4.14, but with anger 
in equation 4.12 being replaced by pride.  The results for these analyses are reported in 
Table 4.16.  With TFC serving as the dependent variable, the interactions of pride and 
using (β = -0.01; p < 0.05) and pride and managing (β = 0.01; p < 0.01) were significant.  
The interaction plot for pride and using (see Figure 4.20) revealed that individuals with 
higher scores on using engaged in decreased TFC, while individuals with lower scores on 
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using engaged in increased TFC as pride increased.  This interaction was not in the 
expected direction.  The interaction plot for pride and managing (see Figure 4.21) 
revealed that individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in increased TFC, 
while individuals with lower scores on managing showed very little change in TFC as 
pride increased.  The high managing result was in the expected direction, while low 
managing result was not in the expected direction.  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4.16 and Figures 4.20 – 4.21 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
With EFC serving as the dependent variable, the interactions of pride and 
perception (β = 0.01; p < 0.01), pride and using (β = 0.004; p < 0.01), and pride and 
managing (β = -0.01; p < 0.01) were significant.  The interaction plot of pride and 
perception (see Figure 4.22) revealed that individuals with higher scores on perception 
engaged in increased EFC, while individuals with lower scores on perception engaged in 
decreased EFC, as pride increased.  The interaction plot of pride and using (see Figure 
4.23) revealed that individuals with higher scores on using engaged in increased EFC, 
while individuals with lower scores on using engaged in decreased EFC, as pride 
increased.  These interactions were not in the expected direction. 
The interaction plot of pride and managing (see Figure 4.24) revealed that 
individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in decreased EFC, while individuals 
with lower scores on managing engaged in increased EFC, as pride increased.  This 




Insert Figure 4.22 – 4.24 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
This completes all supplemental analyses of the emotion → coping relationship 
moderated by EI part of my research model both at the overarching EI level as well as 
underlying EI dimension level.  In summary, examining discrete emotions separately 
reveals a richer and more interesting pattern of results.  A full discussion of all results 
appears in the next chapter.  Similar supplemental analyses were also conducted with EI 
and the behavioral outcomes, as was done in Study 1.  These results are reported in Table 
4.17.  EFC had a significant positive effect on task performance (β = 0.42; p < 0.01).  
TFC had a significant positive effect on OCBI (β = 0.22; p < 0.01), while EFC had a 
significant negative effect on OCBI (β = -0.33; p < 0.01).  EFC had a significant positive 
effect on OCBO (β = 1.55; p < 0.01).  TFC (β = -0.11; p < 0.01), EFC (β = -0.12; p < 
0.01) and EI (β = -0.002; p < 0.01) all had significant negative effects on WDB. 
Given, the complexity of findings, I summarized all supported hypotheses from 
both studies in Table 4.18.  Similarly, Table 4.19 offers a summary of findings from 
supplemental analyses from both studies.  
-------------------------------------------------- 




Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for Study 1
Means
(S.D.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1.PA 2.78(0.72) 0.85 0.15* 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.35** 0.32** -0.08 0.23** 0.11 .14* 0.12 0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.09
2.NA 1.59(0.59) 0.83
-
0.01 0.34** 0.42** -0.08 0.02 -0.11 0.01 0.24** -0.05 0.24** -0.01 -0.07 -0.15* -0.07 -0.05 0.08
3. GMA 25.32(4.91) - -0.09 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.34** 0.01 -0.13* 0.07 -0.07 0.19** 0.04 0.29** 0.43** 0.32** -0.03
4.anger 1.14(0.30) 0.82 0.46**
-
0.30** -0.13 -0.09 -0.01 0.15* -0.12 0.25** -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 -0.13 0.03 0.02
5.guilt 1.19(0.49) 0.86 -0.14* -0.02 -0.14* 0.00 0.25** 0.03 0.22** -0.12
† -0.17* -0.12 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07
6.joy 3.10(.99) 0.93 0.71** -0.05 0.20** 0.00 0.16* -0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05
7.pride 2.92(1.08) 0.79 -0.09 0.26** 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.16* -0.15
†
8.EI 89.11(17.39) - -0.03 -0.10 0.04
-
0.29** 0.26** 0.67** 0.79** 0.79** 0.77** 0.18*
9. TFC 2.41(.52) 0.84 0.15* 0.30** 0.12
† 0.26** 0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.13† -0.07
10. EFC 1.74(.58) 0.84 0.03 0.27** -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.15* -0.08 0.22**
11. SROCBI 3.23(.78) 0.85 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.09 -0.04 0.03 0.00










Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10
Means
(S.D.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
13. task
performance - 0.21** 0.16* 0.29** 0.14* 0.12
14. perception 98.15(16.21) - 0.49** 0.27** 0.26** 0.15
†




(15.09) - 0.58** 0.03
17. managing 89.95(18.13) - 0.29**
18. gender - -
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Table 4.2: OLS regression results with TFC and EFCa
Criterion TFC EFC 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
State PA 0.21** 0.21** 0.09 0.08 
State NA -0.03 -0.03 0.15† 0.14†
GMA 0.00 0.01 -0.11 -0.08 
Anger -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
Guilt 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.15†
Joy 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 
Pride 0.17† 0.16 0.00 -0.04 
EI 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 
Anger*EI - -0.05 - -0.07 
Guilt*EI - 0.03 - 0.09 
Joy*EI - 0.00 - 0.05 
Pride*EI - -0.02 - -0.11 
F Value 2.58** 1.72† 2.09* 1.64†
R 2 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 
∆ R2 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.01 
Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p< .10; a Standardized regression coefficients are 
presented 
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task performance intended OCBI intended WDB 
TFC  0.28**  0.30** 0.08 
EFC -0.13† -0.01 .026** 
F Value 8.65** 9.58** 8.34** 
R 2 0.08 0.09 0.08 




Table 4.4:  Test of coping to behavioral outcomes with confederate ratings  
Dependent variable  Helping Deviance 
TFC  -0.48 0.18 
EFC -0.33 -0.50 
Chi Square 2.24 1.06 
Cox & Snell R 2 0.03 0.01 
Nagelkerke R 2 0.03 0.02 
Total n = 106; for deviance; n = 95 for helping N = 90  
**p  <  .01; *p < .05; † p < .10
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Table 4.5: OLS regression results with anger, TFC and EFCa
Criterion TFC EFC 
Predictor  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
State PA 0.29** 0.28** 0.08 0.07 
State NA -0.03 -0.03 0.19** 0.20** 
GMA 0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.06 
Anger -0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.14 
Perception 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.00 
Using 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.12 
Understanding 0.07 0.06 -0.11 -0.12 
Managing -0.22* -0.21* 0.00 -0.05 
Anger*perception  0.02  -0.23** 
Anger*using  -0.08  0.36†
Anger*understanding  -0.07  0.17 
Anger*managing  0.11  -0.50** 
F Value 2.74** 1.88* 2.01* 2.60** 
R 2 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.15 
∆ R2 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.07** 
Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p< .10; a Standardized regression coefficients are 
presented 
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Table 4.6: OLS regression results with guilt, TFC and EFC a 
Criterion TFC EFC 
Predictor  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
State PA 0.28** 0.29** 0.08 0.09 
State NA -0.04 -0.04 0.15† 0.15†
GMA 0.04 0.05 -0.08 -0.11 
Guilt -0.01 0.01 0.14† 0.10 
Perception 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.02 
Using 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.09 
Understanding 0.07 0.07 -0.13 -0.13 
Managing -0.23** -0.24** 0.02 0.00 
Guilt*perception  -0.11  -0.20* 
Guilt*using  0.15  0.34* 
Guilt*understanding  -0.09  0.04 
Guilt*managing  -0.01  -0.13 
F Value 2.73** 1.98* 2.34* 2.36** 
R 2 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.14 
∆ R2 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04†
Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p< .10; a Standardized regression coefficients are 
presented 
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Table 4.7: OLS regression results with joy, TFC and EFC a 
Criterion TFC EFC 
Predictor  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
State PA 0.23** 0.22** 0.09 0.08 
State NA -0.02 -0.01 0.20** 0.21** 
GMA 0.03 0.03 -0.08 -0.08 
Joy 0.14† 0.14† -0.03 -0.02 
Perception 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.04 
Using 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 
Understanding 0.07 0.07 -0.12 -0.12 
Managing -0.21* -0.22* 0.01 0.00 
Joy*perception  0.01  0.05 
Joy*using  -0.05  -0.15 
Joy*understanding  -0.01  0.01 
Joy*managing  0.07  0.11 
F Value 3.17** 2.12** 1.97* 1.51 
R 2 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.10 
∆ R2 0.06† 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p< .10; a Standardized regression coefficients are 
presented 
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Table 4.8: OLS regression results with pride, TFC and EFC a 
Criterion TFC EFC 
Predictor  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
State PA 0.22** 0.22** 0.09 0.08 
State NA -0.03 -0.04 0.20** 0.19** 
GMA 0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.07 
Pride 0.16* 0.16* -0.01 0.01 
Perception 0.10 0.10 0.03 -0.01 
Using 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Understanding 0.05 0.03 -0.11 -0.14 
Managing -0.19* -0.18† 0.01 -0.01 
Pride*perception  -0.06  -0.08 
Pride*using  -0.07  -0.11 
Pride*understanding  0.01  0.10 
Pride*managing  0.14  0.00 
F Value 3.34** 2.42** 1.95* 1.58†
R 2 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.10 
∆ R2 0.06* 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p< .10; a Standardized regression coefficients are 
presented 
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Table 4.9: OLS regression results with behavioral outcomes a
Criterion  Task performance Intended OCBI Intended WDB 
Predictor     
GMA 0.09 0.06 0.05 
TFC  0.28** 0.30** 0.08 
EFC -0.09 0.00 0.24** 
EI 0.23** 0.03 -0.27** 
F Value 8.79** 5.08** 8.22 
R 2 0.16 0.10** 0.14 
∆ R2 0.12** 0.09** 0.14** 




Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics for Study 2
Means
(S.D.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1. PA 3.00(0.70) 0.91
-
0.30 -0.14 0.10 0.45* 0.61** 0.02 0.49** -0.14 0.05 0.42* 0.40* -0.40
† -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.10
2. NA 1.41(0.32) 0.82 0.37* 0.14 -0.02 -0.14
-
0.13 0.19 0.10 0.17 -0.04 -0.07 0.61** 0.02 -0.20 -0.02 -0.22
3. anger 1.62(0.48) 0.90 0.24
-
0.55** -0.40* 0.13 -0.24 0.68** 0.06 -0.16 -0.40
† 0.33 0.17 0.23 -0.01 0.04
4. guilt 1.18(0.30) 0.81 -0.34
† -0.17 0.13 0.25 0.16 0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.20 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.15
5. joy 2.14(0.74) 0.96 0.75** 0.06 0.51** -0.39* 0.00 0.36
† 0.45* -0.13 -0.06 -0.21 0.18 0.04
6. pride 2.54(0.99) 0.90
-
0.18 0.56** -0.32
† 0.14 0.27 0.39† -0.20 -0.25 -0.15 -0.14 -0.02
7. EI 96.46(15.27) - 0.06 0.27 -0.18 0.19 0.13 -0.06 0.69** .60** 0.67** 0.74**
8. TFC 2.50(0.46) 0.88 -0.43* 0.17 0.44* 0.54** -0.20 0.00 -0.05 0.06 0.14
9. EFC 1.14(0.17) 0.82
-





† 0.48* 0.15 -0.32 -0.23 0.13 -0.19
11. OCBI 3.58(0.91) 0.90 0.83** -0.40* 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.16
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Overall n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p< .10
Means
(S.D.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
12. OCBO 3.66(0.83) 0.86 -0.33 0.12 0.09 -0.06 0.08




(15.93) - 0.298 0.153 0.24





17. managing 98.88(16.50) -
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Table 4.11:  RCM results with TFC and EFCa
Note: Level 1, n = 113; Level 2, n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10
Estimates TFC EFC 
Null model Full model Model 1 Model 2 
Tau 0.15  0.02  
Sigma Squared 0.18  0.07  
ICC 0.46  0.22  
Beta00 2.51** 1.15** 
Anger  -0.03  0.15** 
Guilt  0.40**  0.07 
Joy  -0.06  -0.02 
Pride  0.13**  0.03 
EI  0.00  0.003†
Anger*EI  0.00  0.01** 
Guilt*EI  -0.02* 0.02** 
Joy*EI  0.01  0.01** 
Pride*EI  0.00  0.00 
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Table 4.12: RCM results for behavioral outcomes a
Note: For performance:  Level 1, n = 85; and Level 2, n = 24  
For OCBI:  Level 1, n = 83; and Level 2, n = 24  
For OCBO:  Level 1, n = 79; and Level 2, n = 23 
For WDB:  Level 1, n = 83; and Level 2, n = 23  
**p<.01; *p<.05; † p<.10 
 

















Tau 0.28  0.52  0.41  0.17  
Sigma 
Squared 0.24  0.46  0.72  0.08  
ICC 0.54  0.53  0.36  0.68  
Beta00 4.51** 3.87** 3.67** 1.01**
TFC  -0.09  0.22*  0.17  -0.11** 
EFC  0.40**  -0.33*  1.49**  -0.11** 
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Table 4.13: RCM results for anger, TFC and EFC 
 TFC EFC 
Beta00 2.46** 1.12** 
Anger -0.15** 0.12** 
Perception 0.00 0.00 
Using -0.01 0.00 
Understanding -0.01 0.00 
Managing 0.01† 0.00 
Anger*perception 0.00 0.00 
Anger*using 0.00 -0.003†
Anger*understanding 0.01 0.00 
Anger*managing -0.01** 0.01** 
Note: Level 1, n = 113; Level 2, n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10
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Table 4.14: RCM results for guilt, TFC and EFC 
 TFC EFC 
Beta00 2.47** 1.12** 
Guilt 0.26† 0.07
Perception 0.00 0.004** 
Using -0.01 0.003†
Understanding 0.00 0.00 
Managing 0.01 0.00 
Guilt*perception -0.02** 0.01** 
Guilt*using -0.02** 0.01** 
Guilt*understanding 0.00 0.00 
Guilt*managing 0.06** 0.00 
Note: Level 1, n = 113; Level 2, n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10
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Table 4.15: RCM results for joy, TFC and EFC 
 TFC EFC 
Beta00 2.49* 1.11** 
Joy 0.04 -0.04 
Perception 0.00 0.00 
Using 0.00 0.00 
Understanding 0.00 0.00 
Managing 0.01 0.00 
Joy*perception 0.00 0.00 
Joy*using -0.01 0.00 
Joy*understanding 0.01 0.01* 
Joy*managing 0.01** 0.00 
Note: Level 1, n = 113; Level 2, n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10
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Table 4.16: RCM results for pride, TFC and EFC 
 TFC EFC 
Beta00 2.51** 1.12** 
Pride 0.12** 0.01 
Perception 0.00 0.00 
Using 0.00 0.00 
Understanding 0.00 0.00 
Managing 0.01 0.00 
Pride*perception 0.00 0.01** 
Pride*using -0.01* 0.004** 
Pride*understanding -0.01 0.00 
Pride*managing 0.01** -0.01** 
Note: Level 1, n = 113; Level 2, n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10
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OCBI OCBO  WDB 
Predictor  Full model Full model Full model Full model 
Beta00 4.51** 3.87** 3.59** 1.01** 
TFC -0.08 0.22* 0.14 -0.11** 
EFC 0.42** -0.33* 1.55** -0.12** 
EI 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.002** 
Note:   
Note: For Performance:  Level 1, n = 85; and Level 2, n = 24  
For OCBI:  Level 1, n = 83; and Level 2, n = 24  
For OCBO:  Level 1, n = 79; and Level 2, n = 23 
For WDB:  Level 1, n = 83; and Level 2, n = 23  
**p<.01; *p<.05; † p<.10 
156
Table 4.18: Summary of supported hypotheses from Study 1 and Study 2 
Number statement Study 1 Study 2 comments  
H1 Anger → EFC  
Not 
supported 
Not tested Significant interaction  

















Significant, but opposite 
direction 
H5 Guilt → EFC  
Not 
supported 
Not tested Significant interaction  
H6 Guilt → TFC  
Not 
supported 
Not tested Significant interaction  





Significant, but opposite 
direction 





Significant, but opposite 
direction 
H9 Joy → EFC  
Not 
supported 
Not tested Significant interaction  

















Significant, but opposite 
direction 






H14 Pride → TFC  
Supported  Supported   












H17 EI → TFC  
Not 
supported 
Not tested Significant interaction  
H18 EI → EFC  
Not 
supported 
Not tested Significant interaction  
H19 












Significant, but opposite 
direction 
H21 TFC → OCBI.  
Supported Supported  




H23 TFC → OCBO.  
NA   
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H24 EFC → OCBO.  
NA   




H26 EFC →WDB.  
Supported Not 
supported 
Significant, but opposite 
direction 
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Table 4.19: Summary of supplemental analyses findings from Study 1 and Study 2 
Emotion  Study 1 Study 2 
Anger 
 
anger * perception → EFC anger * managing →TFC 
anger * using → EFC anger * using → EFC 
anger * managing → EFC anger * managing → EFC 
Guilt  guilt * perception → EFC guilt * perception → TFC 
guilt * using →EFC  guilt * using → TFC  
guilt * managing → TFC 
guilt * perception → EFC 
guilt * using → EFC  
Joy joy → TFC joy * managing → TFC 
joy * understanding → EFC 
Pride pride → TFC pride * using → TFC 
pride * managing → TFC 
pride*perception → EFC 
pride * using → EFC 
pride * managing → EFC 
EI EI→ task performance EI → WDB 
EI → WDB  
TFC TFC → task performance  
TFC → OCBI  
EFC  EFC →WDB   
Managing emotions Managing →TFC   
Note:  All findings common to both Study 1 and Study 2 are italicized. This implies that a 
particular relationship was significant in both studies but direction of relationships may 
vary.    
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Based upon cognitive appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) 
and the emerging research in EI (Jordan et al., 2002), I proposed two main ideas.  First, I 
argued for the examination of discrete emotions rather than overarching positive and 
negative dimensions.  Second, I argued that EI would play a significant role in the 
management of these discrete emotions, thus challenging conventional wisdom on the 
unbounded benefits of positive emotions and the perils of negative emotions.   
In addition, I argued that emotions are necessarily dynamic constructs.  As such, a 
proper examination should include designs that assess emotions in response to a specific 
event.  Such arguments then set the stage for a laboratory (Study 1) and a longitudinal 
field study (Study 2).  In this chapter, I first offer a discussion of results from Study 1, 
and Study 2 and then provide a discussion of integrated findings from both studies.  I 
then present a commentary on theoretical and practical contributions of this research.  I 
conclude with a discussion of limitations and future research directions that emerge from  
this research.  
Study 1 
The test of study hypotheses indicated support for only one discrete emotion, 
pride, and its relationship to Task focused coping (TFC).  The positive effect of pride on 
TFC is consistent with previous studies demonstrating that pride is associated with goal
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congruence, perceived fairness, and low situational demand (Herrald & Tomaka, 
2002; Weiss et al., 1999).  Pride is characterized by an approach motivation towards 
one’s task and leads to greater task focus (Lazarus, 1991; 1999).  I had proposed that this 
relationship would only hold for higher EI individuals because they manage their pride in 
a self-beneficial fashion.  For lower EI individuals, I proposed that the darker side of 
pride (narcissism) could take over, resulting in lower TFC.  This moderated relationship 
was not found.  Although pride was positively related to TFC, it was not related to 
Emotion focused coping (EFC).  This finding is not entirely uncommon because a 
positive emotion, such as pride, typically has stronger effects on TFC than EFC (c.f. 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  The proposed relationships of anger, guilt, and joy with TFC 
and EFC failed to emerge, either as main effects or as moderated by EI.    
Lack of support on the front end of the research model is largely driven by 
examination of global EI scores rather than the underlying dimensions.  This is in line 
with arguments that such a dimensional level examination might be more appropriate (see 
also Mayer et al., 2003).  Hypotheses were proposed at the level of overarching scores in 
keeping with prior work in this area (Côté & Miners, 2006).  This viewpoint is further 
substantiated by the differing relationships each of the EI dimensions seem to have with 
the TFC and EFC constructs.  In fact, some of the main effects of EI dimensions were not 
in the expected direction (e.g., negative relationship between managing emotions and 
TFC), suggesting that model respecification might be warranted from a future research 
standpoint.  Alternatively stated, not all EI dimensions affected the coping constructs in 
presumed directions and, as such, uncovering those relationships at the overall score level 
might have been challenging.  This issue is a limitation of my theorizing as well, and I 
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return to full discussion of this issue in the limitations section.  To address this, I also 
conducted extensive supplemental analyses at the underlying EI dimensional levels to 
further investigate study relationships.  These analyses seemed to support my reasoning 
above that most study relationships emerged at a finer level of detail than at the global 
level.  I return to a full discussion of these supplemental analyses findings shortly, 
however, for now I note that examination of global EI scores combined with examination 
of all discrete emotions simultaneously might have played a role in the lack of support for 
the front end of my research model in Study 1.  
On the back end of my research model (coping → behavioral outcomes), the 
results are a little more promising.  Here, the most straightforward result is the positive 
relationship between TFC and task performance.  TFC involves an approach motivation 
towards tasks and is therefore associated with better task performance (Herrald & 
Tomaka, 2002; Park et al., 2004).  TFC includes active coping, planning, restraint coping, 
suppression of competing activities and positive reinterpretation and growth, all of which 
are presumed to enhance task focus (e.g., Carver et al., 1989).  The negative relationship 
between EFC and task performance is also consistent with theory (Herrald & Tomaka, 
2002).  EFC is associated with lowered task performance because it is a coping strategy 
that is symptom-focused and includes an avoidance motivation.  It involves denial, a 
focus on venting emotions, behavioral and mental disengagement and alcohol 
disengagement, which necessarily take away from task focus, thus causing decrements in 
task performance (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002).  
The interesting and novel result for organizational research is the positive 
relationship between TFC and intended OCBI.  The OCBI literature has long-standing 
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support for the positive relationship between OCBI and both positive moods and 
emotions (e.g., George & Brief, 1992; George, 1991; Lee & Allen, 2002).  This study 
casts light on a potential intervening cognitive mechanism that helps explain how people 
translate the motivational energy provided by positive emotions into OCBIs.  TFC is 
characterized by an approach motivation that serves as an energizing base.  This 
energizing base allows an individual to direct her/his approach motivational energy to 
helping coworkers, assuming extra responsibilities and other behaviors known as OCBI.  
Past research indicated that negative emotions are positively associated with 
WDB (Barclay et al., 2005; Lee & Allen, 2002  Our knowledge of the intervening 
mechanisms that lead people to engage in WDBs is sparse.  The positive relationship 
between EFC and WDB sheds light on these elusive potential intervening mechanisms.  
EFC is a strategy that drives people to alleviate the felt emotion.  An individual who 
engages in EFC seeks to restore a sense of equity by retaliation, slighting coworkers, 
stealing office supplies and aggression against the wrongdoer.  The proposed negative 
relationships between EFC and OCBI and the negative relationship between TFC and 
WDB failed to emerge.  Next, I turn to a discussion of findings from the supplemental 
analyses.  
Anger results from a primary appraisal of an undesirable event and a secondary 
appraisal of other blame (Weiss et al., 1999).  The core relational theme (CRT) for anger 
is a self-demeaning offense (Lazarus, 1991).  While experiencing anger, the 
overwhelming motivation for an individual is to correct the wrongdoing.  It was proposed 
that higher EI individuals would respond to such a motivation with greater task focus 
because it is most self- beneficial, and lower EI individuals would respond to such a 
187
motivation with greater emotion focus.  I had also suggested the every dimension of EI 
will act in the same direction as overall EI (see pages 40-41).  Although the relationships 
uncovered were mostly consistent with theory, a few counterintuitive relationships 
emerged as well. 
The effects of anger on EFC were stronger than they were on TFC.  In fact, anger 
was not negatively related to TFC as expected.  First, with EFC serving as the dependent 
variable, the interaction of perception and anger was in the expected direction.  
Individuals who are better able to perceive anger engage in less EFC because they 
recognize the potential for self harm.  The interaction of using emotions to facilitate 
thought and anger may seem counterintuitive because higher scores on this dimension are 
associated with increased EFC.  However, this relationship is indicative of the idea that if 
one had higher scores on perception and was able to think through emotional information, 
then they would engage in EFC as the ability to manage emotions has not kicked in yet.  
Recall that the core theme of anger is a self demeaning offense and the overwhelming 
motivation provided by this emotion is to correct the wrongdoing, which could lead to 
venting, denial and disengagement, all forms of EFC.  This would likely be the pattern if 
the EI construct did not include a higher ability that draws upon such emotional 
information and facilitates more adaptive forms of coping.  This relationship emerges 
with the managing dimension of EI.  The interaction between managing emotions and 
anger revealed that higher scores on managing emotions are associated with decreased 
EFC.  Thus, an individual who perceives anger only (without thinking about what they 
are feeling or managing it) will likely engage in lesser EFC almost as an instinctual 
survival mechanism.  However, the individual who perceives anger and thinks through 
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what they are feeling and how that anger came about might engage in higher EFC as a 
result of a partial (and incomplete) interplay between emotion and cognition.  The 
individual that perceives anger, thinks through it and manages it effectively engages in 
lowered EFC, offering a complete interplay between cognition and emotion.  One 
question that might occur to the general reader is why should we even account for the 
underlying EI dimensions in this instance when managing emotions seems to drive most 
of the total effects of anger on coping  I offer the suggestion that this information 
becomes relevant from a diagnostic and intervention perspective, and I address this in the 
implications section (see also Mayer et al., 2003).  
From the analyses of anger and TFC, managing emotions had a negative 
relationship with TFC.  This relationship is surprising in that I had posited that higher 
scores on this dimension would lead to higher TFC.  However, that does not seem to be 
the case.  Individuals with higher scores on this dimension would necessarily have higher 
scores on all lower EI dimensions (i.e., perception, using emotions and understanding 
emotions) because EI is a hierarchical, multidimensional construct (Mayer et al., 2003).  
This relationship seems to imply that perceiving anger, thinking about the emotion 
eliciting event, and understanding the transition from other emotional states to anger 
actually is associated with decrements in task focus.  This relationship could also speak to 
one fundamental theoretical proposition in that higher scores on managing emotions 
ultimately will cause people to choose the most self-beneficial coping strategy (Mayer et 
al., 1999).  Based on this position, I had proposed that TFC is a self beneficial coping 
strategy and a positive relationship between managing emotions and TFC might be 
expected.  In actuality, this relationship could indicate that individuals might not always 
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view TFC (e.g., actively coping, restraint coping, in this case) as the most self beneficial 
coping strategy.  Consider restraint coping for example.  Adopting restraint means not 
acting and waiting until the right opportunity to do so.  However, individuals with higher 
scores on managing are better able to handle the emotion information (e.g., anger) and 
consequently might prefer resolving the event immediately.  This is because suppression 
and accumulation of negative emotions such as anger eventually lead to negative health 
consequences ( cf. Izard, 1991; Berkowitz, 1998 ), and that goes against the notion of 
what the managing emotions ability does to people.   Even with another dimension of 
TFC such as positive reinterpretation and growth, similar arguments might be made.  
Over and above everything else, anger renders the individual very vigilant to the task at 
hand, and anger (like all negative emotions) drives people to closely analyze and 
scrutinize things (cf. Ortony et al, 1988).  In such an instance, positive reinterpretation 
might act as a double edged sword in that it could reflect too rosy a worldview which the 
individual with higher scores on managing is not disposed towards.   In sum, this 
relationship calls for some modifications to my original theorizing in that the relationship 
between managing emotions and TFC might not be as straightforward as I had expected.  
This recommendation is driven by two main thoughts.  First, TFC might not always be 
the best coping strategy.  Second, my original research model might be improved by 
taking into account the goodness of fit hypothesis (on page 28, I had alluded to this in my 
theorizing, but had not incorporated it for the sake of simplicity), which suggests that the 
choice of a specific coping strategy is contingent on the perceived control the individual 
has over the emotion event (Park et al., 2004).   
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In conclusion, perceiving emotions accurately, and thinking through them could 
actually lead people to engage in lesser TFC and more EFC.  A more complete 
perspective is offered by the examination of managing emotions, which is partially 
consistent with theoretical predictions that individuals with the ability to manage 
emotions effectively will engage in lower EFC ( because of potential self harm) and TFC 
( because it might not be the most self-beneficial) while experiencing a negative intense 
emotion such as anger.   
Guilt results from a perceived displeasure at a specific action, event or 
interpersonal interaction (Lazarus, 1999).  Guilt is distinct from anger because the blame 
for such displeasure rests with oneself rather than another (Lazarus, 1999).  The core 
relational theme of guilt is perceived failure of living up to certain personal or societal 
standards (Lazarus, 1999).  In the remainder of my discussion of relationships, I will 
discuss the relationships that are specific to that emotion.  For example, the main effect of 
managing on TFC has been discussed above for anger, and for the sake of conciseness, I 
will not go over the same discussion again. 
With EFC serving as the dependent variable, I note that the interactions of 
perception and guilt and using emotions and guilt on EFC follow the same pattern of 
associations as noted earlier on with anger.  An individual who only perceives guilt 
(without thinking about what they are feeling or managing it) will likely engage in lesser 
EFC almost as an instinctual survival mechanism.  However, the individual who 
perceives guilt and thinks through what they are feeling and how that guilt came about 
might engage in higher EFC as a result of a partial (and incomplete) interplay between 
emotion and cognition.   
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The appraisal structure of joy is straightforward in that it results from a primary 
appraisal only of perceived goal congruence and a favorable future expectancy (Lazarus, 
1991).  Consistent with theoretical expectations, joy had a positive relationship with TFC.  
As per cognitive appraisal theory, joy is characterized by a primary appraisal of goal 
congruence and a more favorable future expectancy.  As such, those experiencing joy are 
free to focus their attention on task-related activities.  This relationship, while in line with 
prior research (e.g., Herrald & Tomaka, 2001; Izard, 1991), is not novel to this study. 
Pride and joy share the primary appraisal that causes them in that they both 
include a primary appraisal of goal congruence (Lazarus, 1991; 1999).  But pride is 
distinct from joy in that the credit for such goal congruence is attributable to oneself 
(Lazarus, 1991; 1999; Ortony et al., 1988).  Pride was positively related to TFC and this 
relationship has already been discussed fully before.  
I now turn to a discussion of the relationships that emerged from the supplemental 
analyses relating coping to behavioral outcomes.  EI was positively related to task 
performance. This relationship is in line with recently emerging literature that EI could 
predict task performance beyond general mental ability (Lyons & Schneider, 2005; Cote 
& Saveedra, 2006).   
The results with intended WDB are novel and unique.  EI was negatively related 
to intended WDB.  Given the current interest in organizational literature on research 
focused to help curtail or manage WDB, this is an important finding.  One might expect 
to see this relationship as EI has been linked to lesser deviance in the psychology 
literature (Brackett et al., 2005).  Several scholars have recently echoed calls for research 
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focusing on individual difference variables that could relate to the potential for WDB 
(Barclay et al., 2005; Lee & Allen, 2002).  This study answers such calls.   
Study 2 
Study 2 was conducted for two main reasons.  First, I wanted to assess 
generalizability of findings from Study 1 to a work sample.  Second, the study of discrete 
emotions in a field setting is sparse at best in the management literature.  The few studies 
that have been conducted fail to account for the dynamic nature of discrete emotions, 
necessitating a longitudinal repeated measures design.  This study contributes to the 
emotion literature on these two counts, at the least. 
The findings from hypothesis testing were much better and richer than in the lab 
studies for the emotion to coping part of my research model.  To the best of my 
knowledge, which includes a literature review, this is the first study of its kind to 
investigate the effects of anger and guilt in an organizational sample, and it yielded some 
interesting findings.  The main plausible reason for the paucity of organizational research 
on anger and guilt is that they are intense and short lived by nature.  Furthermore, guilt, 
especially, is hard to capture in field settings.  From a theoretical standpoint, I posited 
that high EI individuals would engage in more TFC and less EFC when experiencing 
both anger and guilt.  Likewise, I posited that low EI individuals would engage in more 
EFC and less TFC when experiencing anger and guilt.   
The interaction findings with regard to guilt seem counter intuitive at first glance, 
as the interaction plot of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.6) revealed that low EI individuals 
engaged in higher TFC as guilt increased.  The higher EI individual maintained the same 
level of task focus as prior to experiencing guilt.  This finding indicates that higher EI 
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individuals are able to perceive and reason through guilt and maintain task focus.  The 
vigilance motivation of guilt signals that all is not well and the high EI individual is task 
focused after experiencing guilt.  The low EI individual engages in higher task focus, but 
the curious aspect of this relationship is the sharp increase in such task focus.  Further 
examination of the interaction plot revealed that this effect is almost a perfect linear 
relationship.  I think this relationship is a function of the CRT of guilt (the perceived 
failure to live up to personal or societal standards) and the low EI individual’s efforts to 
assuage self blame.  If one considered the context of this study, this relationship becomes 
somewhat more conceptually explicable.  For example, one of the events driving an 
officer’s guilt in this study was the discovery of a child sexual predator.  This resulted in 
the officer expressing guilt, as he felt he had let down the children of the community.  He 
further expressed disappointment at a world in which such things could occur, and the 
event description was marked by self reproach and regret.  Yet, this officer had to attend 
to other events as well throughout the day (one of which was a press briefing) that 
demanded his attention.  In such an instance, the low EI individual exclusively focuses on 
the one event that causes such self reproach and overcompensates on that task, maybe 
even at the expense of other tasks.  However, the higher EI individual maintains the task 
focus (attributable to the vigilance component of guilt), yet also does not neglect other 
tasks at hand.   
Moreover, recall that TFC is composed of such components as suppression of 
competing activities.  In this sample, individuals have to attend to multiple tasks even 
while experiencing the target emotion, and as such, the ability to neglect other activities 
might not necessarily be the best strategy for their overall performance.  In summary, I 
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find this relationship very interesting and novel as the effects of EI on coping might be 
more intricate than I had originally proposed.  The above relationship seems to signal that 
the stability of task focus for higher EI individuals might be the most self-beneficial 
strategy for that individual.  The marked increase in task focus for the low EI individual 
speaks to compliance (and overcompensation) at the cost of personal well being.  This 
interpretation leads us to the findings related to the interaction of guilt and EI on EFC.  
The interaction plot of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.8) indicated that higher EI individuals 
engaged in increased EFC and lower EI individuals engaged in decreased EFC as guilt 
increased.  The interesting aspect of this finding, when taken together with the finding 
regarding to TFC above, is that high EI individuals maintained their task focus and 
engaged in more EFC as guilt increased.  This is a remarkable finding in that the ability 
to accurately perceive, reason through and manage emotions seems to have an effect 
beyond what I had originally conceptualized.  These individuals seem to function at a 
higher level of coping than is normally presumed, even in the coping literature (e.g., 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  Ultimately, I think this further lends support to the most 
critical proposition of EI.  It is an ability that helps people deal with emotions in the most 
self-beneficial fashion.  In the case of guilt, that effect seems to be playing out with both 
stability in task focus (TFC) and simultaneous attempts at resolving the symptoms of the 
emotion (EFC).  
 The interaction plot of anger and EI (see Figure 4.7) revealed that both high and 
low EI individuals engaged in increased EFC as anger increased.  This effect was more 
pronounced for higher EI individuals than lower EI individuals.  The interaction effect of 
anger and EI on TFC failed to emerge.  However, the finding with respect to EFC might 
195
yet reflect the nature of EI as an ability that helps people deal with emotions in the most 
self-beneficial fashion.  I note here that much of my theorizing did not account for the 
goodness of fit hypothesis I referred to earlier in the discussion for Study 1 and in 
theoretical development.  This point of view suggests that while experiencing emotions, 
the most self-beneficial strategy for an individual is contingent on the perceived control 
one has over the emotion eliciting event.  Park et al., (2004) demonstrated that 
components of EFC such as avoidance (denial and disengagement in this research) and 
emotion approach (similar to focus on venting emotions) might be the more adaptive 
coping strategies when perceived control is low.  In this sample, anger is elicited under 
extreme conditions.  For example, consider one anger eliciting event in this study.  An 
officer expressed extreme anger at a driver with an expired tag who also ran a stop sign.  
While the officer was trying to resolve the incident, this individual continued speaking on 
a cell phone, and the officer reported being angry and frustrated at the driver’s attitude.  
Now, consider the components of EFC.  It includes focus on venting emotion, denial, 
behavioral and mental disengagement, and alcohol disengagement.  All of these 
components could be temporary adaptive coping strategies in this case, as the event in 
question was, including its timely resolution (as the driver refused to get off the cell 
phone and got mad at the officer for asking her to do so), a bit beyond the control of the 
officer.  In this instance, the officer voiced disbelief (denial component of EFC) at the 
driver’s attitude.  
The interaction of joy and EI was also somewhat counter intuitive at first glance. 
This interaction (see Figure 4.9) revealed that high EI individuals engaged in increased 
EFC while low EI individuals engaged in decreased EFC as joy increased.  This 
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relationship along with the findings, for anger seem to further support the goodness of fit 
hypothesis in that the context of the emotion eliciting event and perceived control make a 
difference as to which form of coping might be the most adaptive.  Here, the high EI 
individual seems to favor EFC over TFC with the experience of most emotions.  
Wherever plausible, higher EI individuals seem to engage in both TFC and EFC to a 
greater extent than low EI individuals.  However, wherever this plausibly exceeds their 
psychological and cognitive resources, they seem to choose EFC.  This idea of EFC 
emerging as the more adaptive coping strategy in this context will become somewhat 
clearer when I discuss the findings relating EFC to behavioral outcomes.  In addition, I 
note that pride was positively related to TFC both in study 1 and this study. The positive 
effect of pride on TFC is consistent with theoretical predictions that pride is associated 
with goal congruence, perceived fairness, and low situational demand (Herrald & 
Tomaka, 2002; Weiss et al., 1999).  Pride is characterized by an approach motivation 
towards one’s task and leads to greater task focus (Lazarus, 1991; 1999).  In summary, 
for the findings from emotion to coping hypotheses from study 2, I note that one 
interaction and one main effect were significant for TFC.   However, three of the four 
proposed interactions were significant relating to EFC.  EFC also seemed to emerge as 
the more adaptive coping strategy, and this is further explained below.  
The results from the coping-to-behavioral-outcomes part of my model are even 
more surprising.  Interestingly, EFC was positively related to task performance.  This is 
unexpected, as I had earlier suggested that EFC would be negatively related to 
performance.  But in retrospect and given this finding, I think this relationship suggests 
that when the emotional event is beyond the control of the individual, EFC might be the 
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most self-beneficial coping strategy.  Again, I note here that much of my theorizing did 
not account for the goodness of fit hypothesis.  This point of view suggests that while 
experiencing emotions, the most self-beneficial strategy for an individual is contingent on 
the perceived control one has over the emotion eliciting event.  In this sample, emotions 
are elicited under extreme conditions and some components of EFC (e.g., behavioral and 
mental disengagement) might be the most self-beneficial strategy, at least temporarily.  
This is one explanation for the positive association between EFC and performance.  I 
offer the following perspective from Carver et al (1989) to lend support to my position 
that EFC might sometimes be the most self-beneficial coping strategy:  
“We should reemphasize that coping responses discussed in this section may well 
be beneficial for some people in some situations, whereas they might not be 
beneficial for other people or in other situations (c.f. Wortman & Lehman, 1985). 
To put it differently, a given coping strategy may not be intrinsically maladaptive, 
but may become dysfunctional if it is relied on for long periods when other 
strategies are more useful.  This general question—when a coping response is 
adaptive and when it is not—would seem to deserve a good deal of additional 
attention from researchers.”  (Carver et al, 1989, p. 269). 
 
Next, I turn to a discussion of OCBI findings.  As expected, TFC had a positive 
effect on OCBI.  Task-focused coping involves an approach motivation rather than 
avoidance motivation. With this approach motivation as the energizing base, an 
individual who is presented with a request for help is more likely to comply with that 
request even if it is not a part of her/his job description.  This argument further suggests 
that an individual is more likely to direct her/his approach motivational energy toward 
helping coworkers, assuming extra responsibilities and other such behaviors known as 
OCBI.  The negative effect of EFC on OCBI was also as expected.  In emotion-focused 
coping, the motivational base is mainly avoidance.  As such, the individual is more likely 
to deny the gravity of the event and withdraw from coworkers.  In this case, one employs 
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a more repressive form of coping, which essentially isolates her/him from the environs.  
One’s energy is focused upon the ongoing emotion experience.  In this frame of mind, an 
individual is less likely to engage in both forms of OCBs.    
Interestingly, both EFC and TFC had a negative effect on WDB.  The relationship 
for TFC with WDB is as expected, however the relationship between EFC and 
WDBseems a bit counter intuitive.  This finding might indicate that as long as the 
individual is engaged in resolving the event itself or the symptoms of the emotion, they 
are less likely to engage in any form of extra role behaviors.  Taken together with the 
findings from task performance, the pattern that emerges seems to be getting more 
informative.  The choice of TFC as a coping strategy predisposes people to increments in 
OCBI and decrements in WDB.  The choice of EFC as a coping strategy predisposes 
people to better task performance, decrements in OCBI and decrements in WDB.   In 
sum, TFC seems to allow people to engage in extra role behaviors  even at the expense of 
task related performance at times.  This is because TFC involves approach motivation 
and it disposes people to be more compliant with regard to extra role behaviors.  
However, EFC allows people to perform better, yet not engage in extra role behaviors, 
whether positive or negative.  I find this pattern very encouraging, as EFC includes 
vigilance motivation in addition to avoidance motivation as an energizing base.  These 
findings indicate that vigilance motivation drives people to perform better, while 
avoidance motivation seems to isolate them from any form of extra role behaviors.  
Consider an example from an academic setting.  A scholar might be incredibly well 
published and perform top rate research but might not necessarily engage in extra role 
behaviors that benefit the organization or coworkers.  In fact, some might even argue that 
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such exclusion of extra role behaviors might be necessary in order to enhance task 
performance.  Now, I turn to a discussion of findings from supplemental analyses.  In the 
interest of conciseness, I will fully discuss findings that are unique up to this point.  
Where findings replicate Study 1 findings or the findings from the previous sections in 
Study 2, I simply make note of such similarity, presuming that the same interpretation 
applies.   
The interactions of anger and managing resulted in lowered TFC for the 
individual with higher scores on managing.  Simultaneously, I note that the interaction of 
anger and managing resulted in the higher EI individual engaging in increased EFC.  
These findings are consistent with the findings reported earlier for overall EI in that 
individuals with higher EI cope with the emotion eliciting event by focusing on the 
emotion itself, as this could be the most self-beneficial strategy, given the lack of 
perceived control over the eliciting event.  The interaction finding with regard to anger 
and using emotions to facilitate thought revealed that individuals with both high and low 
scores on this dimension engaged in increased EFC, with this effect being more 
pronounced for those with higher scores.  Taken together with the finding for managing 
emotions and, ultimately, overall EI, the individual with lower scores on using emotions 
might ultimately benefit from the ability to manage emotions effectively, as that seems to 
drive the increase in EFC.  
The findings for guilt and the dimensions of EI are a little more complex.  The 
direction of the interaction for perception and using showed that higher scores on these 
dimensions lead to decreased TFC as guilt increased.  However, the interaction effect of 
managing emotions and guilt on TFC revealed that higher scores on managing led to 
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increased TFC as guilt increased, while the converse was true for lower scores on this 
dimension.  This finding is counter to the one found for overall EI.   I speculate that when 
taken together (i.e., all dimensions together), the negative effects of perception and using 
and the positive effect of managing emotion on TFC ultimately resulted in the stability of 
TFC for higher overall EI individuals.  However, if one were only examining the effect of 
the managing emotions dimension, higher scores on this dimension drive TFC, at least 
for guilt.  This could be a peculiar effect for guilt, with its heavy underpinnings of self 
reproach and overcompensation at the cost of personal well being.  The findings for guilt, 
perception and using emotions to facilitate thought on EFC are more consistent with 
those uncovered for overall EI.   Interestingly, those with higher scores on these 
dimensions engaged in increased EFC as guilt increased, while those with lower scores 
displayed stability in EFC as guilt increased.  
The findings for joy are revealing as well.  Here, I found that while experiencing 
joy, higher scores on managing led to increased TFC and higher scores on understanding 
led to increased EFC.  Interestingly, when these two interactions are interpreted together, 
individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in greater TFC and those with 
higher scores on understanding engaged in increased EFC.  This finding is consistent 
with earlier discussion on overall EI, wherein higher EI individuals engaged in increased 
EFC.  Thus, individuals with higher scores on EI and higher scores on two of its 
dimensions (understanding and managing) engaged in both TFC and EFC as joy 
increased.  This information might have relevance from a practical standpoint as noted 
later.   
201
Managing emotions and pride interacted to produce a similar effect on TFC as in 
the case of joy.  Here, I found that while experiencing pride, higher scores on managing 
led to increased TFC.  However, using emotions to facilitate thought led to decreased 
TFC.   These findings with regard to pride and TFC reveal that different EI dimensions 
do different things.  If one were to think through the experience of pride and its 
implications for coping, then the individual with a higher ability to reason through pride 
related information (self satisfaction with no imperative for increased task focus) engaged 
in decreased TFC.  However, if one were to be focused on managing the emotion, the 
individual with higher scores on managing emotions engaged in increased TFC.  The 
interactions of pride with perception and using revealed that individuals with higher 
scores on these dimensions engaged in increased EFC as pride increased.  Furthermore, 
the interaction of pride and managing revealed that higher scores on managing led to 
decreased EFC.  Taken together with the findings for pride and TFC, higher scores on 
perception and using led to increased EFC and decreased TFC.   However, managing 
emotions offers an interface of the intelligence component of EI with one’s personality.  
Thus, the individual with higher scores on managing curbs the narcissistic side of pride 
by engaging in less EFC.  For example, s/he might not talk so much about how proud 
they are (focus on venting emotions component of EFC) and not isolate themselves from 
coworkers or tasks (behavioral and mental disengagement).  The reverse is true for the 
individual with lower scores on managing, with decrements in task focus and increments 
in emotion focus.  Following Ortony and colleagues (1988), in Chapter 2,   I had labeled 
such an effect the swollen head syndrome, and the individual with lower scores on 
managing seems unable to curtail it.  
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Overall Discussion  
In this section, I attempt to integrate the findings from Study 1 and Study 2 and 
discuss the implications thereof.  At this point in this document, the general reader is 
aware of the incredible complexity in findings from this research.  My task at this stage is 
to offer a coherent take away message for management scholars.  With this motive in 
mind, I first present a discussion of the coping to behavioral outcomes part of my 
research model as this does two things.  First, it quickly points out the “so what” aspect 
of this research for management scholars.  Second, it lends lucidity to the discussion of 
the emotions-coping part of my research model that will follow.  
With regard to behavioral outcomes, from Study 1, TFC and EFC related 
positively and negatively, respectively, with task performance.  TFC was also positively 
related to intended OCBI while EFC was positively related to intended WDB.  The 
positive relationship between EFC and intended WDB sheds light on these elusive 
intervening mechanisms.  EFC is a strategy that drives people to alleviate the felt 
emotion.  An individual who engages in EFC seeks to restore a sense of equity by 
retaliation, slighting coworkers, stealing office supplies and directing aggression against 
the wrongdoer.  EI was negatively related to intended WDB.  Given the current interest in 
organizational literature on research focused to help curtail or manage WDB (e.g., 
Barclay et al., 2005), this is an important finding.   
From Study 2, EFC was positively related to task performance.  This relationship 
suggests that when the emotional event is beyond the control of the individual, EFC 
might be the most adaptive coping strategy1. The goodness of fit point of view suggests 
that while experiencing emotions, the most self beneficial strategy for an individual is 
 
1 Assuming adaptive coping facilitates task performance 
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contingent on the perceived control one has over the emotion eliciting event.  In this 
sample, emotions are elicited under extreme conditions and some components of EFC 
(e.g., behavioral and mental disengagement) might be the most self beneficial strategy, at 
least temporarily.  This explains the positive association between EFC and task 
performance.  Similarly, EFC was positively related to OCBO.   I suspect that in this 
particular organization, OCBO is almost seen as a component of task performance as it 
includes items such as “show pride when representing the organization in public”, 
“express loyalty toward the organization” and “demonstrate concern about the image of 
the organization”.  One of the stated missions of police officers is courtesy towards the 
general public (also courtesy from dispatch and communications employees) and law 
enforcement employees are, inherently, proud of their organizational affiliation.    
However, EFC was negatively related to both OCBI and WDB, indicating that 
individuals who engaged in EFC might outperform those who engaged in lesser EFC 
with respect to the task at hand.  However, they do not engage in positive or negative 
extra role behaviors (i.e., OCBI and WDB).  Those engaged in TFC do not accrue task 
performance related benefits, yet they engage in more OCBIs and less WDB.   
Summary: When the emotion event is perceived as controllable, TFC led to better 
task performance and intended OCBI.  EFC led to lowered task performance and greater 
intended WDB.  EI was negatively related to intended WDB.  When the emotion event is 
perceived as less controllable, EFC led to better task performance, more OCBOs and less 
OCBIs and WDB.  TFC on the other hand, led to more OCBIs only and less WDB.  EI 
was negatively related to WDB.  
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Now, I turn to an integration of findings from both studies for the emotion to 
coping part of my model.  In the interest of conciseness and coherence, I address overall 
EI findings where such effects were found first for TFC and then for EFC.  Wherever 
such overall EI effects were not found, I discuss dimension level EI findings.  First, I 
address the findings with regard to anger.  From the lab study, it was found that the 
individual that perceives anger thinks through it and manages it effectively, engages in 
lowered EFC, offering a complete interplay between cognition and emotion.  This finding 
is consistent with my theorizing in that individuals with higher scores on these 
dimensions of EI actually engaged in lesser EFC, even in the face of an intense negative 
emotion such as anger.  This relationship is particularly appealing as EFC was negatively 
related to task performance, and positively related to intended WDB in this study.   
From Study 2, it was found that both high and low EI individuals engaged in 
increased EFC as anger increased.  However, this effect was more pronounced for higher 
EI individuals.  This result might seem contradictory to that of Study 1.  However, upon 
on closer examination the following pattern emerges.  Study 2 differed from Study 1 in 
the control that the target individual might have perceived over the emotion eliciting 
event.  This point of view suggests that while experiencing emotions in real settings (not 
a simulated setting), the most self beneficial strategy for an individual is contingent on 
the perceived control one has over the emotion eliciting event.  In this sample, anger is 
elicited under extreme conditions.  The higher EI individual engaged in increased EFC as 
ultimately EFC is positively related to task performance and OCBOs, and negatively 
related to WDB.  However, EFC was also negatively related to OCBI in this study.   With 
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regard to dimensions of EI, the same general pattern emerged, i.e., higher scores on EI 
dimensions led to increased EFC.  
Summary: For anger, where one perceives that the emotion event is under one’s 
control, the individual with higher scores on EI (or its dimensions) engaged in lesser EFC 
than the individual with lower scores on EI ( or its dimensions).  Where one might not 
perceive as much control over the emotion eliciting event, the higher EI individual 
engaged in more EFC than the lower EI individual.  From both studies, one finding 
would seem apparent and consistent:  Higher EI individuals eventually pick the coping 
strategy that better facilitates task performance and reduces WDB.  Where events are not 
under one’s control, the higher EI individual acts in an almost selfish fashion by focusing 
exclusively on increments in her/his task performance, without necessarily performing 
extra role behaviors (specifically OCBI).  
Guilt results from a perceived displeasure at a specific action, event or 
interpersonal interaction (Lazarus, 1999).  Guilt is distinct from anger because the blame 
for such displeasure rests with oneself rather than another (Lazarus, 1999).  From Study 
1, the individual who more accurately perceives guilt and thinks through what they are 
feeling (perception and using dimensions of EI) and how that guilt came about engages in 
higher EFC as a result of a partial (and incomplete) interplay between emotion and 
cognition.  From Study 1, it can be gleaned that the ability to accurately perceive and 
reason through emotional information is actually detrimental to the individuals’ ultimate 
task performance (because of higher EFC) in the absence of the managing emotions 
ability.  
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From Study 2, the interaction of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.6) revealed that higher 
EI individuals showed a stable level of TFC, while low EI individuals engaged in higher 
TFC as guilt increased.  The interaction of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.8) indicated that 
higher EI individuals engaged in increased EFC and lower EI individuals engaged in 
decreased EFC as guilt increased.  The interesting aspect of this finding, especially when 
taken together with the finding with regard to TFC above, is that high EI individuals 
showed stability in TFC and engaged in more EFC as guilt increased.  This is a 
remarkable finding in that the ability to accurately perceive, reason through and manage 
emotions seems to have an effect beyond what I had originally conceptualized.   
Summary: When the emotion eliciting event is perceived as being under one’s 
control, the ability to perceive and reason through emotion information (EI dimensions) 
was detrimental to that individual’s task performance and led to greater intended WDB 
due to increments in EFC.  When guilt is experienced in a real setting and events might 
be beyond one’s control, the higher EI individual showed stability in TFC paired with 
higher EFC, which translates into better performance, more OCBIs and OCBOs and less 
WDB.  For the low EI individual in the real setting, the experience of guilt results in a 
marked increased in TFC, leading to more OCBIs, perhaps at the expense of task 
performance.  This finding seems to speak to the CRT of guilt, in that low EI individuals 
overcompensate at the cost of personal well being.  
From Study 1, joy had a positive relationship with TFC.  From Study 2, the 
interaction of joy and EI revealed that high EI individuals engaged in increased EFC and 
low EI individuals engaged in decreased EFC as joy increased.  This relationship along 
with the findings for anger seem to further support the goodness of fit hypothesis in that 
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the context of the emotion eliciting event and perceived control make a difference to 
which form of coping might be the most adaptive.  Thus, individuals with higher scores 
on EI and higher scores on two of its dimensions (understanding and managing) engaged 
in both TFC and EFC as joy increased.  Thus, with the experience of joy, the higher EI 
individual engaged in higher EFC, with associated increments in performance and 
OCBOs and lesser WDB.  Only individuals with higher scores on managing emotions 
could channel the motivational energy inherent in joy into better TFC, while the 
individual with lower scores on managing showed decrements in TFC.  This last result 
places bounds on the benefits of positive emotions such as joy for the individual with the 
lower ability to manage emotions.  This has been my argument all along in that it 
challenges Broaden and Build theory’s proposition of boundless benefits of positive 
emotions.  
Summary: Note the change in patterns for TFC and EFC as we progress from an 
examination of the negative emotions (anger and guilt) to a more positive emotion, joy.  
The individual with higher scores on managing emotions and overall EI engaged in 
higher TFC and EFC, respectively, with associated improvements in task performance, 
OCBOs, OCBIs and decrements in WDB, as joy increased.  
From Study 1, pride has a positive effect on TFC.  Since there were no interaction 
findings from Study 1, the discussion offered for Study 2 is relevant with regard to the 
interaction of pride and EI dimensions.  From study 2, I found that while experiencing 
pride, higher scores on managing led to increased TFC.    However, higher scores on 
using emotions to facilitate thought led to decreased TFC, while experiencing pride.  If 
one were to think through the experience of pride and its implications for coping, then the 
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individual with a higher ability to reason through pride related information (self 
satisfaction with no imperative for increased task focus) engaged in decreased TFC.  
However, if one were to be focused on managing the emotion, the individual with higher 
scores on managing emotions engaged in increased TFC.  The interactions of pride with 
perception and using revealed that individuals with higher scores on these dimensions 
engaged in increased EFC as pride increased.  Furthermore, the interaction of pride and 
managing revealed that higher scores on managing led to decreased EFC.  Taken together 
with the findings for pride and TFC, higher scores on perception and using led to 
increased EFC and decreased TFC.   However, managing emotions offers an interface of 
the intelligence component of EI with one’s personality.  Thus, the individual with higher 
scores on managing curbs the narcissistic side of pride by engaging in less EFC.  For 
example, s/he might not talk so much about how proud they are ( focus on venting 
emotions component of EFC) and not isolate themselves from coworkers or tasks( 
behavioral and mental disengagement).  The reverse is true for the individual with lower 
scores on managing, with decrements in task focus and increments in emotion focus.  
Following Ortony and colleagues (1988), in Chapter 2, I had labeled such an effect the 
swollen head syndrome and the individual with lower scores on managing seems unable 
to curtail it.  These findings suggest that while, experiencing pride, individuals with 
higher scores on managing engaged in greater TFC and lesser EFC, thus engaging in 
more OCBIs (perhaps at the cost of task performance) and less WDB.  Individuals with 
lower scores on managing engaged in less TFC and increased EFC, thus performing 
better with respect to the task at hand and engaging in more OCBOs (but not OCBIs).  
This effect of lower managing is consistent with narcissistic pride wherein these 
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individuals might be really good with respect to task performance but not pleasant to 
work with and/or not inclined to help out coworkers.  
Summary: Pride differs from joy in that the motivational base of pride includes a 
substantial component of self satisfaction.  The findings from pride indicated that 
individuals with a higher ability to manage emotions engaged in a lowered task focus, 
thus being more open to requests for help from coworkers and such other behaviors 
constituting OCBI.  I see this effect as their (individuals with a higher ability to manage 
emotions) effort at managing the narcissistic side of pride.  For the individuals, with a 
lower ability to manage emotions, pride brought about increments in EFC with associated 
increments in task performance and OCBIs, but at the expense of OCBIs.  
Contributions to Theory and Practice 
This research incorporates current theory from the academic psychology and 
emotion literatures to present a more holistic approach to examining the meaning of and 
consequences of emotions.  This research contributes to the existing literature on several 
counts, as noted below.  
From a theoretical standpoint, this study contributes to existing emotion literature 
by articulating the chain of events that unfold after the elicitation of four intense discrete 
emotions:  anger, guilt, joy and pride.  Sutton and Staw (1995) called for sound theories 
that tell a good story and have explanatory power.  The role of coping answers this call 
by offering explanatory cognitive mechanisms between felt emotion and behaviors.  The 
differing effects of anger, guilt, joy and pride in their implications for coping point at the 
value of examining discrete emotions.     
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Furthermore, from a theoretical standpoint, note that anger and guilt eventually 
result in different effects on behavioral outcomes via their effects on coping.  More 
specifically, guilt and anger both seem to drive the high EI individual towards EFC, 
which in turn results in higher performance, OCBOs and less WDB.  However, guilt 
differed from anger in that it was also associated with stability in TFC, thus implying that 
while experiencing guilt, high EI individuals were more likely to engage in OCBIs than 
when they experienced anger.  For the low EI individual though, there are no 
performance related benefits while experiencing anger and guilt.  However, while 
experiencing guilt, low EI individuals show a marked increase in TFC, thus engaging in 
more OCBIs, perhaps at the expense of performance.  The reason I highlight the 
differences between the anger and guilt is that these differences point at the value of 
examining discrete emotions rather than overarching dimensions.  For example, Lee and 
Allen (2002) found that the negative discrete emotion of fear was positively related to 
OCBI.  This finding, along with the one for guilt in this research, suggests that certain 
negative discrete emotions might be drivers of extra role behaviors directed towards other 
individuals.  These findings might have gone undetected by examining overall positive 
and negative emotion dimensions.  
House, Shane and Harold (1996) have called for the examination of stable 
dispositional influences on work-related variables.  This research answers that call 
through the investigation of the role of EI and its dimensions.  Furthermore, this type of 
theorizing unraveled some implications of emotions and EI that have largely been 
unexplored in management literature.  From both studies, the novel contribution of this 
research lies in the role played by EI (and wherever applicable, its dimensions) in 
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affecting the emotion to coping relationship.  The overarching theme from both studies is 
that higher EI individuals manage emotions in ways that better facilitate task performance 
and lead to lowered WDB.  This finding is a particularly important on several counts.  
First, this is the first research of its kind to unravel these relationships between EI and 
behaviors in a field setting.  Second, these relationships emerged in Study 1 even after 
controlling for GMA, thus pointing at the unique contribution of EI over GMA in helping 
explain variability in these outcomes.   
Furthermore, even research examining discrete emotions previously found that 
negative discrete emotions such as hostility lead to greater incidence of WDB (e.g., Lee 
& Allen, 2002).  However, as Lee and Allen noted, this effect ignored the influence of 
stable individual differences that might contribute to decrements in WDB, even with the 
experience of negative emotions.  In this research, findings suggest that EI is one such 
individual difference, and that should, at the very least, cause us to re-examine prevalent 
theoretical propositions concerning the detrimental effect of negative emotions.    
Had I stopped at Study 1, the more intricate pattern of findings from Study 2 
would have gone undetected.  However, Study 2 opened up some very interesting 
possibilities.  For one, Study 2 revealed different patterns of relationships for emotions 
and coping.  Study 2 highlights the significance of examining these relationships in real 
time settings.  Much prior research in coping has been conducted in laboratory settings 
only (e.g., Herald & Tomaka, 2002), due to the inherent difficulty in capturing intense 
emotions very close to their actual occurrence in natural settings.  This study achieved 
that goal, at least to some degree, and our knowledge of how natural settings can 
drastically affect the relationship between emotions and coping is advanced.  
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Alternatively, Study 2 could also reflect sample specific findings in that the emotion 
eliciting events in this sample are extreme, and law enforcement might subtly allow for a 
culture of denial, disengagement and alcohol disengagement (all components of EFC) to 
help people deal with such events.  Even if it were the case that Study 2 findings are 
sample specific, these results might generalize to similar settings with intense emotion 
demands such as the healthcare, military and the travel industries.  Consider a medical 
doctor who has to treat a patient with a terminal disease.  This could cause the doctor 
some amount of frustration and grief, as ultimately, s/he might not be able to save that 
patient’s life.  Yet, from the perspective of performing better at the task at hand, the best 
possible coping strategy for that doctor might be to mentally and behaviorally disengage 
from the goal of ultimate survival towards offering the best patient care.  
With that caveat in mind, I now forward arguments that dig a little deeper into 
coping responses, making the case for why TFC is more adaptive in laboratory settings, 
while EFC might be more adaptive in field settings.  First, Carver et al., (1989) note this 
very same idea in their seminal work on the COPE inventory.  Second, consider an 
example of EFC – behavioral and mental disengagement.  Behavioral and mental 
disengagement is defined as follows:   
“Behavioral disengagement is reducing one's effort to deal with the stressor, even 
giving up the attempt to attain goals with which the stressor is interfering. 
Behavioral disengagement is reflected in phenomena that are also identified with 
terms such as helplessness.  In theory, behavioral disengagement is most likely to 
occur when people expect poor coping outcomes.  Mental disengagement is a 
variation on behavioral disengagement, postulated to occur when conditions 
prevent behavioral disengagement (cf. Carver, Peterson, Follansbee, & Scheier, 
1983).  Mental disengagement occurs via a wide variety of activities that serve to 
distract the person from thinking about the behavioral dimension or goal with 
which the stressor is interfering.  Tactics that reflect mental disengagement 
include using alternative activities to take one's mind off a problem (a tendency 
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opposite to the suppression of competing activities), daydreaming, escaping 
through sleep, or escape by immersion in TV.”  (Page 269, Carver et al, 1989).  
 
From a sociological perspective, such disengagement from goals, or helplessness, 
has long been viewed negatively in favor of actually dealing with a stressor (emotion 
eliciting event) directly.  However, intuitively, the above description of disengagement in 
its many forms is a coping strategy that most people who are very successful actually use 
precisely towards that end:  being more successful.  Moreover, recent evidence in 
psychology suggests that such disengagement is actually a more adaptive coping strategy 
than many forms of TFC (e.g., planning) in many real life situations (i.e., outside the 
laboratory) (cf. Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003; Sprangers & Schwartz, 
1999).  Wrosch et al., (2003) note that this is because such disengagement frees up the 
individual’s cognitive and psychological resources to more freely attend to tasks at hand 
and redefine the stressor, thus resolving the event.  I also note that the one thing that 
struck me about the field setting was the use of humor as a constant strategy to combat 
the events of the day.  Most times, this brand of humor bordered on denial and 
disengagement from the task at hand, but now, I can almost see that maybe such humor 
could possibly be the police officer’s adaptive coping strategy.  One could advance 
similar arguments for the adaptational significance of the other forms of EFC, but in the 
interest of conciseness, I will not lay out arguments for every dimension of EFC.   
The alignment of emotion definitions, measurement and analyses with the theory 
underlying it is another contribution of this research.  To facilitate this alignment, 
emotion was defined as per its knowledge base and theory was developed for each 
specific emotion.  I incorporated a research design aimed at minimizing retrospective bias 
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and one that was capable of capturing intraindividual variability in emotion.  Scholars 
have sounded calls for more within person research in affective based constructs (Beal et 
al., Briner & Kiefer, 2005; Miner et al., 2005).  This dissertation answers the call for such 
research.  Thus, from a research design and methodological perspective, this dissertation 
included a lab based study and a longitudinal field study.  The lab study allowed for 
emotion elicitation in response to specific events, thus aligning level of theory with level 
of measurement.  The field study allowed for examination of findings in a field sample 
and thus enhances the potential for generalizability of findings, while also aligning levels 
of theory and measurement.  Furthermore, I note that this is one of the very few research 
projects (if not the only one) that includes both a lab-based study and a repeated measures 
field study.  Typically, several researchers who have conducted lab-based studies have 
called for emotion research in the filed (Weiss et al., 1999; Herrald & Tomaka, 2002) and 
field based researchers ( e.g., Brown et al., 2005) have called for lab based studies.  This 
research answers both those calls and extends what has been done in emotion research in 
the past by incorporating both designs.  
As for practical contributions, with this research, our knowledge of the effects of 
discrete emotions at work and the implications of EI was advanced.  For example, 
affective events theory suggest that positive interactions could buffer the effects of 
negative workplace hassles, and this could be one strategy managers use in helping 
manage negative emotions.  My dissertation extends this perspective by suggesting that 
negative emotions (anger and guilt) might not always be detrimental.  Rather, managers 
could focus on helping individuals better reason through emotional information and 
manage it, thus leading to adaptive coping strategies.  For example, the officer who 
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reported guilt at a child sexual predator could have benefited from a discussion of what 
he was feeling and how that information (self reproach) could affect his coping strategies.  
Most pertinently, EI is an intelligence and cannot be developed, yet one could impart 
training related to the handling of emotional information.  This might be so much more 
critical in work arenas that create conditions for intense emotions to arise, such as law 
enforcement, the medical profession and airline travel.   
I cautiously advance some implications for the practical behavioral implications 
of this research.  This caution is primarily driven by my reluctance to advance practical 
implications from one research project.  While this project is comprehensive in many 
ways, it is but one piece of research, and practical implications should be advanced from 
accumulated research.  The most straightforward implication, as noted earlier, is that 
individuals with higher EI will choose the most self beneficial coping strategy, and 
managers can direct the attention of lower EI individuals in a similar direction.  
Specifically, lower EI individuals could be alerted to the information provided by 
emotions and how they could potentially affect coping.  The caveat in this regard is that 
the ability to accurately perceive and reason through emotions without the ability to 
manage emotions might actually be detrimental to some extent.   
Affective Events Theory posits that employees experience uplifts and hassles at 
work everyday, and an accumulation of these events predicts their attitudes and behaviors 
(Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).  Ashkanasy et al., (2002) contend that managing these 
events is the most pertinent challenge for managers today.  In response to such a 
challenge then, research results indicate that such management could occur through 
incorporating more uplifts (positive interactions) that buffer the effects of hassles 
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(negative interactions) (Grzywacz & Marks, 2000; Miner et al., 2005).  Taken together 
with this existing body of research, my dissertation offers one managerial implication that 
goes beyond the above reported research results.  The traditional viewpoint in 
management (following sociology and psychology) has been that EFC coping strategies 
such as venting emotions, behavioral and mental disengagement and alcohol 
disengagement are necessarily dysfunctional (Bennett et al., 1995).  However, that might 
not always be the case.  Maybe sometimes the most functional strategy in dealing with 
emotions is allowing employees to talk about how they feel in response to both positive 
and negative events at work.  In that same vein, managers who discipline employees for 
disengagement (such as daydreaming or fantasizing, and in the current business context, 
internet surfing) might do well to rethink that strategy.  I also note that Ashkanasy et al., 
(2004) posited this idea in that they suggested that EFC might sometimes be the more 
functional response.  First, this research offers the first empirical test of that idea.  
Second, this research extends Ashkanasy et al’s., ideas by also incorporating behavioral 
outcomes that go beyond performance only.  Specifically, I looked at a range of outcomes 
behaviors such as OCBI, OCBO and WDB.   
The negative effect of EI on WDB is the most pertinent practical implication as it 
held up consistently across both studies.  Organizations could benefit from screening 
individuals on EI where such WDB needs to be managed.  Alternatively, organizations 
could offer training programs that alert individuals to understanding and managing 
emotional information better such that it results in decrements in WDB. 
In summary, the first empirical work on EI to appear in a mainstream academic 
outlet (ASQ) recently found that ability based EI has a compensatory effect for 
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individuals with low cognitive intelligence (Côté & Miners, 2006) .  Specifically, they 
found that when individuals have lower cognitive intelligence, those with higher EI 
perform better than those with lower EI.  The current project falls within the same realm 
as the work of Côté and Miners (2006).  However, it is also different in that those 
scholars employed one field-based cross sectional study to test their ideas.  My work also 
examined a range of outcome behaviors.  The bottom-line message seems to be that 
under conditions of high emotional arousal, and both with low and high-perceived control 
over the situation, higher EI individuals inherently choose a coping strategy that 
facilitates task performance.  Furthermore, EI being negatively related to WDB is an 
important finding for managers who seek to minimize such behaviors in real settings.  I 
cautiously note that having emotionally intelligent employees might benefit organizations 
in several ways, both with respect to performance and with respect to extra role 
behaviors.  These findings, along with those of Côté and Miners (2006), start to offer 
some initial support for the predictive validity of ability based EI in organizational 
research.   
Recently, Barsade and Gibson (2007) lamented the paucity of organizational 
research on discrete emotions and the role of ability based EI in explaining effects of 
such discrete emotions.  This dissertation fills that important gap.  However, as one 
journal editor noted in a research talk (Tom Lee, former editor of AMJ), the most 
interesting kinds of research not only fill research gaps but, most importantly, ask 
questions that challenge conventional wisdom in a scientific domain.  With this 
dissertation, positing that EI would ultimately inform coping choices with the experience 
of positive and negative emotions falls under the purview of such a challenge.  At first 
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glance, it is a bit hard to digest the finding that lower EI individuals engaged in lower 
TFC (from Study 1) even after experiencing positive emotions.  Similarly, higher EI 
individuals engaged in higher EFC (from Study 2), thereby leading to better performance 
even after experiencing negative emotions.  These findings, I believe are at the core of 
this dissertation’s contribution to organizational research.  
Limitations  
The strength of this dissertation is that it included a laboratory-based study and a 
longitudinal field study.  However, the downside of such a massive research project is 
that it is fraught with challenges and limitations.  This research was replete with its share 
of both, though these do not necessarily affect our ability to draw valid inferences. 
For Study 1, the primary shortcoming is that emotion, coping and intended 
behavioral data all came from the same respondent.  This could imply common method 
bias for this portion of the research model.  However, these constructs (at least emotion 
and coping) are psychological in nature, and there is no other way to measure them.   In 
addition, the assessment of EI and GMA occurred using different techniques and at 
different points in time from the assessment of emotion, coping and intended behaviors.  
The significant interaction effects might thus be less prone to such common method bias 
as the method and time comprising the two terms that went into every interaction were 
different.  
I also note the lack of results with actual behaviors in Study 1 as a limitation.  
However, this result is probably at least partly due to the artificiality of the lab setting in 
which a relative stranger (the confederate) asks for help (proxy for OCBI) or suggests the 
stealing of cash (proxy for WDB) to an undergraduate student who was only there for 
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extra credit.  With that said, I was a bit surprised that almost 20 of the 90 respondents in 
the stealing condition were willing to do so.  However, this was not sufficient to induce 
statistically significant results.   
In Study 2, the main limitation was the sample size, with only 29 individuals 
returning all five days of emotion and coping surveys to match up with their EI scores. 
However, I note that the response rate is about 20-22%, and this is not entirely 
uncharacteristic of cross sectional field data collection.  With five days worth of surveys 
and an added 45-minute long MSCEIT, the 20% response rate is not entirely surprising, 
and maybe quite good given the demands placed on the subjects.  Furthermore, in my 
interactions with officers, several of them expressed interest in the project.  However, 
they also noted that the sheer magnitude of paperwork was a major obstacle to their 
participation in this study.  There was no way for me to get around that challenge in this 
study, given certain practical resource constraints.  However, I note that the use of 
handheld PDAs is very attractive for this purpose in that individuals filling out surveys 
can do so when they are reminded of it.  Nevertheless, given certain practical funding 
constraints, the use of PDAs was not feasible for this study.  The major concern with low 
response rates in organizational research is if the non-respondents differ in meaningful 
ways from respondents in a way that affects the phenomenon under investigation.  
However, in a recent meta analysis on response rates and effect sizes in organizational 
research, Schalm and Kelloway (2001) pointed out that response rates do not adversely 
affect the validity of findings.  As such, the general reader might have some degree of 
confidence in the inferences drawn from this study.  
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The peer ratings obtained in Study 2 (about 66% of all behavioral ratings were 
other rated) came from an officer or coworker who the target employee had worked with 
on a particular critical incident.  One could argue that such peers could have rated the 
target employee more favorably.  This is because they could be friends and/or due to the 
nature of this sample, which is very tightly knit.  Furthermore, following Côté and Miners 
(2006), one could suggest that those with higher EI manage their impressions with others 
well, resulting in higher behavioral ratings.  Future research could focus on an 
aggregation of peer ratings and/or supervisory ratings to get around these issues.   
The use of peer ratings for WDB in Study 2 is also a limitation to some extent.  
Bennett and Robinson (2000) note that for assessment of deviance, self-ratings might be 
as valid (if not more valid) than peer ratings.  This is because many deviant behaviors 
might go undetected by peers.  Typically, self-ratings that are entirely anonymous are 
considered valid, but in this study, anonymity could not be guaranteed, as I had to 
identify respondents for purposes of matching up repeated measures of emotion, coping 
and behavioral ratings, their MSCIET scores and handing out cash prizes.  In that vein, I 
also note that the use of a psychometrically sound WDB measure, which is well accepted 
in the literature on deviance, might in reality serve as a limitation in this study.  Bennet 
and Robinson (2000) point out that some forms of deviance might be organization 
specific and might go undetected using a broad measure such as theirs.  
In addition, I note that study 2 was based on a convenience sample.  This violates 
the assumptions of random sampling germane to most multivariate statistics.  One way 
around the limitations of a convenience sample is to mail surveys to randomly selected 
participants.  However, given the nature of the phenomenon in question, i.e., measuring 
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emotions for five days along with coping and behavioral ratings, that type of mail survey 
design would have been next to impossible to conduct.  Ultimately, I note that the use of 
convenience samples is widely prevalent in organizational research.  For example, a 
recent paper studying the effects of EI on performance published in the Administrative 
Science Quarterly used a convenience sample of 175 full time university employees 
(Côté & Miners, 2006).  While the prevalence of a particular technique does not yet 
address the issue above, I claim refuge in precedent (see Lee & Allen, 2005; Park et al, 
2004).   
From a theoretical standpoint, the major limitation of this study was not taking 
into account the goodness of fit hypothesis, as that could have better explained many 
findings from Study 1 and Study 2.  I alluded to the idea of EFC being better suited under 
low control situations in my theorizing but had to hold that perspective constant in order 
to keep this project manageable.  From a measurement perspective, I did not assess 
perceived control over the emotion event.  That would have complicated an already 
complex study.  However, thankfully, Study 2 included detailed event descriptions and 
intuitively (and qualitatively), I can make the inference that these events did not involve 
much perceived control2. In retrospect though, that one assessment might have bolstered 
confidence in my inferences.  
Another issue that deserves mention is the difficulty in pinpointing (and 
measuring) low versus high control situations in a setting such as this.  For example, 
study 2 included a sample that by nature is trained to perceive control over their events.  
 
2I have documented these event descriptions and can share that information with the 
interested reader.  
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Intuitively, I am suggesting that law enforcement employees are not inclined to report 
that they do not have control over a situation if that question were to be posed directly.  
This is a kind of egotistical representation of the self they carry and this issue might be 
relevant to some other professions as well (e.g., surgeons).  In such conditions, the use of 
qualitative descriptions of the event might be the best clue regarding perceived control.  
Thus, it might have been useless to ask them that question directly.   
Finally, across both Study 1 and Study 2, I note one theoretical limitation that 
deserves attention in future research.  The study of discrete emotions is complex and 
multilayered as I noted elsewhere in this manuscript.  In real settings, people experience 
several emotions at the same time and this is similar to the idea of emotion ambivalence 
if one were to be experiencing both positive emotions and negative emotions 
simultaneously.  However, there is no guidance in the literature on how one could treat 
such emotion ambivalence conceptually.   
Future research directions 
 This dissertation opens up a host of future research directions.  I only discuss the 
immediate ones in the interest of succinctness.  First, all theory and analyses in this 
project were at the level of overarching TFC and EFC dimensions.  However, given the 
seeming support for the goodness of fit hypothesis, the next logical step would be to 
examine the effects of discrete emotions and EI and its dimensions on specific 
dimensions of TFC and EFC3. This is because certain dimensions of TFC and EFC might 
emerge as more adaptive than others.  For example, active coping (a component of TFC) 
 
3 I conducted such an analyses as well, and the results are even more promising. 
However, I ended up with a 200 + page results chapter and had to abandon that direction 
to keep this dissertation manageable and coherent. 
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might be more adaptive than planning or suppression of competing activities (also 
components of TFC).  Next, this research only focused on four discrete emotions for the 
sake of conciseness and parsimony.   However, several other emotions occur in 
organizational settings routinely.  For example, it might be fruitful for future research to 
focus on the effects of basic emotions (e.g., fear), and more complex emotion blends 
(e.g., compassion).  As noted earlier, the integration of the goodness of fit hypothesis 
seems crucial for future research.  
 Another area that is exciting is the role of emotion contagion.  Since higher EI 
individuals are better able to perceive and reason through their own emotions and those 
of others, one could ask if these individuals are more likely to “catch” another’s emotion 
at work.  Furthermore, is there such a thing as too much of a good thing effect with EI?  
For example, Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) found that the ability to accurately perceive 
positive emotions led to higher supervisory and peer ratings while the ability to 
accurately perceive negative emotions resulted in lower behavioral ratings.  Can a similar 
mechanism be in effect for the higher EI individuals?  Intuitively, it seems like the ability 
to constantly perceive emotions and disentangle emotion information might get mentally 
exhausting, at least at some point, and this could be an issue that deserves future research 
attention. 
 One idea that struck me in conducting these two studies is that people vary in 
their ability to “feel”.  For example, some people are emotionally flat and they have a 
tendency to disconnect from the emotion event.  Future research is required to assess 
individual differences in the ability to emotionally engage in work situations.  
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One also needs consider the generalizability of the theory and results from this 
research to field settings with low emotional arousal.  Following Weiss and Cropanzano 
(1996), one could speculate that all workplaces might be emotionally charged, at least to 
an extent.  However, the intensity of emotion experiences might differ from one setting to 
the next.  For example, what about the constant experience of grief for caregivers in a 
medical setting?  Are there certain coping strategies that are especially suited to the 
management of grief?  This area deserves future research attention as well. 
 .The role of other individual difference variables such as gender might also be a 
fruitful future research avenue.  For example, prior research has indicated that females 
consistently score higher than males on EI (Mayer et al., 2003).  Introducing gender as a 
moderator of the moderated relationship between emotion and EI on coping might reveal 
three way interactions.  One cannot ignore the influence of cultural differences either in 
examining emotions as they are largely driven by socially acceptable rules of experience 
and display (Yuki, Maddux, & Masuda, 2007).   
Recently, Amabile and colleagues (2005) found that affect and creativity might be 
related in a non-linear fashion.  My dissertation presumed and examined all relationships 
in a linear fashion only.  However, future research might benefit from examining 
nonlinear trends in the emotion- coping relationship.  In addition, one might also examine 
the unfolding of these relationships when creativity is the outcome.  Similarly, Barsade 
and Gibson (2007) noted the dearth of research examining the effects of discrete 
emotions on decision-making outcomes.  This could be a potential future research avenue 
as well.  
I also note that this dissertation was focused only on work related behavioral 
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outcomes. However, psychology has a long standing history of examining the effects of 
emotion on health and psychological outcomes (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; 
Ong, Bergeman, Bisconti, & Wallace, 2006).  It might be interesting to investigate the 
effects of EI with regard to such health and psychological outcomes.  The use of 
alternative measurement techniques such as ESM and work episodes might help either 
parallel the findings from this research or reveal interesting differences.  The role of 
qualitative research designs in helping inform questions about emotion effects cannot be 
ignored either.  Emotions are extremely hard to pinpoint and measure in natural settings 
and the use of techniques such as ethnographic study or structured interviews might 
reveal more interesting findings (see for example, Norgaard, 2006). 
The discussion of emotions in work life is incomplete without considering the 
implications for and from leadership theories.  Conceptual ideas regarding the positive 
association amongst EI and transformational leadership behaviors abound (e.g., George, 
2000).   However, this research sets the stage for examination of such leader EI on 
follower emotion experiences, displays and their consequent effects on behaviors.  
Furthermore, how might a transformational leader respond to EFC (such as venting and 
disengagement) as a coping strategy both within the self and followers?  For example, a 
leader who is disengaged and/or is focused on venting negative emotions might not be 
seen as very inspirational, thus placing bounds on the generalizability of this study’s 
findings to higher levels in the organization.  Future research needs to address if the 
conceptual domain of transformational leadership and/or behavioral indicators of the 
same need be revisited in the light of positive effects of EFC on performance.  
In that same vein then, this research leads us to the question of the effects of 
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discrete emotions, coping and the role of EI at multiple levels within the organization.  
Practically, one cannot help but wonder how EFC strategies such as disengagement, 
denial and focus on venting emotions could affect long-term organizational performance.  
For example, in customer service interactions, components of EFC, while beneficial for 
individual performance, might have other possible detrimental effects on organizational 
performance.  
 At this stage, the most pertinent future research implication stemming out this 
research is the examination of changes in EI.  More specifically, we now know that EI 
affects coping, yet the research on exactly how training and development interventions 
might be designed to compensate for lower EI in real settings is almost non existent.  I 
make this observation with regard to the ability based EI model.  Such training related 
programs abound in the popular press on the mixed model conceptualizations, and that 
information is not relevant to the current ability based conceptualization of EI.   
Conclusion 
 This research introduced novel and comprehensive theory regarding the interplay 
of four discrete emotions, EI and their implications for coping and behavioral outcomes.  
The results indicate that EI does affect coping strategies such that higher EI individuals 
engage in more self-beneficial forms of coping.  Such adaptive coping strategies, in turn, 
translated into better task performance, OCBOs and negative effects on WDB.  The 
results for OCBI are mixed.  The strength of this research (and its unique contribution) is 
in developing theory at the level of discrete emotions.  Furthermore, I aligned levels of 
theory, measurement and analyses in this research through the use of a laboratory study, a 
longitudinal event based field study, and the use of random coefficient modeling.  
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Ultimately, the main contribution of this research lies in the findings that higher EI leads 
people to choose coping strategies (TFC or EFC) that eventually benefit their task 
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Appendix 1: Laboratory Task.
Imagine you and your partner were on a spaceship that landed on the moon and your 
spaceship ran out of fuel.  You both have to survive for three days after which some 
rescue teams might reach the moon to help you.  As a team, please rank order the items 
below in order of importance for survival in this scenario.  Your answers will be scored 
against the ratings of NASA’s experts. The winning team gets a $20 cash prize! 
 
ITEM RANK 
Box of matches  
Food concentrate  
50 meters of nylon rope  
Parachute silk  
Solar-powered portable heating 
unit 
 
Two .45-caliber pistols  
One case of dehydrated milk  
Two 50 kg-tanks of oxygen  
Stellar map of Moon’s 
constellations 
 
Self-inflating life raft  
Magnetic compass  
Fifty liters of water  
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Signal flares  
First-aid kit including injection 
needles 
 




Appendix 2: Measures 
 
State Positive and Negative Affect will be measured via the profile of Positive and 
Negative affective schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). 
 
Instructions to respondents: This scale consists of a number of words that describe how 
people feel. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to 
that word. Indicate to what extent you have felt that way today. Use the following scale to 
record your answers. 
 
1
Very slightly or 




















Emotions will be measured using a shorter version of a questionnaire developed by 
Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O’ Connor (1987).  
 
Instructions to respondents: This scale consists of a number of words that describe how 
people feel. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to 
that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now. Use the following scale to 




Very slightly or 






Quite a bit 
5
Very much 
Amused Anger Aggravated 
Blissful Rage Irritated 
Cheerful Outrage Agitated 
Gaiety Fury Annoyed 
Gleeful Wrath Embarrassment 
Jolly Hostility Humiliation 
Jovial Ferocity Pity 
Joyful Bitterness sympathy 
Delighted Hate Exasperation 
Enjoyment Loathing Frustration 
Glad Scorn Grouchiness 
Happy Spite Grumpiness 
Jubilant Vengefulness Rapture 
Elation Dislike Relief 
Ecstasy Resentment Amazement 
Euphoric Disgust Surprise 
Enthusiasm Revulsion Astonishment 
Zealous Contempt Despair 
Zestful Envy Gloom 
Excited Jealousy Grief 
Thrill Torment Sorrow 
Exhilaration Guilt Anxiety 
Content Shame Panic 
Pleasure Regret Nervous 
Pride Remorse Tense 
Triumph Alienation Uneasy 
Eager Isolation Apprehension 
Hope Defeat Dread 
Self satisfied Insecurity  
Coping will be measured using the COPE Inventory developed by Carver, Scheier and 
Weintraub (1989). † indicates items left out of Study 1 surveys which are presented in 
Appendix 1. * indicates items left out of Study 2 surveys which are presented in 
Appendix 4. 
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Instructions to respondents: Please think about any stressful event or incident you have 
experienced recently (within the last two months). Indicate the extent to which you did 
each of the following in dealing with that stressful event. Use the following scale. 
 
1
I didn't do this 
at all 
2
I did this a little 
bit 
3




I did this a lot 
Active coping 
I take additional action to try to get rid of the problem. 
I concentrate my efforts on doing something about it. 
I do what has to be done, one step at a time. 
I take direct action to get around the problem. 
 
Planning  
I try to come up with a strategy about what to do. 
I make a plan of action.  
I think hard about what steps to take. 
I think about how I might best handle the problem. 
 
Suppression of competing activities 
I put aside other activities in order to concentrate on this. 
I focus on dealing with this problem, and if necessary let other things slide a little. 
I keep myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities. 
I try hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts at dealing with this. 
 
Restraint coping 
I force myself to wait for the right time to do something. 
I hold off doing anything about it until the situation permits. 
I make sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon. 
I restrain myself from doing anything too quickly. 
 
Seeking social support for instrumental reasons 
I ask people who have had similar experiences what they did†.
I try to get advice from someone about what to do.* † 
I talk to someone to find out more about the situation. 
I talk to someone who could do something concrete about the problem. † 
Seeking social support for emotional reasons 
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I talk to someone about how I feel. 
I try to get emotional support from friends or relatives. 
I discuss my feelings with someone. † 
I get sympathy and understanding from someone. 
 
Positive reinterpretation & growth 
I look for something good in what is happening.  
I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive. 
I learn something from the experience. † 
I try to grow as a person as a result of the experience. † 
Acceptance 
I learn to live with it. † 
I accept that this has happened and that it can't be changed. 
I get used to the idea that it happened. 
I accept the reality of the fact that it happened.* 
 
Turning to religion 
I seek God's help. 
I put my trust in God. 
I try to find comfort in my religion. 
I pray more than usual. 
 
Focus on & venting of emotions 
I get upset and let my emotions out. 
I let my feelings out.* 
I feel a lot of emotional distress and I find myself expressing those feelings a lot. 
I get upset, and am really aware of it. 
 
Denial 
I refuse to believe that it has happened. † 
I pretend that it hasn't really happened. 
I act as though it hasn't even happened. 
I say to myself "this isn't real." 
 
Behavioral disengagement 
I give up the attempt to get what I want. 
I just give up trying to reach my goal. † 
I admit to myself that I can't deal with it, and quit trying. 




I turn to work or other substitute activities to take my mind off things. 
I go to movies or watch TV, to think about it less.* † 
I daydream about things other than this. 
I sleep more than usual.* † 
Alcohol-drug disengagement 
I drink alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about it less. 
Anagram Task 
Below are a series of anagrams.  You have 10 minutes to solve all the anagrams.  No 
foreign words, plurals or proper nouns can serve as solutions.  Please start solving the 
anagrams. 
 
kalfe     ____________    blentao   ____________ 
 
snilaoi  ____________    remude   ____________ 
 
ciimtv   ____________    loroc      ____________ 
 
sodpiee ____________    ecepsa    ____________ 
 
elbmut  ____________    gegirrt    ____________ 
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Organizational Citizenships Behaviors will be measured using a scale developed by 
Lee & Allen (2002), from previous OCB scales. † indicates items left out of Study 1 
surveys which are presented in Appendix 1. * indicates items left out of Study 2 surveys 
which are presented in Appendix 4. 
 
Instructions to respondents: Please indicate to what extent the target person engages in 
the following behaviors. Use the following scale. 
 
1
Very slightly or 










1. Help others who have been absent. 
2. Willingly give her/his time to help others who have work-related problems. 
3. Adjust her/his work schedule to accommodate other employees’ requests for time off. 
4. Go out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in the work group. 
5. Show genuine concern and courtesy toward coworkers, even under the most trying 
business or personal situations. 
6. Give up time to help others who have work or nonwork problems. 
7. Assist others with their duties. 
8. Share personal property with others to help their work. 
 
OCBO Items†
1. Attend functions that are not required but that help the organizational image. 
2. Keep up with developments in the organization. 
3. Defend the organization when other employees criticize it. 
4. Show pride when representing the organization in public. 
5. Offer ideas to improve the functioning of the organization. 
6. Express loyalty toward the organization. 
7. Take action to protect the organization from potential problems. 
8. Demonstrate concern about the image of the organization. 
 
Workplace deviance behavior will be measured using a scale developed by Bennett & 
Robinson (2000). † indicates items left out of Study 1 surveys which are presented in 
Appendix 1. * indicates items left out of Study 2 surveys which are presented in 
Appendix 4. 
 
Instructions to respondents: Please indicate to what extent the target person engages in 
the following behaviors. Use the following scale. 
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1
Very slightly or 






Quite a bit 
5
definitely 
1. Worked on a personal matter instead of work for your employer†
2. Taken property from work without permission 
3. Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working 
4. Made fun of someone at work 
5. Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business 
expenses†
6. Said something hurtful to someone at work 
7. Taken an additional or a longer break than is acceptable at your workplace†
8. Repeated a rumor or gossip about your company†
9. Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark or joke at work 
10. Come in late to work without permission†
11. Littered your work environment 
12. Cursed at someone at work 
13. Called in sick when you were not 
14. Told someone about the lousy place where you work 
15. Lost your temper while at work 
16. Neglected to follow your boss's instructions 
17. Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked 
18. Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person 
19. Left work early without permission†
20. Played a mean prank on someone at work 
21. Left your work for someone else to finish†
22. Acted rudely toward someone at work 
23. Repeated a rumor or gossip about your boss or coworkers†
24. Made an obscene comment at work 
25. Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job 
26. Put little effort into your work 
27. Publicly embarrassed someone at work 
28. Dragged out work in order to get overtime 
 
Task Performance will be assessed using a measure currently in use at the organization 
and one that meets industry standards for officer performance.  
 
Instructions to respondents: Please rate the target officer on the following for the incident 
























1. Driving skill  
2. Orientation and response time to calls 
3. Field performance 
4. Investigative skills 
5. Interview/ interrogation skills 
6. Officer safety 
7. Control of conflict 
8. Problem solving 
9. Decision making 
10. Radio usage: listening and comprehension 
11. Radio usage: appropriate use of codes/procedures 
12. Radio usage: articulations of transmissions. 
13. Relationships with citizens in general 
14. Relationships with ethnic groups other than one’s own 
15. Relationships with other department members 
16. Knowledge of departmental policies/procedures 
17. Knowledge of criminal statues  
18. Knowledge of city ordinances 
19. Knowledge of traffic codes 
20. Knowledge of code of criminal procedure 
 
In addition, the MSCEIT (a measure of EI) and WPT (a measure of general mental 
ability) will be filled out by each respondent.   
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Appendix 3: Surveys for Study 1 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe how people feel. Read each item 
and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what 
extent you have felt that way today. Use the following scale to record your answers. 
 
1
Very slightly or 




















This scale consists of a number of words that describe how people feel. Read each item 
and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what 
extent you feel this way right now. Use the following scale to record your answers. 
 
1
Very slightly or 






Quite a bit 
5
Very much 
Amused Anger Aggravated 
Blissful Rage Irritated 
Cheerful Outrage Agitated 
Gaiety Fury Annoyed 
Gleeful Wrath Embarrassment 
Jolly Hostility Humiliation 
Jovial Ferocity Pity 
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Joyful Bitterness sympathy 
Delighted Hate Exasperation 
Enjoyment Loathing Frustration 
Glad Scorn Grouchiness 
Happy Spite Grumpiness 
Jubilant Vengefulness Rapture 
Elation Dislike Relief 
Ecstasy Resentment Amazement 
Euphoric Disgust Surprise 
Enthusiasm Revulsion Astonishment 
Zealous Contempt Despair 
Zestful Envy Gloom 
Excited Jealousy Grief 
Thrill Torment Sorrow 
Exhilaration Guilt Anxiety 
Content Shame Panic 
Pleasure Regret Nervous 
Pride Remorse Tense 
Triumph Alienation Uneasy 
Eager Isolation Apprehension 
Hope Defeat Dread 
Self satisfied Insecurity  
Think about how you feel right now. If you were presented with a stressful event right 
now, indicate the extent to which you might do whatever each following statement says. 
Use the following scale. 
 
1
I didn't do this 
at all 
2
I did this a little 
bit 
3




I did this a lot 
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I might take additional action to try to perform better. 
I might concentrate my efforts on doing something about anything bothering me. 
I might do what had to be done, one step at a time. 
I might take direct action to get around any problem. 
I might try to come up with a strategy about what to do. 
I might make a plan of action. 
I might think hard about what steps to take. 
I might think about how I might best handle the event. 
I might put aside other activities in order to concentrate on this. 
I might focus on dealing with this event, and if necessary let other things happening slide 
a little. 
I might keep myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities. 
I might try hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts at dealing with 
this event. 
I might force myself to wait for the right time to do something. 
I might hold off doing anything about the events in this experiment until the situation 
permits. 
I might make sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon. 
I might restrain myself from doing anything too quickly. 
I might talk to someone 
I might talk to someone about how I feel. 
I might try to get emotional support from friends or relatives. 
I get sympathy and understanding from someone 
I might look for something good in what is happening. 
I might try to see any problem in a different light, to make it seem more positive. 
I might accept that the event has happened and that it can't be changed. 
I might get used to the idea that it happened. 
I might accept the reality of the fact that it happened. 
I might seek God's help. 
I might put my trust in God. 
I might try to find comfort in my religion. 
I might pray more than usual. 
I might get upset and let my emotions out. 
I might feel a lot of emotional distress and find myself expressing those feelings a lot. 
I might get upset  
I might pretend that it hasn't really happened. 
I might act as though it hasn't even happened. 
I might say to myself "this isn't real." 
I might give up the attempt to win this task. 
I might admit to myself that I can't deal with it, and quit trying. 
I might reduce the amount of effort I'm putting into solving the problem. 
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I think of other things to take my mind off things happening. 
I might be daydreaming about things other than my tasks. 
I might be thinking about going to the bars in order to think about it less. 
 
Please indicate to what extent you might engage in the following behaviors right now. 
 
1
Very slightly or 






Quite a bit 
5
definitely 
Would willingly help others. 
Willingly give your time to help your partner fix the AV equipment. 
Adjust your work schedule to accommodate such helping 
Go out of the way to be friendly to your partner. 
Show genuine concern and courtesy toward your partner, even under the most trying 
situations. 
Give up time to help anyone in need. 
Assist others with their duties. 
Share personal property with others to help them. 
Take property from the lab without permission 
Spend too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working  
Make fun of someone in the lab 
Say something hurtful to someone  
Make an ethnic, religious, or racial remark or joke  
Littered your environs 
Curse at someone  
Tell someone how lousy this experiment is 
Lose your temper  
Neglect to follow instructions 
Intentionally work slower than you can work 
Discuss confidential information with friends 
Play a mean prank on someone  
Act rudely toward someone  
Make an obscene comment  
Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol  
Put little effort into your task 
Publicly embarrass someone  
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In addition, participants will be moved to a different room to take the MSCEIT, WPT 
and provide the following demographic information. 
 
Please circle one that applies: 
 
Gender Female Male 





High school College degree Masters degree 
How many years of work experience do you have? ---------------------- 
 
What is your age in years and months? ---------------------------- 
 
What year of college are you in? ------------------------------- 
 
Confederate survey: To be used on day one with OCB as an outcome. 
 
Did your partner help you fix the AV equipment? Please circle the one that applies.  
 
Please add anything else about this participant related to her/his behavior during the 
task 
 
Did help 1 
Did not help at all 0 
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Confederate survey: To be used on day two with WDB as an outcome. 
 
Did your partner help you tamper with the AV equipment? Please circle the one that 
applies.  
 
Was your partner willing to steal gift certificates? Please circle the one that applies.  
 
Was your partner willing to steal answer keys? Please circle the one that applies.  
 
Please add anything else about this participant related to her/his behavior during the 
task. 
 
Did help 1 






Appendix 4: Surveys for Study 2 
 
This survey is entirely confidential. Only the primary investigator will have access to this 
data. After all data is entered, all identifying information will be deleted. You can be 
assured of complete confidentiality. Anything you report here is only for academic 





Shift start time: 
Shift ending time: 
When did you actually get off your shift? 
 
Which department do you belong to? 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe how people generally feel. Read 
each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate 




Very slightly or 




















Please choose one event from today in which you worked with another officer and 
that stands out in your mind as particularly demanding or important. Think of this event 
as a continuous series of scenes like in a film. Give each scene a brief name to help you 
remember it (e.g., interrogated suspect, searched suspect, background check on suspect).  
 
Event name:  
 
Please write down the name and badge number of the officer who worked with you 
on this event:  
 
Try to remember as much detail as possible about each scene. Describe this event in 
detail, kind of like writing in your diary. 
 
Now, describe your feelings about the event, your work on the event and your fellow 
officer’s feelings about the event.  
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Add anything else you would like to report about this event. 
 
Please turn page only after you have completed this page.  
 
Now, please think about you felt right after the incident you just described. Indicate to 
what extent you felt in the way described by each of the words below. Use the following 















Blissful Rage Irritated 
Cheerful Outrage Agitated 
Gaiety Fury Annoyed 
Gleeful Wrath Embarrassment 
Jolly Hostility Humiliation 
Jovial Ferocity Pity 
Joyful Bitterness sympathy 
Delighted Hate Exasperation 
Enjoyment Loathing Frustration 
Glad Scorn Grouchiness 
Happy Spite Grumpiness 
Jubilant Vengefulness Rapture 
Elation Dislike Relief 
Ecstasy Resentment Amazement 
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Euphoric Disgust Surprise
Enthusiasm Revulsion Astonishment 
Zealous Contempt Despair 
Zestful Envy Gloom 
Excited Jealousy Grief 
Thrill Torment Sorrow 
Exhilaration Guilt Anxiety 
Content Shame Panic 
Pleasure Regret Nervous 
Pride Remorse Tense 
Triumph Alienation Uneasy 
Eager Isolation Apprehension 
Hope Defeat Dread 
Self satisfied Insecurity  
Think about the incident you just described. Think about how you reacted to the events in 




I didn't do this 
at all 
2
I did this a little 
bit 
3




I did this a lot 
I took additional action to try to resolve the incident. 
I concentrated my efforts on doing something about anything bothering me in this 
incident. 
I did what had to be done, one step at a time. 
I took direct action to get around any problem. 
I tried to come up with a strategy about what to do. 
I made a plan of action. 
I thought hard about what steps to take. 
I thought about how I might best handle the incident. 
I put aside other activities in order to concentrate on this. 
I focused on dealing with this incident, and if necessary let other things happening slide a 
little. 
I kept myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities. 
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I tried hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts at dealing with this 
incident. 
I forced myself to wait for the right time to do something. 
I held off doing anything about the events in this incident until the situation permits. 
I made sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon. 
I restrained myself from doing anything too quickly. 
I tried to get advice from someone who had similar experiences about what to do. 
I talked to someone to find out more about the situation. 
I talked to someone who could do something concrete about the problem. 
I talked to my partner or friends about how I feel. 
I tried to get emotional support from my friends and relatives 
I discuss my feelings with someone. 
I get sympathy and understanding from someone. 
I looked for something good in what is happening. 
I tried to see the problem in a different light, to make it seem more positive. 
I learnt something from the experiences in this incident. 
I try to grow as a person because of this experience. 
I accept that this has happened and that it can't be changed. 
I get used to the idea that it happened. 
I accept the reality of the fact that it happened. 
I seek God's help. 
I put my trust in God. 
I try to find comfort in my religion. 
I prayed more than usual. 
I got upset and let my emotions out. 
I felt a lot of emotional distress and I find myself expressing those feelings a lot. 
I got upset, and am really aware of it.  
I refuse to believe that it has happened. 
I pretend that it hasn't really happened. 
I act as though it hasn't even happened. 
I say to myself "this isn't real." 
I gave up the attempt to resolve the incident. 
I admitted to myself that I can't deal with it, and quit trying. 
I reduced the amount of effort I'm putting into solving the problem. 
I started to think of other things to take my mind off things happening on the job. 
I was daydreaming about things other than the incident 
I was thinking a cold alcoholic beverage might be welcome to help me better deal with 
the event. 
 
Thank you. Please make sure you write the name of this incident on the slip provided on 




Please recall the incident described by your fellow officer who handed you this package. 
Please indicate to what extent that officer engaged in the following behaviors during the 












did this a lot 
5
definitely 




Help others who have been absent 
Willingly gave his time to help others who have work-related problems. 
Adjust his work schedule to accommodate other employees’ requests for time off. 
Go out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in the work group. 
Show genuine concern and courtesy toward coworkers, even under the most trying 
business or personal situations. 
Give up time to help others who have work or nonwork problems. 
Assist others with their duties. 
Share personal property with others to help their work. 
Attend functions that are not required but that help the organizational image. 
Keep up with developments in the organization. 
Defend the organization when other employees criticize it.  
 Show pride when representing the organization in public.  
Offer ideas to improve the functioning of the organization. 
 Express loyalty toward the organization. 
Take action to protect the organization from potential problems. 
Demonstrate concern about the image of the organization. 
 
Please indicate to what extent that officer engaged in the following behaviors during the 




this and did 
it this time 
2








done this a 
bit 
5
did not do 




Worked on a personal matter instead of work for your employer 
Taken property from work without permission 
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Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working 
Made fun of someone at work 
Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than he spent on business 
expenses 
Said something hurtful to someone at work 
Taken an additional or a longer break than is acceptable at your workplace 
Repeated a rumor or gossip about your organization 
Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark or joke at work 
Come in late to work without permission 
Littered your work environment 
Cursed at someone at work 
Called in sick when he was not 
Told someone about the lousy place where he works 
Lost his temper while at work 
Neglected to follow your boss's instructions 
Intentionally worked slower than he could have worked 
Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person 
Left work early without permission 
Played a mean prank on someone at work 
Left his work for someone else to finish 
Acted rudely toward someone at work 
Repeated a rumor or gossip about your boss or coworkers 
Made an obscene comment at work 
Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job 
Put little effort into his work 
Publicly embarrassed someone at work 
Dragged out work in order to get overtime 
 























1. Driving skill  
2. Orientation and response time to calls 
3. Field performance 
4. Investigative skills 
5. Interview/ interrogation skills 
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6. Officer safety 
7. Control of conflict 
8. Problem solving 
9. Decision making 
10. Radio usage: listening and comprehension 
11. Radio usage: appropriate use of codes/procedures 
12. Radio usage: articulations of transmissions. 
13. Relationships with citizens in general 
14. Relationships with ethnic groups other than one’s own 
15. Relationships with other department members 
16. Knowledge of departmental policies/procedures 
17. Knowledge of criminal statues  
18. Knowledge of city ordinances 
19. Knowledge of traffic codes 
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